Posted by
Darko Trifunovic on Saturday, April 12, 2008 12:08:17 PM
Fawaz Damra. [Source: Associated Press]By
the mid-1980s, Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam jointly
founded a charity front based in Pakistan which is called Maktab
al-Khidamat (MAK) (which means “services office”) and is also known as
Al-Kifah (which means “struggle”) (see 1984). Branches start to open in the US; the first one apparently opens in Tucson, Arizona, where al-Qaeda has a sleeper cell (see 1986).
But around 1986, Khaled Abu el-Dahab, the right hand man of double
agent Ali Mohamed, informally founds the branch in Brooklyn, New York,
and it soon becomes the most important US branch. [New York Times, 10/22/1998; Burr and Collins, 2006, pp. 269-270]
On December 29, 1987, three men, Mustafa Shalabi, Fawaz Damra, and Ali
Shinawy, formally file papers incorporating Al-Kifah, which is called
the Al-Kifah Refugee Center. At first, it is located inside the Al
Farouq mosque, which is led by Damra. But eventually it will get it own
office space next to the mosque. Shalabi, a naturalized citizen from
Egypt, runs the office with two assistants: Mahmud Abouhalima, who will
later be convicted for a role in bombing the WTC in 1993 (see February 26, 1993), and El Sayyid Nosair, who will assassinate a Jewish leader in New York in 1990 (see November 5, 1990). [New York Times, 4/11/1993; Newsweek, 10/1/2001; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 11/4/2001] Jamal al-Fadl, a founding member of al-Qaeda and future FBI informant (see June 1996-April 1997), also works at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in its early days. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 155]
The Brooklyn office recruits Arab immigrants and Arab-Americans to go
fight in Afghanistan, even after the Soviets withdraw in early 1989. As
many as 200 are sent there from the office. Before they go, the office
arranges training in the use of rifles, assault weapons, and handguns,
and then helps them with visas, plane tickets, and contacts. They are
generally sent to the MAK/Al-Kifah office in Peshawar, Pakistan, and
then connected to either the radical Afghan faction led by Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf or the equally radical one led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. [New York Times, 4/11/1993]
The CIA has some murky connection to Al-Kifah that has yet to be fully
explained. Newsweek will later say the Brooklyn office “doubled as a
recruiting post for the CIA seeking to steer fresh troops to the
mujaheddin” fighting in Afghanistan. At the same time, the Brooklyn
office is where “veterans of [Afghan war arrived] in the United
States—many with passports arranged by the CIA.” [Newsweek, 10/1/2001]
The New Yorker will later comment that the Brooklyn office was a refuge
for ex- and future mujaheddin, “But the highlight for the center’s
regulars were the inspirational jihad lecture series, featuring
CIA-sponsored speakers.… One week on Atlantic Avenue, it might be a
CIA-trained Afghan rebel traveling on a CIA-issued visa; the next, it
might be a clean-cut Arabic-speaking Green Beret, who would lecture
about the importance of being part of the mujaheddin, or ‘warriors of
the Lord.’ The more popular lectures were held upstairs in the roomier
Al-Farouq Mosque; such was the case in 1990 when Sheikh [Omar]
Abdul-Rahman, traveling on a CIA-supported visa, came to town.” One
frequent instructor is double agent Ali Mohamed, who is in the US
Special Forces at the time (see 1987-1989).
Bin Laden’s mentor Azzam frequently visits and lectures in the area. In
1988, he tells “a rapt crowd of several hundred in Jersey City, ‘Blood
and martyrdom are the only way to create a Muslim society… However,
humanity won’t allow us to achieve this objective, because all humanity
is the enemy of every Muslim.’” [New Yorker, 3/17/1995] Ayman Al-Zawahiri, future Al-Qaeda second-in-command, makes a recruiting trip to the office in 1989 (see Spring 1993). [New Yorker, 9/9/2002]
The Brooklyn office also raises a considerable amount of money for
MAK/Al-Kifah back in Pakistan. The Independent will later call the
office “a place of pivotal importance to Operation Cyclone, the
American effort to support the mujaheddin. The Al-Kifah [Refugee Center
was] raising funds and, crucially, providing recruits for the struggle,
with active American assistance.” [Independent, 11/1/1998]
Abdul-Rahman, better known as the “Blind Sheikh,” is closely linked to
bin Laden. In 1990, he moves to New York on another CIA-supported visa
(see July 1990)
and soon dominates the Al-Kifah Refugee Center. Shalabi has a falling
out with him over how to spend the money they raise and he is killed in
mysterious circumstances in early 1991, completing Abdul-Rahman’s take
over. Now, both the Brooklyn and Pakistan ends of the Al-Kifah/MAK
network are firmly controlled by bin Laden and his close associates. In
1998, the US government will say that al-Qaeda’s “connection to the
United States evolved from the Al-Kifah Refugee Center.” Yet there is
no sign that the CIA stops its relationship with the Brooklyn office
before it closes down shortly after the 1993 WTC bombing. [New York Times, 10/22/1998]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Jamal al-Fadl, Khaled Abu el-Dahab, Mahmud Abouhalima, Mustafa Shalabi, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Fawaz Damra, Maktab al-Khidamat, Central Intelligence Agency, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Abdullah Azzam, El Sayyid Nosair, Al Farouq Mosque, Ali Mohamed, Al-Kifah Refugee Center, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ali Shinawy
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Khaled Abu el-Dahab. [Source: Egyptian government]In
the mid-1980’s, Khaled Abu el-Dahab, an Egyptian medical student, joins
the militant group Islamic Jihad, and also meets Ali Mohamed. Mohamed
convinces el-Dahab to move to the US and become a sleeper cell agent.
