Posted by
Darko Trifunovic on Wednesday, July 30, 2008 5:14:13 AM
Safe Haven" for Al Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan
The strategic significance of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Pakistan stems from its perceived pivotal role in the
stabilization of security in neighboring Afghanistan and the war
against terrorism. The region is believed to be a “safe haven” used by
the al-Qaeda high command for planning future terrorist acts against
the US and the rest of the world. In addition, it has been the backyard
for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and a training ground for
terrorists, especially suicide bombers. Recently, Michael Chertoff, the
US Secretary for Homeland Security, is reported to have categorically
stated that “(al-Qaeda) are using their platform in the frontier areas
of Pakistan to train operatives.
1
In addition Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has stated that any future terror attack against US interests
would most likely be carried out by Islamic militants based in
Pakistan's restive tribal belt bordering Afghanistan.
Addressing a
press conference he said that tribal groups with ties to Al-Qaeda in
Pakistan's FATA area represent the worst security threat to the United
States. He said, "I believe fundamentally if the United States is going
to get hit, it is going to come out of the planning of the leadership
in the FATA” specifically that of al-Qaeda.2
Admiral Mullen’s statement underlined the concern about the FATA
region being used as the staging area for attacks against United States.
This paper aims to address the concerns about the FATA region, the
impact of the indigenous Pakistan Taliban, and their role in aiding the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. It also seeks to understand the
nature of the insurgency and the involvement of different actors in the
area. The purpose is not to dismiss security concerns as fabricated
and/or exaggerated, but to remember that the unrest in FATA is not only
due to the Taliban but also to various other factors. The principal
causes are the socio-economic deprivation of the people of the area and
the failure to reintegrate the mujahideen fighters from the Afghan
jihad back into mainstream society. Further, this piece draws attention
to the fact that the instability in Pakistan’s FATA region is the
result of conflict and insecurity emanating from neighboring
Afghanistan, and not vice versa. Lastly, this study will conclude with
recommendations regarding shortcomings in current strategies being
employed to deal with unrest in the region, as well as chalking out a
development plan that promises to mitigate regional insecurity by
seeking the involvement of the Islamic states.
FATA, comprising seven semi-autonomous agencies and six settled
frontier regions, has historically posed a governance nightmare for
successive regimes. Militant tribes inhabit the FATA, and the rugged
terrain of the region is ideal for guerrilla warfare. FATA’s 400 km
long border with Afghanistan is porous with multiple unchecked crossing
points. The close tribal links between the people on both sides of the
border have made it virtually impossible to monitor cross border
movement. Pakistan’s proposals to fence and mine the border have met
with strong resistance from the Afghan government which fears that any
such tacit agreement would be tantamount to accepting the contentious
Durand Line as an officially recognized border.3
The prospects of a change in the security situation in the FATA
region remain bleak, with overtures to engage the militant groups being
met with skepticism and drawing sharp criticism in Washington. In fact,
as a result of US pressure, efforts to initiate a dialogue have been
shelved at present. This, in particular, relates to the negotiations
with the Baitullah Mehsud led Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an
umbrella organization that includes different militant groups. The key
TTP objectives include: enforcing the sharia, uniting against NATO
forces in Afghanistan and carrying out “defensive jihad against the
Pakistan army.”4 Mehsud has been categorical in declaring
his intent to continue the jihad against the international forces in
Afghanistan. This prompted the United States to voice its concern to
Islamabad about the ongoing negotiations with the TTP. In an interview
given to journalists in May 2008, Mehsud expressed his doubts about the
future of any deal with the Pakistani government, stating that any such
peace agreement is doomed unless the government changes its policies,
stops being subservient to the US, and reasserts its sovereignty.
