Posted by
Darko Trifunovic on Thursday, May 01, 2008 6:17:05 AM
Why Following the Money Leads to Terrorists
Source: Matthew Levitt, European Voice, 14 February
The UN has just added three financiers to its terrorism list for providing
financial support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. This would be
heartening news but for the fact that it took the UN more than a year to do
this, even though the US Treasury had designated the three Kuwaitis supporters
of terrorism, a full 13 months ago.
Does such tardiness matter? Hardly, according to the
political scientist Ibrahim Warde, whose latest book The Price of Fear
denounces such efforts as a waste of time or worse, ruining innocents and
hampering world trade. The hunt for terrorist money is more political
grandstanding than effective policy, according to Warde and a host of other
academic critics. Even after six years of following and freezing terrorists'
funds, intelligence officials in both the US
and Europe warn that al-Qaeda still has both
the intention and the capability to conduct potentially devastating attacks.
But combating terror finance remains -- and should
remain -- central to counterterrorism strategy. As deputy chief of the US
Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, I saw first-hand the utility of
denying terrorists access to the funds they need to carry out their plot.
Having left government service, I have lectured widely to think-tanks, bankers
and governments in Europe over the past year.
In contrast to the academics they understand perfectly well why it helps to
prosecute, or at least name, those who finance terrorism.
Terror attacks are in themselves inexpensive and not
infrequently funded by local cells through criminal activity -- the
Madrid bombings, for
instance. But considerable funds are needed to maintain terror networks -- for
recruitment, training, travelling, planning operations, bribing corrupt officials
and so on.
To eliminate or reduce a cell's means of raising and
transferring funds is to degrade significantly its capabilities. As difficult
as it may be to deter a suicide bomber, terrorist designations can deter
non-designated parties. Major donors inclined to finance extremist causes may
think twice before putting their personal fortunes at risk. Unlike information
derived from human spies or satellite intercepts, which require considerable
vetting to determine their authenticity, a financial transfer is a matter of
fact. Raising, storing and transferring money leaves a financial trail that
investigators can follow. The British authorities foiled the summer 2006
liquid explosive aviation plot thanks in large part to financial intelligence.
Following the money will at a minimum make it harder for terrorists to travel,
procure materials, provide for their own families, or radicalise others.
It can also force terrorists out of hiding. Financial
intelligence played an important role in the capture of Hambali, the operations
chief of Jemaah Islamiya and mastermind of the 2002 Bali
bombing. Designations and securing convictions for material support for
terrorism are only the most visible of the tools in the counter-terrorism
arsenal. In itself, following or freezing terrorists' assets will never drain
the swamp of all available funds.
But it should not be under-estimated as a deterrent,
nor as an effective way of disrupting logistical and financial support
networks. This view is confirmed by the terrorists themselves. In 1995,
captured World Trade
Center bomber Ramzi Yousef was flown
over the twin towers on his way to a New
York jail. When an FBI agent pointed out that the
towers were still standing, Yousef replied: "They wouldn't be if I had had
enough money and explosives."
Even today, terrorists lament their lack of funds and
how it limits their capabilities. Mustafa Abu Yazid, reportedly the al-Qaeda
chief in Afghanistan ,
broadcast an appeal this year complaining that: "In
Afghanistan the mujahedeen
especially need money. We have hundreds of volunteers for martyrdom operations,
but don't have the money to equip them." Abu Yazid knows what it's like
to be strapped for cash; the US Treasury designated him as a terrorist in the
wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks that he helped finance.
Matthew Levitt, a former deputy
assistant secretary of the US Treasury for intelligence and analysis, is a
senior fellow and director of the Stein Programme on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an adjunct
professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International
Studies.