El-Dahab does so in 1987, moving to Santa Clara, California, where
Mohamed has a residence. El-Dahab marries an American woman, becomes a
US citizen, and gets a job at a computer company. In 1987, a female
acquaintance of el-Dahab enters his apartment unannounced and finds
several men there cleaning rifles. She decides it is something she does
not want to know about, and breaks off contact with him. In 1990,
Mohamed and el-Dahab travel together to Afghanistan. They are
financially supported by a network of US sympathizers, including two
Egyptian-American doctors. Beginning in 1990, El-Dahab’s apartment
becomes an important communications hub for al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad
cells all over the world. For much of the 1990’s, the Egyptian
government cut direct phone links to countries like Sudan, Yemen,
Afghanistan or Pakistan in an effort to disrupt communications between
radical militants. So Dahab acts as a telephone operator for the
Islamic Jihad network, using a three-way calling feature to connect
operatives in far-flung countries. He communicates with bin Laden’s
base in Sudan (where bin Laden lives until 1996). He receives phone
calls from the likes of Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who
also visits California twice (see Spring 1993; Late 1994 or 1995).
He distributes forged documents and makes money transfers. He is
trained to make booby-trapped letters, enrolls in a US flight school to
learn how to fly gliders and helicopters, and recruits additional US
sleeper agents (see Mid-1990s).
He helps translate US army manuals and topographical maps into Arabic
for al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad training. El-Dahab will move to Egypt in
1998 and get arrested in October of that year. He will confess his role
in all of this in an Egyptian trial in 1999. The Egyptian government
will sentence him to 15 years in prison (see 1999). [New York Times, 10/23/2001; London Times, 11/11/2001; San Francisco Chronicle, 11/21/2001; Chicago Tribune, 12/11/2001]
Robert Morgenthau. [Source: Robert Maass / Corbis]In
the late 1980s, Osama bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam are
running a charity front called Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK)/Al-Kifah in
Peshawar, Pakistan, and it has an important branch in Brooklyn, New
York, called the Al-Kifah Refugee Center that is sending money and
recruits to fight in Afghanistan. The CIA apparently helps the Al-Kifah
Brooklyn office send up to 200 people from the US to fight in
Afghanistan (see 1986-1993).
Many of them are US citizens. Zalmay Khalilzad, a State Department
Afghan specialist who will go on to become a prominent neoconservative,
will later deny knowing of any Arab-Americans fighting with the
mujaheddin. But one anonymous Congressional aide will recall occasional
mentions of Al-Kifah Refugee Center or its head Mustafa Shalabi by some
of the most radical mujaheddin. He says, “Among that cabal, the extreme
militant fringes, Shalabi was known.… [T]hey were asking to talk to him
so he could organize some particular assistance.” The Neutrality Act
prevents US citizens from fighting against countries not at war with
the US, but the New York Times will later note, “Yet there is no sign
that a criminal investigation ever took place even though Federal
agents had come across broad hints about the center’s activities when
they investigated the [Meir] Kahane assassination [in 1990 (see November 5, 1990) and the slaying of Mr. Shalabi [in 1991]” (see (February 28, 1991)). Kahane’s assassin, El Sayyid Nosair, was one of Shalabi’s assistants. [New York Times, 4/11/1993]
Apparently the CIA’s ties to the Al-Kifah Refugee Center prevent other
US agencies from investigating it, even after the 1993 WTC bombing when
all of the bombers are found to have been tied to the center. While
Al-Kifah closes itself down shortly after the WTC bombing, it
immediately reopens in Boston under a different name and continues to
publish the same newsletter and post from the same website (see April 1993-Mid-2003).
The New Yorker will later comment, “[W]hen the fanatical fervor [the
CIA] whipped up leads to unintended consequences - the assassination of
a Jewish militant leader in Manhattan, the bombing of the World Trade
Center, a terror conspiracy to blow up the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels
and other Manhattan landmarks - [the CIA tried] to discourage local law
enforcement agencies and the FBI from looking into the matter too
deeply.” After Nosair assassinates Kahane, the FBI tells District
Attorney Robert Morgenthau that Nosair was a lone gunman, not part of a
broader conspiracy. However, the FBI had truckloads of evidence
connecting to Al-Kifah strongly suggesting otherwise that it does not
closely investigate. The FBI also blocks him from tying Sheikh Omar
Abdul-Rahman to the WTC bombing (see After February 26, 1993).
Morgenthau will later speculate the CIA may have encouraged the FBI not
to pursue any other leads. “The FBI lied to me. They’re supposed to
untangle terrorist connections, but they can’t be trusted to do the
job.” [New Yorker, 3/17/1995] Counterterrorism expert Steven Emerson will later call Al-Kifah “al-Qaeda’s operational headquarters in the United States.” [Emerson, 2006, pp. 436]
In 1994, a secret internal CIA report will conclude that the agency is
“partially culpable” for the WTC bombing because of its support for
radicals connected to Al-Kifah. One CIA source will say, “By giving
these people the funding that we did, a situation was created in which
it could be safely argued that we bombed the World Trade Center” (see January 24, 1994).
But even after 1994 there is little evidence that the links from
Al-Kifah were carefully explored by any US government agency. For
instance, the government will not freeze Al-Kifah’s funds until shortly
after 9/11, long after it ceased to exist (see September 24, 2001).