To make matters worse, in an incident on June 10, a US air attack on
a paramilitary check-post killed 11 Pakistani soldiers, including an
officer, in the Mohmand Agency. Pakistan reacted angrily even as the US
maintained that it had informed them of the air strike conducted to
counter an ambush attack on Afghan/coalition forces on the Afghan side
near the border. A strongly-worded reaction from the Pakistani army
described the attack as “completely unprovoked and cowardly” and
“blamed the coalition forces for the violent act and said that the
incident had hit at the very basis of cooperation and sacrifice with
which Pakistani soldiers are supporting the coalition in the war
against terror,” adding that “such acts of aggression do not serve the
common cause of fighting terrorism.” The army emphasized that, “A
strong protest has been launched by the Pakistan Army, and we reserve
the right to protect our citizens and soldiers against aggression.”5
This attack is expected to have a detrimental effect on the confidence
of the Pakistani Army as it relates to the need to cooperate with the
Americans in the ongoing war against terrorism.
Military Operations in FATA
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| Faryal Leghari: "It
is hoped that the international community, including the US, the EU,
and especially the GCC states, will reach out to extend cooperation" |
Pakistan
first deployed its military in the FATA region in 2002 in an effort to
expel foreign fighters, mostly those belonging to al-Qaeda and other
affiliated organizations, as well as to counter the growing threat
posed by local militants. The military operations in the region evolved
over three distinct phases. In the first phase, the operations were
focused on dismantling the al-Qaeda and Taliban networks. The second
phase focused on the selective scouting of the Taliban, and the third
stage dating from 2005 to the present (2008) has consisted of large
military operations.
At present the total strength of the Pakistani armed forces
deployed along the Afghan border is 100,000 soldiers, with two
division-sized forces in Waziristan, despite the lull in military
operations. The operations conducted by the armed forces in 2007-2008
included 38 surgical air strikes by the Pakistan Air Force/Army, and 25
ground operations that resulted in 930 militants being killed, of which
508 were foreigners.6 The withdrawal of the armed forces and
removal of all military checkpoints in FATA as demanded by the TTP is
highly unlikely. There were rumors of relocation and withdrawal in some
areas but the officials have refuted these. At present, Bajaur, North
and South Waziristan, and Mohmand – to some extent – continue to be the
most troubled of the seven agencies comprising FATA.
Nature of the Insurgency in FATA and the Key Players
In trying to comprehend the evolution of the current situation, it
is important to understand the imbalance in the power structures in the
FATA region. Prior to 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
power structure in the region had only two elements – the tribes and
the Pakistani government. These two powerful elements co-existed
peacefully and the governance of the region was designed around them.
It was only after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
subsequent hasty departure of the international community from the
scene that militant organizations, including jihadist militants of
different nationalities, emerged. The traditional power structure was
threatened by this violent third element, which led to a power struggle
that erupted after the US-led attacks on the Taliban in October 2001.
To date, this new element in the power structure has not adapted to nor
been accepted by the traditional power setup in the region. In fact,
the heavily financed and armed militants outmatched the tribal chiefs
who stood up to them. They have killed approximately 120 tribal elders
on charges of being spies of the Pakistani government and/or the
Americans. It was only when it became clear that these militants had
outmatched the Frontier Corps that the army was called in to control
the situation.
The main reasons that have led to the emergence of this region as a
flashpoint of extremism, terrorism and violent insurgency can be traced
to the days of the liberation of Afghanistan and includes several
failures on part of Islamabad and the international community. These
include:
1) The failure to reintegrate the mujahideen (after the Afghan Jihad and ouster of Soviets);
2) The failure to provide the people of the region with desperately
needed socio-economic resources, including basic facilities in health,
education and communications 7; and
3) The failure to initiate reforms both at the political and administrative level in the FATA region.
The cumulative effect of these factors provided a fertile ground for
the emergence of several players/groups that had clearly defined stakes
in exploiting the situation.
Any effort to tackle the insurgency requires an understanding of the
key local players, their strategic objectives and their linkages to
other organizations or groups with vested interests.
Currently we can discern four categories of militants in the tribal areas.