A convoy of Soviet tanks leaving Afghanistan. [Source: National Geographic]Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan, in accordance with an agreement signed the previous year (see April 1988). However, Afghan communists retain control of Kabul, the capital, until April 1992. [Washington Post, 7/19/1992]
It is estimated that more than a million Afghans (eight per cent of the
country’s population) were killed in the Soviet-Afghan War, and
hundreds of thousands had been maimed by an unprecedented number of
land mines. Almost half of the survivors of the war are refugees. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002]
Richard Clarke, a counterterrorism official during the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush administrations and the counterterrorism “tsar” by
9/11, will later say that the huge amount of US aid provided to
Afghanistan drops off drastically as soon as the Soviets withdraw,
abandoning the country to civil war and chaos. The new powers in
Afghanistan are tribal chiefs, the Pakistani ISI, and the Arab war
veterans coalescing into al-Qaeda. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 52-53]
Abdullah Anas. [Source: History Channel]According
to author Richard Labeviere, in this year Talaat Fouad Qassem, a leader
of the Egyptian militant group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, is designated by
a leaders from different radical militant groups to head up the
militant effort in Bosnia. Qassem is living in exile in Denmark and
recruits the help of two Algerian militants also living in exile in
Europe, Kamer Eddine Kherbane and Abdullah Anas. In future years, the
three of them will coordinate all the requests for volunteers from
European countries who want to fight in Bosnia. They will send about
2,000 volunteers to camps in Bosnia near the towns of Zenica and Tuzla.
Kherbane will directly lead the Tuzla group. [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 73]
In 1991, Kherbane will set up a charity front in Croatia that is a
branch of Maktab al-Khidamat/Al-Kifah, which is closely tied to
al-Qaeda (see 1991 and Early 1990s). In 1995, Qassem will be abducted in Croatia by US forces and killed in Egypt (see
September 13, 1995).
A
2006 analysis compiled jointly by US and Croatian intelligence will
reveal that al-Qaeda began infiltrating the Balkans region even before
the start of the Bosnian war in 1992. Kamer Eddine Kherbane, a member
of Algerian militant group GIA, moved to Zagreb, Croatia, in 1991 to
set up a charity front at the direct request of Osama bin Laden. The
organization, called Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) or Al-Kifah, is closely
tied to al-Qaeda. Its Brooklyn, New York, branch called the Al-Kifah
Refugee Center is tied to both the 1993 WTC bombers and the CIA (see 1986-1993). [Associated Press, 4/17/2006]
Apparently the Zagreb branch of MAK/Al-Kifah is also called the
Al-Kifah Refugee Center like the Brooklyn branch and has very close
ties with that branch (see Early 1990s). A Spanish police report will later claim that Kherbane is the head of the Zagreb branch. [CNN, 12/8/2002]
The analysis will allege that Kherbane used Al-Kifah “to infiltrate GIA
members into Bosnia,” and that Iran and unnamed Arab countries paid for
the operation through money transfers. [Associated Press, 4/17/2006] Kherbane appears to have begun working with other radical militants in Bosnia in 1990 (see 1990).
“A Call for Jihad in Bosnia” flyer published by the Al-Kifah Refugee Center’s Boston branch. [Source: Public domain]The
Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York, is al-Qaeda’s main
foothold in the US and most of the 1993 WTC bombers are closely tied to
it. It had been formed in the 1980s to send militants to fight in
Afghanistan and also help veteran fighters settle in the US (see 1986-1993).
But the Afghanistan war against the Soviets ended in early 1989 and the
winning factions soon began fighting amongst themselves (see February 15, 1989).
But a new cause is on the horizon as Yugoslavia starts falling apart.
By 1991, the center’s parent organization in Pakistan, Maktab
al-Khidamat(MAK)/Al-Kifah begins setting up al-Qaeda charity fronts in
the Bosnia region (see 1991).
The main regional MAK/Al-Kifah branch in Zagreb, Croatia, is also
called the Al-Kifah Refugee Center like the Brooklyn branch and has
very close ties with that branch (see Early 1990s). In 1992, war breaks out in Bosnia (see April 6, 1992)
and the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn shifts its focus fully to
the Bosnia cause. For instance, the Boston branch publishes “A Call for
Jihad in Bosnia.” It claims that more than 100,000 Bosnians had been
killed and that thousands of Muslim girls had been kidnapped and kept
in Yugoslav army camps for sex. It urges readers who wish “to provide
the emerging jihad movement in Bosnia with more than food and shelter”
to send their donations to Al-Kifah. And just as Al-Kifah led the
effort to send US-based militants to fight in Afghanistan, it appears
to do the same for Bosnia. Vanity Fair will later claim, “Dozens and
perhaps hundreds of US residents are reported to have joined appeals to
fight the Serbs in Bosnia.” [Vanity Fair, 3/2005]
The head of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center’s Zagreb branch, Kamer Eddine
Kherbane, apparently is also one of the leaders of the mujaheddin
fighters in Bosnia around this time (see 1990 and 1991). The CIA had ties to Al-Kifah during the Afghan war (see Late 1980s and After)
and there is some circumstantial evidence of US government ties to it
during the Bosnia war. In 1992, Ali Mohamed, a double agent and ex-US
Special Forces officer with close ties to Al-Kifah, leads a group of US
militants who are all ex-US soldiers to train and fight in Bosnia (see December 1992).
Abu Ubaidah Yahya, an ex-US marine and security chief at the Brooklyn
branch, will lead a second group of US militants to fight in Bosnia
(see Spring 1993).
Apparently the bin Laden guest house where Yousef lived. [Source: National Geographic]According
to Pakistani investigators, Ramzi Yousef spends most of this time at
the Beit Ashuhada guesthouse (translated as House of Martyrs) in
Peshawar, Pakistan, which is funded by Osama bin Laden. Pakistani
investigators reveal this bin Laden-Yousef connection to US
intelligence in March 1995. The CIA will publicly reveal this in 1996. [Central Intelligence Agency, 1996 
; Tenet, 2007, pp. 100] While living there, Yousef receives help and financing from two unnamed senior al-Qaeda representatives. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 47] Yousef will be arrested at another nearby bin Laden safe house in February 1995 (see February 7, 1995) with bin Laden’s address found in his pocket. [London Times, 10/18/1997] During these years, Yousef takes long trips to the US in preparation of the WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993) and the Philippines, where several plots are developed (see January 6, 1995). He also uses an al-Qaeda influenced mosque in Milan, Italy, as a logistical base (see 1993-1997).
Territory
controlled around the start of the war. White represents the Bosnian
Serbs while gray represents Bosnian Muslims and Croats. [Source: Time / Cowan, Castello, Glanton]Bosnia
declares independence from Yugoslavia (which is now mostly made up of
Serbia). The Bosnian Serbs immediately declare their own separate
state, but remain closely tied to Serbia. War between Bosnia and Serbia
begins immediately, adding to the existing war between Croatia and
Serbia. Within days, the US recognizes the states of Croatia, Slovenia,
and Bosnia. The European Union, which has already recognized Croatia
and Slovenia, recognizes Bosnia as well. Serbia immediately gains the
upper hand and within a month Serbian forces surround most of the area
around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. [US Department of State, 12/6/1995; Time, 12/31/1995; New York Times, 10/20/2003]
Ahmed Ajaj. [Source: FBI]Al-Qaeda
Operatives Ahmad Ajaj and Ramzi Yousef enter the US together. Ajaj is
arrested at Kennedy Airport in New York City. Yousef is not arrested,
and later, he masterminds the 1993 bombing of the WTC. “The US
government was pretty sure Ajaj was a terrorist from the moment he
stepped foot on US soil,” because his “suitcases were stuffed with fake
passports, fake IDs and a cheat sheet on how to lie to US immigration
inspectors,” plus “two handwritten notebooks filled with bomb recipes,
six bomb-making manuals, four how-to videotapes concerning weaponry,
and an advanced guide to surveillance training.” However, Ajaj is
charged only with passport fraud, and serves a six-month sentence. From
prison, Ajaj frequently calls Yousef and others in the 1993 WTC bombing
plot, but no one translates the calls until long after the bombing. [Los Angeles Times, 10/14/2001]
Ajaj is released from prison three days after the WTC bombing, but is
later rearrested and sentenced to more than 100 years in prison. [Los Angeles Times, 10/14/2001]
One of the manuals seized from Ajaj is horribly mistranslated for the
trial. For instance, the title page is said to say “The Basic Rule,”
published in Jordan in 1982, when in fact the title says “al-Qaeda”
(which means “the base” in English), published in Afghanistan in 1989.
Investigators later complain that a proper translation could have shown
an early connection between al-Qaeda and the WTC bombing. [New York Times, 1/14/2001]
An Israeli Newsweekly later reports that the Palestinian Ajaj may have
been a mole for the Israeli Mossad. The Village Voice has suggested
that Ajaj may have had “advance knowledge of the World Trade Center
bombing, which he shared with Mossad, and that Mossad, for whatever
reason, kept the secret to itself.” Ajaj was not just knowledgeable,
but was involved in the planning of the bombing from his prison cell. [Village Voice, 8/3/1993]
Double
agent Ali Mohamed spends much of 1992 training al-Qaeda recruits in
Afghanistan. But he also gives specialized training in Sudan, Bosnia,
and other conflict zones. Using the alias Abu ‘Abdallah, he is part of
a 14-man al-Qaeda team made up of retired US military personnel that
enters Bosnia through Croatia to train and arm mujaheddin fighters
there. Apparently this will come to light in a 1998 trial in Egypt. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 41, 150, 337]
The training takes place at Meskovic, a village near the town of Tuzla.
The 14-man team are smuggled into Bosnia one by one in December 1992.
The team is said to be sponsored by a “mosque in Newark, New Jersey.” [Associated Press, 12/3/1995] Mohamed regularly trained militants at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, an al-Qaeda
front in the US (see 1987-1989),
and there was a mosque associated to it in Newark. This effort takes
place at a time when Al-Kifah is sending many US-based militants to
fight in Bosnia (see 1992).
It will later be alleged that a US Army official met with people at
Al-Kifah in December 1992 and offered to help with a covert operation
to support Muslims in Bosnia (see December 1992).