1) The jihadists, who are called “purists”, and whose chief purpose
is to fight jihad. For them, there is no difference between the Soviets
and the United States/NATO, as they are all perceived as occupiers of
an Islamic state. These people are believed to have no desire to
indulge in anti-state or criminal activity. It is understood that these
“purists” will cross over into Afghanistan to fight jihad. The
particular nature of the regional terrain is conducive to their
activities and their cross-border incursions are expected to continue.
2) The indigenous Pakistani Taliban, who have regrouped under
Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-i-Taliban, and like-minded smaller
organizations and groups. The TTP’s emergence as an independent entity
with a sophisticated organizational structure and operational
capability was formally announced in December 2007. The group had been
active in the FATA region, principally in the South Waziristan,
Mohmand, and Bajaur Agencies for some years. The TTP has successfully
engaged the Pakistan armed forces and currently supports Taliban
operations in Afghanistan against NATO forces. This has resulted in
other smaller militant groups, like Lashkar-i-Islam, joining them
either as associated partners or as followers. Mehsud’s organization,
which is reported to be 5,000 strong, has attracted many disbanded
terrorist groups that are not confined to the FATA region. In fact, the
TTP’s reach now extends to the settled areas of the NWFP, including the
districts of Swat, Malakand, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, D.I.Khan,
Kohistan and Buner.8
3) The criminal groups who have assumed the mantle jihad in order to
exploit the situation to the benefit of their criminal activities.
4) The “shadow” group whose identity is yet to be determined. This
group is believed to be involved in attempts to reignite conflict when
the situation calms down and some headway is being made in efforts to
bring peace.
The multi-layered nature of the insurgency demands a similar
approach in dealing with the actors involved. There is a need to
strengthen the regional security forces including the police, the
khassadars and the levies: 9 as an integrated force, they
could deal effectively with the criminal elements and the smaller
militant groups. In order to ensure the implementation of the strategy
to deal with the insurgency, it is crucial to harness the support of
the tribes. In fact, the government, by exploiting differences between
the Uzbek militants and the Waziri tribes, waged a successful operation
in March 2007 that resulted in the killing and expulsion of more than
300 Uzbeks from the area.
Failings of the US Strategy towards FATA
![]() |
| "The
strategic significance of FATA of Pakistan stems from its perceived
vital role in the stabilization of security in neighboring Afghanistan
and the war against terrorism." |
It
seems that the US has failed in its “winning the hearts and minds”
strategy; in fact, it has not even bothered to operate in this context
in the FATA region. Conducting air strikes, dismissing civilian (and
now military) casualties as “collateral damage”, and then expecting
local people to be grateful for development aid seems presumptuous.
While development funds are badly needed in the impoverished and
radicalized region, the truth is that the tribesmen view any
development aid from western quarters as blood money. There is evident
hostility towards western aid, a fact exploited by the militants who
have termed it
haram and have vowed to wage all efforts to
sabotage any such projects. As a result of the huge socio-economic
deficit – a problem that can be partly considered a failure of the
Pakistani government and partly of the international community that
abandoned the region after the ouster of the Soviets from Afghanistan –
the region has tilted towards extremism and terrorism. The conflict in
Afghanistan became the cause for the consequent radicalization,
terrorism, weapons proliferation and narcotics trafficking.
As if the missile attacks from an unmanned predator aircraft,
which caused civilian casualties were not enough – it is now rumored
that the Pentagon has planned ground operations in the tribal areas. It
is beyond comprehension that Washington seems to have entirely
disregarded realities on the ground. Instead, they reveal signs of
panic by erring in their policy-making. Their rhetoric about successes
in Iraq and control of the situation in Afghanistan is in contradiction
to reality, and it seems that the policy makers in Washington are
scrambling to take any measure that might indicate some semblance of
control over the situation in these two countries.
In order to deter cross-border incursions by al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, and to gain logistic support from Pakistan, the US should
focus on increasing troops on the Afghan border. The villages that have
sprung on the Afghan side of the border have been largely ignored by
the coalition and Afghan security forces and are believed to also
provide sanctuary and logistical support to the Taliban and others.