Twelve of the Americans leave within two months after training a group
of 25 mujaheddin in insurgency warfare. But Mohamed and another
American only known by the code name Abu Musa remain at Meskovic until
June 1993, occasionally accompanying the mujaheddin on attacks behind
Serb lines. [Associated Press, 12/3/1995]
Ahmed Idris Nasreddin. [Source: NBC News]An
Italian intelligence report alleges the Switzerland-based Al Taqwa Bank
is funding radical groups in Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan, and is a
major backer of Hamas, but Swiss authorities are slow to investigate. [Salon, 3/15/2002; Forward, 10/17/2003]
The Italians are interested in Al Taqwa because of its connection to a
radical Italian mosque, the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, which
Al Taqwa founder and director Ahmed Idris Nasreddin helped create and
finance in the early 1990s. The mosque is close to Al Taqwa’s
headquarters in Lugano, a town on the border between Switzerland and
Italy. It is also connected to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and
extremists fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-1994)
and European investigators increasingly suspect that the Milan mosque
is an important general recruiting and supply center for al-Qaeda and
other radical militant groups. [Newsweek, 3/18/2002]
Reportedly, the Italians tell a Swiss prosecutor that Al Taqwa
“comprises the most important financial structure of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamic terrorist organizations.” Italian intelligence
also finds links between Al Taqwa and the Milan mosque through
Nasreddin. Additionally, two other top officials in the mosque are Al
Taqwa shareholders. [Salon, 3/15/2002; Forward, 10/17/2003]
Italian officials get the impression that Swiss officials are loathe to
look into Al Taqwa. In 1997, the Italians convince a Swiss prosecutor
to start questioning Al Taqwa officials. But reportedly, an Al Taqwa
lawyer is able to make phone calls to influential people and have the
investigation stopped. [Salon, 3/15/2002]
Bomb damage in underground levels of the WTC in 1993. [Source: Najlah Feanny/ Corbis]An
attempt to topple the World Trade Center fails, but six people are
killed and over 1000 are injured in the misfired blast. An FBI
explosives expert later states that, “If they had found the exact
architectural Achilles’ heel or if the bomb had been a little bit
bigger, not much more, 500 pounds more, I think it would have brought
her down.” Ramzi Yousef, who has close ties to bin Laden, organizes the
attempt. [Village Voice, 3/30/1993; US Congress, 2/24/1998]
The New York Times later reports on Emad Salem, an undercover agent who
will be the key government witness in the trial against Yousef. Salem
testifies that the FBI knew about the attack beforehand and told him
they would thwart it by substituting a harmless powder for the
explosives. However, an FBI supervisor called off this plan, and the
bombing was not stopped. [New York Times, 10/28/1993]
Other suspects were ineptly investigated before the bombing as early as
1990. Several of the bombers were trained by the CIA to fight in the
Afghan war, and the CIA later concludes, in internal documents, that it
was “partly culpable” for this bombing (see January 24, 1994). [Independent, 11/1/1998] 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is an uncle of Yousef and also has a role in the WTC bombing (see March 20, 1993). [Independent, 6/6/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
One of the attackers even leaves a message which will later be found by
investigators, stating, “Next time, it will be very precise.” [Associated Press, 9/30/2001]
In
June 1993, Abu Ubaidah Yahya will tell the New York Times that early in
the year he went to Bosnia with several other Muslims from the New York
region to help embattled Bosnian Muslims “with technical advice and
medical aid.” [New York Times, 6/26/1993]
Yahya is an ex-US Marine connected to numerous figures in the 1993 WTC
bombing and “Landmarks” bombing plots, and US intelligence had him
under surveillance since January 1993 (see January 7-13, 1993),
although how intensive the surveillance was is unknown. The FBI is
aware that Yahya repeatedly travels in the spring of 1993 to Vienna,
Austria, to pick up money from the Bosnian-linked Third World Relief
Agency charity front (see Early April 1993),
so presumably he goes to nearby Bosnia on some or all of those trips.
It is likely he and his group actually go to Bosnia to fight, since one
of his associates told an FBI informant that Yahya and a group of about
ten men he trained were going to fight in Bosnia once their training
session was over, and the training ended in February 1993 (see December 1992-Early February 1993).
Saudis also gave Yahya’s close associate Clement Rodney Hampton-El a
considerable amount of money to train militants in the US to fight in
Bosnia (see December 1992). [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 113] Yahya is the security chief of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, a charity front linked to both al-Qaeda and the CIA (see 1986-1993).
A group of US militants linked to Al-Kifah go fight in Bosnia starting
in December 1992, but this must be a different group since Yahya is
still training his group for another two months (see December 1992-June 1993 and December 1992-Early February 1993).
Informant
Emad Salem, pictured bent over in a green shirt, enables the FBI to
take surveillance footage like this of the plotters making a bomb. [Source: National Geographic]Eight
people are arrested, foiling a plot to bomb several New York City
landmarks. The targets were the United Nations building, 26 Federal
Plaza, and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels. This is known as the
“Landmarks” or “Day of Terror” plot. The plotters are connected to
Ramzi Yousef and the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. If the
bombing, planned for later in the year, had been successful, thousands
would have died. An FBI informant named Emad Salem had infiltrated the
group, gathering information that leads to arrests of the plotters (see
April 23, 1993). [US Congress, 7/24/2003]
Abdul-Rahman will eventually be sentenced to life in prison for a role
in the plot. Nine others will be given long prison terms, including
Ibrahim El-Gabrowny and Clement Rodney Hampton-El. [New York Times, 1/18/1996] Siddig Siddig Ali, who was possibly the main force behind the plot (see April 23, 1993), will eventually be sentenced to only 11 years in prison because he agreed to provide evidence on the other suspects [New York Times, 10/16/1999]
After the “Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, is arrested for his involvement in several bomb plots (see July 3, 1993),
his New Jersey residence is searched by the FBI. A business card from
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, is found. Sixty-two
thousand dollars in cash is also found in Abdul-Rahman’s briefcase,
suggesting he is being well funded. [Lance, 2006, pp. 139]
Anwar Shaaban. [Source: Evan Kohlmann]The
Islamic Cultural Institute mosque in Milan, Italy is dominated by
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, the Egyptian militant group led by Sheikh Omar
Abdul-Rahman. The imam of the mosque, Anwar Shaaban, is a leader of
that group and also a leader of the mujaheddin efforts in Bosnia. The
Islamic Cultural Institute serves as a transit and logistical base for
mujaheddin coming or going to Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995).
After the 1993 WTC bombing, US investigators will discover heavy phone
traffic between the Milan mosque and the Jersey City mosque run by
Abdul-Rahman. Furthermore, they learn that bomber mastermind Ramzi
Yousef used the Milan mosque as a logistical base as well. [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001] Yousef also prayed at the Milan mosque prior to the WTC bombing. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 171]
Shaaban is a close friend of Talaat Fouad Qassem, another leader of
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and one of the highest ranking leaders of the
mujaheddin fighting in Bosnia. Qassem is directing the flow of
volunteers to Bosnia while living in political asylum in Denmark (see 1990). [Kohlmann, 2004, pp. 25]
In April 1994, seven Arab men living in Denmark, including Qassem, are
arrested. US prosecutors will later claim that fingerprints on
documents and videotapes seized from the men match fingerprints on bomb
manuals that Ahmad Ajaj was carrying when he entered the US with Yousef
(see September 1, 1992).
A raid on one apartment in Denmark uncovers bomb formulas, bomb making
chemical, sketches of attack targets, some videotapes of Abdul-Rahman’s
sermons, and a pamphlet claiming responsibility for the WTC bombing and
promising more attacks. Also, phone records and documents found in
Abdul-Rahman’s Jersey City apartment show the men in Denmark were
communicating regularly with Abdul-Rahman. [New York Times, 4/15/1995]
But no one in either Milan or Denmark will be charged with a role in
the WTC bombing. Danish police will later say that none of the seized
documents indicated that the Arab men personally took part in the
bombing. The men all are released and ironically, two of them are
granted political asylum in Denmark because they are members of
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiya, which the Danish consider to be a persecuted
group. [Associated Press, 6/28/1995] In 1995, an Italian magistrate will issue arrest warrants for Shaaban and 60 other extremists (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995), but Shaaban will flee to Bosnia, where he will die of bullet wounds in unexplained circumstances (see December 14, 1995). [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001]
The US government will later call the Islamic Cultural Institute
al-Qaeda’s main logistical base in Europe and some evidence will link
figures connected to it to the 9/11 plot (see Late 1998-September 11, 2001).
Sam
Karmilowicz, a security officer at the US embassy in Manila,
Philippines, will later claim that on September 18, 1994 the embassy
receives a call from an anonymous person speaking with a Middle Eastern
accent that there is a plot to assassinate President Clinton, who is
scheduled to visit Manila from November 12 through 14, 1994. The caller
says that a Pakistani businessman named Tariq Javed Rana is one of the
leaders of the plot. Further, Rana is using counterfeit US money to
help pay for the plot. An interagency US security team is immediately
notified and begins investigating the threat. A few weeks later,
Karmilowicz is told by members of this team that the plot was a hoax.
Clinton comes to the Philippines as scheduled and no attack takes
place. [CounterPunch, 3/9/2006]
However, bomber Ramzi Yousef moved to the Philippines in early 1994,
along with his uncle Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and associate Wali
Khan Amin Shah. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
Yousef will later confess to FBI agents that he planned to assassinate
Clinton by blowing up his motorcade with a missile or explosives, but
gave up because the security was so tight. Shah will also confess to
this plot and add that the order to kill Clinton came from bin Laden. [Guardian, 8/26/1998]
CNN will report in 1998, “The United States was aware of the planned
attempt before the president left for the Philippines and as a result,
security around the president was intensified.” [CNN, 8/25/1998]
Secret Service sources will later report that large sums of counterfeit
US currency were entering the Philippines during the time of the plot.
Karmilowicz will conclude that the warning about the assassination was
accurate and that Tariq Rana was involved in the plot. CNN reporter
Maria Ressa will later tell Karmilowicz that her sources in the
Philippine intelligence and police believe that Rana is a close
associate of Yousef and KSM. Additionally, her sources believe Rana is
connected to the Pakistani ISI. [CounterPunch, 3/9/2006] Rana will be monitored by Philippines police and eventually arrested in April 1995 (see December 1994-April 1995).
Djamel Zitouni. [Source: Fides Journal]Djamel
Zitouni takes over the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). There are
allegations that the Algerian government manipulated the GIA from its
creation in 1991 (see 1991).
After going through several leaders, it appears that the GIA’s new
leader Zitouni is in fact an agent of the Algerian intelligence agency.
For instance, in 2005 the Guardian will report that Algerian
intelligence “managed to place Djamel Zitouni, one of the Islamists it
controlled, at the head of the GIA.” [Guardian, 9/8/2005]
And journalist Jonathan Randal will write in a 2005 book that according
to Abdelkhader Tigha, a former Algerian security officer, “army
intelligence controlled overall GIA leader Djamel Zitouni and used his
men to massacre civilians to turn Algerian and French public opinion
against the jihadis.” [Randal, 2005, pp. 170-171] Indeed, prior to Zitouni taking over, the GIA tried to limit civilian casualties in their many attacks (see December 1991-October 27, 1994).
But Zitouni launches many attacks on civilian targets. He also attacks
other Islamist militant groups, such as the rival Islamic Salvation
Army (AIS). He also launches a series of attacks inside France. [Crotty, 2005, pp. 291-292] Zitouni also kills many of the genuine Islamists within the GIA. [New Zealand Listener, 2/14/2004]
These controversial tactics cause the GIA to slowly lose popular
support and the group also splits into many dissident factions. Some
international militant leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Qatada
continue to support the GIA. He will finally be killed by a rival
faction on July 16, 1996. [Crotty, 2005, pp. 291-292]
A
suspected terrorism financier enters the US with apparent CIA help.