Besides, the refugee problem (Pakistan hosted about 4 million Afghan
refugees, of which about 2 million are still to be repatriated) needs
to be addressed on an immediate basis.
The US and its allies should also focus on strengthening the
institutional structures in Afghanistan and make concerted efforts to
root out criminal and corrupt elements within the establishment. The
Afghan Army and police trained by the international forces are expected
to share more of the burden of the ISAF at some point later in 2008.
However, this is not expected to have much of an impact on controlling
the Taliban insurgency, as this is in actuality a nationalist movement.
Rampant corruption at various levels within the system, ineffective
central governance, and the disillusionment of the Afghan people with
the establishment are also contributing factors.
The linkages between narcotics production and the insurgency are
often discussed but have yet to be fully addressed. There is strong
evidence that narcotics serve as the crucial financial supply-line for
the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A hard-hitting strategy for narcotics
eradication complemented by a viable alternative livelihood plan for
the opium farmers is the need of the hour. In addition, the vested
interests of international organized criminal groups, specifically the
narco-mafia, in an unstable Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be ignored.10
As for the Pakistani perception of the “War on Terror”, the truth of
the matter is that the Pakistani people, in general, do not consider it
their war; they feel they have been dragged into it. Despite being
subjected to a wave of suicide attacks and the spread of
Talibanization, they feel these are reactions to the government’s
support of US policies. Instead of aggravating an already volatile
situation by staging ground operations to hunt down al-Qaeda, the US
should place the onus on the Pakistani military and beef up the
regional security forces with technical training and intelligence
support. Any air strikes to hit “high value targets” must be conducted
only by the Pakistani armed forces, and these should be kinetic strikes
with minimal civilian casualties. Pakistani intelligence services are
already in close collaboration with the US and other allies, where
intelligence information is shared with about 50 countries on a daily
basis. This intelligence cooperation could be enhanced with added focus
on the development of human intelligence in the area (FATA and other
identified sensitive areas in Pakistan) aided by technical
surveillance.
In reaction to the constant haranguing from Western sources
regarding the role of the ISI and elements in the armed forces in
helping the Taliban, Pakistan has recently issued a strong denial of
such activities. It has taken particular exception to the report issued
by the RAND Corporation entitled “Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan”
which claims that there are Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan and
that elements within the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Frontier
Corps (FC) are providing arms and financial assistance to Taliban.
Pakistan has also categorically denied that any of its officials or
troops is helping insurgents and has rejected the report’s allegations.
A statement issued by the Pakistani military denounced the report,
stating that it, “is misleading, factually incorrect and based on
propaganda to create doubts and suspicion in the minds of (the) target
audience about Pakistan’s role in supporting the coalition forces in
Afghanistan.”11
As far as Pakistan is concerned, efforts to catch some of the key
al-Qaeda planners and operators have met with considerable success in
the past. However, the struggle promises to be a long one, for the
organization has now grown into a movement. The strategy in the War on
Terror should be to avoid the high-handed approach and the use of
language that has generated hatred and extremism against the West in
the past. It is naïve to expect that the unilateral use of force could
lead to the eradication of terrorism. Recommendations have been made at
the international level to address the root causes of grievances and
injustices (perceived or real) that lead to radicalization and
extremism. However, the growing spread of radicalization not only among
the so-called madrassah trained youth but also among the educated
classes portends that the problem will not be an easy one to resolve.
In fact, there is a clear lack of strategy as well as a lack of
commitment to implement and sustain plans geared towards resolving the
region’s problems; the lack of understanding of the people, their
culture and beliefs is another major problem.
On the other hand, as part of a comprehensive strategy, the US has
planned to contribute over $2 billion, with a special development
package worth $750 million including the establishment of
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in the FATA region. The US has
also drawn up a Security Development Plan estimated to cost $400
million for enhancing the capability of the Frontier Corps, thus
improving security in the region.12 These are commendable
initiatives and are expected to yield dividends for the local people.