Philippines investigators had begun monitoring and investigating
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, earlier in 1994
(see 1994). [Ressa, 2003]
According to a 1999 book by Richard Labeviere, near the conclusion of
this investigation, the Philippine government expedites an order
expelling Khalifa from the country. Khalifa gets a visa to the US
through the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with the help of the
CIA. The CIA had a history of using that consulate to give US visas to
radical Muslim militants dating back to the 1980s (see September 1987-March 1989). [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 365; Time, 10/27/2003]
Another account claims his visa “was issued, despite his notoriety,
because of a computer error.” When he applied for the visa in August
1994, the address he gave was that of the bin Laden family company. [US News and World Report, 5/15/1995] He enters the US on December 1. The report detailing his terrorist connections is released on December 15 (see December 15, 1994). The next day, Khalifa is arrested in the US (see December 16, 1994-May 1995). [US News and World Report, 5/15/1995]
A
secret report about al-Qaeda’s support for Islamic militant groups in
the Philippines is released to Philippine President Fidel Ramos and
other top national leaders. Contents of the report are leaked to the
media in April 1995. [Japan Economic Newswire, 4/16/1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000; Ressa, 2003]
Starting sometime in 1994, Philippine investigator Colonel Rodolfo
Mendoza began looking into foreign support for Islamic militant groups
in the Philippines. Mendoza combines “hundreds of wiretaps and
countless man-hours of surveillance into a 175-page report…” which is
titled “Radical Islamic Fundamentalism in the Philippines and its Links
to International Terrorism.” It includes a watch list of more than 100
names of Arab nationals. Mendoza is the handler for Edwin Angeles,
second in command of the militant group Abu Sayyaf and secretly an
undercover government operative (see 1991-Early February 1995). The report is said to be based on information from many sources and corroborated by Angeles. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000; Ressa, 2003]
The investigation has a special focus on Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin
Laden’s brother-in-law, who has been under surveillance for months. The
report states Khalifa has founded at least eight organizations to fund
terrorism: “Although most of them are seemingly legitimate charitable
institutions or NGOs, it has been uncovered that Khalifa has been using
them as cover for his terroristic activities in the Philippines as well
as abroad.” In the Philippines, this money mainly goes to the Abu
Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). [Japan Economic Newswire, 4/24/1995; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000; CNN, 11/24/2004]
The report also says Khalifa’s activities in the Philippines strongly
link with Muslim extremist movements in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Russia,
Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Romania, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan,
Albania, the Netherlands and Morocco. [Japan Economic Newswire, 4/16/1995]
The Philippine branch of the Saudi charity the International Islamic
Relief Organization (IIRO) was founded by Khalifa in 1991. The report
states, “The IIRO which claims to be a relief institution is being
utilized by foreign extremists as a pipeline through which funding for
the local extremists is being coursed.” [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/9/2000]
It is not clear when US intelligence gets a copy of this report.
However, Khalifa is arrested in the US one day after the report is
released, then eventually let go (see December 16, 1994-May 1995). Remarkably, he will never be officially designated a terrorism funder before his death in 2007 (see January 30, 2007) and the Philippines branch of IIRO will only be so designated in 2006 (see August 3, 2006).
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. [Source: CBS News]Mohammed
Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law to bin Laden, is arrested in the US. He
is held for visa fraud, but he is believed to be a major terrorist. His
arrest takes place at a Holiday Inn in Morgan Hill, California. [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/24/2001] That is only about 20 miles from Santa Clara, where double agent Ali Mohamed is running an al-Qaeda cell (see 1987-1998).
Counterterrorism expert Steven Emerson will later say of Khalifa and
Mohamed, “It seems to me that they were probably in contact. I’m basing
that only intuitively on the fact that they were in the same area, they
were close to bin Laden, and they would’ve had an incentive to stay
together.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 167] According to one account, Khalifa is arrested on behalf of the government of Jordan, because he is on trial there. [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/24/2001] Another account claims that Philippine authorities “tipped off Federal authorities on Khalifa’s movements.” [Filipino Reporter, 4/27/1995]
He is traveling on a Saudi passport. He’d flown into the US from London
on December 1 and has papers indicating he would be heading back to the
Philippines. [Lance, 2006, pp. 158-159] It has been claimed that the CIA helped him get his US visa (see December 1, 1994). There are many reasons for US authorities to suspect Khalifa is a major terrorist figure:
He is arrested with Mohammed Loay Bayazid, one of the dozen or so
original members of al-Qaeda. Bayazid had attempted to purchase nuclear
material for bin Laden the year before (see December 16, 1994).
Philippine investigators had recently completed a secret report on
terrorist funding. The report focuses on Khalifa, and says his
activities in the Philippines strongly link with Muslim extremist
movements in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Russia, Malaysia, the United Arab
Emirates, Romania, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Albania, the Netherlands,
and Morocco. It calls a charity which Khalifa runs a “pipeline through
which funding for the local extremists is being coursed.” Perhaps not
coincidentally, the report was released just one day before Khalifa’s
arrest in the US (see December 15, 1994).
His possessions, which are quickly examined and translated, include a
handwritten manual in Arabic detailing how to set up a terrorist
curriculum at a school in the Philippines, giving lessons in
bomb-making and assassination. [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/24/2001]
Khalifa’s business card was discovered in a search of the New York City residence of Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman in 1993 (see August 1993).
He is an unindicted coconspirator in the “Landmarks” bombings plot,
which would have killed thousands in New York City. The trial is
getting underway at this time. Abdul-Rahman will be convicted and
sentenced to over 300 years in prison (see June 24, 1993).
A State Department cable from days after his arrest states Khalifa is a
“known financier of terrorist operations and an officer of an Islamic
NGO in the Philippines that is a known Hamas front.”