However, as seen in the past, the implementation of such projects has
faced obstacles, with a major portion of the funds going towards
consultants’ fees in western capitals and very little trickling down to
benefit the locals. Afghanistan is facing the same problem where
reconstruction funds amount to a meager $7-8 billion compared to
military costs of $80 billion. Implementation of such projects can be
made acceptable to the people by involving Muslim countries that can
play instrumental roles; this will be discussed below in more detail.
Pakistan’s Strategy towards FATA: Suggested Amendments
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| "The agriculture sector has been neglected due to the lack of resources" |
The
effort to use military deployment as a means of political negotiation
and a facilitator of economic development has been absent from the
strategy to deal with the situation in the tribal areas. A political
strategy, drawn up in consultation with tribal elders, to spread
awareness among the local tribes could clear up any misconceptions and
mistrust created by the militants. At this point the
presence of military forces in the region as a means to apply sustained pressure to deter any sabotage attempts is important.
Historical facts show that the unilateral use of the force has never
been an answer to resolve the FATA’s problems. Though a military
presence in the FATA eventually became a necessity, this has had an
adverse effect on the administrative set-up as the authority of the
political agent has been eroded.13 Taking punitive action
against the tribes, including blockades and mass arrests, will not work
and will likely lead to a worsened situation. In fact, the militants
have welcomed blockades of the area as it deprives the locals of the
area of their basic economic needs.
In order to rectify the present situation, there should be a
graduated response. Political and administrative reforms need to be
introduced with the possible merger of the region into the NWFP. (The
government has proposed renaming the province, from NWFP, to
‘Pukhtookhwa’ as a first step in addressing the perceived neglect of
the region). Until such time, the authority of the political agent must
be restored.
As for negotiations with militants and peace agreements, the
government needs to show resolve in standing by its objectives of not
tolerating any type of activity against the state apparatus or violence
against its citizens. Pakistan has expressed its inability to control
incursions into Afghanistan on its own. It is only fair that Pakistan
and Afghanistan should share the responsibility to stop such
incursions. Further, NATO must act upon the government’s proposals to
the ISAF command to post extra troops and check movements on the Afghan
side of the border. While curtailment of the use of force against
groups like the TTP is not a likely option in the foreseeable future,
there should be a continuous effort to keep channels of communication
and dialogue open with such groups.
Socio-economic Development in the FATA Region
The provincial government in the NWFP plans to initiate a $4 billion
development fund for the Frontier province including the FATA region.
This is in addition to the $2 billion Sustainable Development Fund
(SDP) for the FATA region that could not be implemented due to a lack
of resources and funds.
A key factor in the implementation of any development work in the
region is consolidating and strengthening local support. It is
important to reach an effective agreement with the tribes in the FATA
region in order to implement development projects. This in turn will
have far reaching implications, as the tribes will realize the benefits
of these projects for their areas.
A comprehensive regional development plan encompassing training and
provision of jobs, infrastructure, education, health, agriculture and
trade development is urgently required. However, for immediate impact,
providing jobs to the people from the area either locally or
internationally is vital.
Any future development plans for the FATA should include the Islamic
states, principally the GCC states, as integral partners with a leading
role. This would be immensely beneficial in two ways. Firstly, it would
counter the widespread hostility in the area towards western aid and
the fears of a broader ‘design’ to subvert the people of the area from
their religion and beliefs. Secondly, the locals, who would perceive
these projects as an Islamic initiative, would resist sabotage attempts
by militants. The projects would also address the concern about
unemployed youth being drawn into extremism, as they would aim to
provide jobs to young people. 14Much of the large youth
population (approximately 15 percent in Waziristan alone) could also be
provided jobs in the Gulf States with strict monitoring from the
Pakistani side. Understandably the Gulf States would have security
concerns as well, which would need to be addressed by Pakistan.
In fact, the export of labor from these areas to the GCC States
would add to employment opportunities. The local tribes can be
apportioned a quota that could be flexible and based on performance and
good behavior. Providing training opportunities in remote areas could
facilitate the recruitment of locals for un-skilled and semi-skilled
labor. Mobile training teams would travel throughout FATA with tribal
support in order create awareness among the local population about
opportunities. The Political Agent and the tribal elders could also be
involved in the process in order to facilitate the endeavor in addition
to propagating the initiative regionally.
The existing recruitment centers in the Frontier Province and other
parts of the country could be utilized for providing further training
in various fields to those who have had some basic education and other
technical training. It is expected that there will be a larger turnout
for labor recruitment in the construction and services sector. This
would be mutually beneficial for the FATA area and Pakistan as well as
the Gulf States due to booming construction and real estate development
in the Gulf. 15
A key area in dire need of resources is the transportation
infrastructure, specifically roads. Any development in the roads
network would have an immediate impact on the people’s lives and make
the region more accessible. This would also boost trade and commerce in
the region. Home to 3.96 million people, FATA suffers from a lack of
development in the education, health, energy and agricultural sectors.
The literacy rate for FATA is a mere 17.42 percent, according to a 1998
census, compared to 43.92 percent for the rest of Pakistan. The female
literacy rate at three percent is the lowest in the country. 16
Similarly, the health sector also demonstrates poor indicators. The
total number of hospitals in the entire FATA region is 33, with a
further 301 dispensaries. Sadly, there is only one doctor for a
population of 6,970.17
The agriculture sector has also been neglected due to a lack of
resources. Addressing the issues of water scarcity, land reclamation
and forestry development, the introduction of tunnel farming for
off-season vegetables and fruits, and livestock farming could give a
boost to overall development in the region. Similarly, the mining of
coal, marble and other important minerals is a potential goldmine
waiting to be tapped. The region also badly needs energy for village
electrification and irrigation purposes. Additionally, tapping sources
of hydroelectric power and solar energy is another area that could be
explored.
Conclusion
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| "Tapping resources of hydroelectric power and solar energy is another area that could be explored" |
Pakistan’s
military cooperation with the US and coalition forces in Afghanistan is
likely to continue despite the June 10 air strikes that have elicited a
sharp reaction and created tension. However, the air strikes by US
aircraft and coalition forces must be curtailed in the larger interest
of winning this war. As stated earlier, it is advisable that Pakistani
forces carry out any air strikes on targets inside Pakistan. The
criticism of Pakistan’s efforts being aired in Washington has caused
confusion leading to a debate in the country on whether or not the
current situation is part of an induced destabilization process aimed
at denuclearizing the country.
In any case, a genuine effort to completely root out extremism
requires that the West revise its strategy. It is also mandatory that
the internal dynamics of the FATA region be incorporated in any
strategy that seeks to deal with the conflict situation.
Pakistan should step up efforts to implement political,
administrative and judicial reforms in keeping with tribal traditions.
There must be a concerted effort to dispel the feeling among the people
that they are not part of the mainstream in the country. More
importantly, the government should address their frustration and sense
of socio-economic deprivation. As stated earlier, the use of military
force should only serve as a supporting tool for implementing the
political and economic strategies discussed above. However, it would
also help to thwart the militants’ goal of exploiting the situation and
recruiting people for extremist activities.
It is hoped that the international community, including the US, the
EU, and especially the GCC states, will reach out to extend cooperation
for the development of the FATA region. It should be kept in mind
however, that there is no short cut to achieve the final objective.
While measures implemented on an immediate basis could generate results
and change perceptions, a multifaceted strategy that would work on
different levels would need a long-term commitment and sustained
resources. This is the responsibility the international community must
commit to; for Afghanistan’s example is a stark reminder of how an
unattended situation can disintegrate into chaos.
Notes:
1 BBC World News, June 1, 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7429699.stm
2 Geo Television Network, June 11, 2008.
http://www.geo.tv/6-11-2008/19148.htm
3
The Pak government, in the face of belligerent Afghan posturing about
sending its forces to hunt down Taliban leaders like Mehsud and Mualvi
Umer (there was an ambiguity about which “Umer” Karzai referred to,
there is the Taliban leader Mullah Umer (Afghan) and then there is
Maulvi Umer who is the spokesman of the TTP (Mehsud’s); had also
propositioned NATO to increase vigilance on the Afghan side of the
border. Border monitoring has to be a collective responsibility in this
case and must be shared equally between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the
International Coalition Forces.
4 Daily Times, December 16, 2007.
5 The News, June 12, 2008.
6
Information obtained from interviews with some high level Intelligence
Officers in Islamabad, May 17, 2008. Identity cannot be disclosed as
per prior understanding.
7 This socio-economic deprivation has
led to rise in extremism and radicalization. As a result the Taliban
and other militant organizations have been able to recruit much of the
younger population as well as many of the returnees of the Afghan jihad.
8 The News, December 16, 2007.
9
The establishment of Federal Levies and Khassadrs in FATA and (tribal
areas in Balochistan) was introduced by the British and has to date
been maintained in order to exercise an effective control over the
tribal people and for the maintenance of law and order in the tribal
areas. The political agent holds the control of the federal levies and
khassadars and runs the day to day affairs of policing the agency.
Levies are the community police. They perform all functions that the
regular police are supposed to do. Total strength of Federal Levies in
FATA is 6785. Khassadar position is hereditary and incumbents carry
their own weapons for the duty. Total strength of Khassadars working in
NWFP & FATA is 17597.
10 It is believed that the Taliban in
Afghanistan are being paid heavily by the organized crime groups
running the narcotic trafficking network to allow safe passage of drug
consignments to pass into Pakistan and Iran for trafficking to other
destinations. The al Qaeda is also believed to be using narco money as
a financial supply-line. The narcotics production and trafficking is
now directly linked to the financing of the Taliban insurgency and the
terrorist funding for al Qaeda and other associated groups. The
international community needs to address this on an urgent basis.
11 The News, June 12, 2008
12 Shuja Nawaz, “Rethinking the War in Pakistan’s Borderlands,” The Huffington Post, March 13, 2008.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shuja-nawaz/rethinking-the-war-in-pak_b_91407.html
13
The Political Agent referred to here is the administrator appointed by
the Governor of the NWF province and is in charge of running the
administration of the agency. This setup has been implemented since the
days of British Colonial rule has carried on successfully to date.
Ironically with the increased military presence of the Pakistan Army,
the role and authority of the Political Agent is now reduced to a
nominal stature.
14 Some quarters assert that the GCC states
do not fully respect labor rights and question the increased export of
Pakistan labor force to the Gulf. Recent press reports also brought to
light several incidents where protests over unpaid wages and proper
accommodation were staged by the work force especially in the
construction sector. This served as an eye opener causing some of these
host states to review the problems and address the violations. Many of
these workers who were found guilty of inciting and indulging in
violence were deported as well. It is not correct to assume that there
are no transgressions in the labor sector by private or semi private of
even government owned companies but there is marked improvement and
more openness about such issues. In fact several of the GCC states are
on a self improvement drive.
15 In view of anti trafficking laws
and labor reforms being implemented due to international concerns for
expatriate labor communities in GCC states, and a desire to improve
their image, many of the GCC states have seriously started to take
measures to improve abuses within the labor sector. It is not expected
to assume a model status but things have improved significantly over
the years. It is also true as proved by a study conducted by Gallup
Pakistan, that Pakistan labor force prefer the Gulf as a work
destination due to closeness to home, perceived higher monetary returns
and ideological reasons.
16 Directorate of Education FATA, NWFP, Pakistan Education Survey, 2004-05, Census Report of FATA, 1998.
17 Statistics provided by the FATA Secretariat, Year 2006.
This artice has been first published in Volume II, Issue 10 of Perspectives on Terrorism.
Faryal Leghari
Researcher
Gulf Research Center in Dubai