An alias is found in his personal organizer that was also used in a
bomb-making manual brought into the US by Ahmad Ajaj, Ramzi Yousef’s
travel partner, when the two of them came to the US to implement the
1993 World Trade Center bombing (see September 1, 1992).
Bojinka plotter Wali Khan Amin Shah’s phone number is found in
Khalifa’s possessions. The Bojinka plot, if successful, also would have
killed thousands (see January 6, 1995). [Lance, 2006, pp. 158-159]
A number in Pakistan that Ramzi Yousef had used to call the Philippines
is found as well. Author Peter Lance will later note that such numbers
“should have led the FBI directly to Ramzi Yousef, the world’s most
wanted man” at the time. [Lance, 2006, pp. 160]
However,
despite this wealth of highly incriminating material, within weeks of
his arrest the US will decide to deport him to Jordan (see January 5, 1995). Over the next four months, even more of his links to terrorist activity will be discovered (see Late December 1994-April 1995). But Khalifa will be deported anyway (see April 26-May 3, 1995), and then soon freed in Jordan (see July 19, 1995).
Entity Tags: Ramzi Yousef, Steven Emerson, US Department of State, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Philippines, Ahmad Ajaj, Peter Lance, Mohammed Loay Bayazid, Ali Mohamed, Osama bin Laden, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Jordan, Omar Abdul-Rahman
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa was arrested in the US in mid-December 1994 (see December 16, 1994-May 1995), and as he is held the evidence tying him to terrorism continues to grow:
One week after his arrest, the State Department tells the immigration
judge handling Khalifa’s case that he had “engaged in serious terrorist
offenses” and that his release “would endanger US national security.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 158-159]
In early January, police in the Philippines uncover the Bojinka plot,
involving associates of Khalifa. A Philippine investigator makes a
chart connecting the Bojinka figures and places Khalifa in the middle
of it (see Spring 1995). The plot, if successful, would have killed thousands while also assassinating the Pope (see January 6, 1995).
Meanwhile, The FBI translates literature in Khalifa’s luggage
advocating training in assassination, explosives, and weapons,
including discussions of the “wisdom of bombing churches and murdering
Catholic priests.” [New York Times, 5/2/2002; Lance, 2003, pp. 233-35]
Phone numbers to Khalifa’s Philippine charity fronts are found on
bomber Ramzi Yousef’s laptop seized in early January 1995 as the
Bojinka plot is exposed. Khalifa’s business card is found in the
apartment Yousef was staying in as well. [Lance, 2006, pp. 158-159, 203]
Bojinka plotter Wali Khan Amin Shah is arrested in early January 1995. He is found with multiple phone numbers for Khalifa. [Stephen Handelman, 7/31/1996; Lance, 2006, pp. 158-159]
When Yousef is arrested in February 1995 (see February 7, 1995),
he will be asked about Khalifa’s business card found in his apartment.
According to an FBI report issued at the time, Yousef claims that he
did not personally know Khalifa, but had been given the card by fellow
Bojinka plotter Wali Khan Amin Shah as a contact in case he needed
help. He also says that he is aware that Khalifa is a relative of Osama
bin Laden. [Lance, 2006, pp. 203]
In February and March, Philippine interrogation of one Bojinka plotter
uncovers a planned second wave of attacks that would involve flying
airplanes into US buildings, including the World Trade Center, CIA
headquarters, and the Pentagon (see February-Early May 1995).
This will eventually evolve into the 9/11 attacks. US investigators are
notified about this sometime in the spring of 1995 (see Spring 1995).
On April 1, Philippine authorities arrest six men and announce they are
connected to Khalifa and Bojinka plotters such as Ramzi Yousef (see April 1, 1995-Early 1996). The Philippine Interior Secretary calls Khalifa a key figure in Islamic extremist efforts. [Associated Press, 4/16/1995]
The Associated Press reports that Khalifa is believed to be “a key
figure in efforts to recruit new members of the Abu Sayyaf group.” On
April 4, the Abu Sayyaf raid a Christian town called Ipil and kill over
fifty people in what is the group’s largest and most brutal terrorist
attack (see April 4, 1995). This increases the importance of Khalifa’s ties with them. [Associated Press, 4/16/1995]
Khalifa is accused by Yemen, Egypt, and Algeria of financing subversion in those countries. [Associated Press, 4/16/1995]
Despite all this evidence, Khalifa will soon be deported to Jordan for retrial there (see May 3, 1995-August 31, 1995), even though the key witness against him has already recanted. He will be found innocent and set free (see July 19, 1995).
A
Saudi company called the Twaik Group deposits more than $250,000 in
bank accounts controlled by Mamoun Darkazanli, a Syrian-born
businessman suspected of belonging to the Hamburg, Germany, al-Qaeda
cell that Mohamed Atta is also a part of. In 2004, the Chicago Tribune
will reveal evidence that German intelligence has concluded that Twaik,
a $100 million-a-year conglomerate, serves as a front for the Saudi
Arabian intelligence agency. It has ties to that agency’s longtime
chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Before 9/11, at least two of Twaik’s
managers are suspected by various countries’ intelligence agencies of
working for al-Qaeda. One Twaik employee, who is later accused of
helping to finance the financing of the 2003 Bali bombing (see October 12, 2002),
repeatedly flies on aircraft operated by Saudi intelligence. In roughly
the same time period, hundreds of thousands of additional dollars are
deposited into Darkazanli’s accounts from a variety of suspicious
entities, including a Swiss bank owned by Middle Eastern interests with
links to terrorism and a radical Berlin imam. Darkazanli is later
accused not just of financially helping the Hamburg 9/11 hijackers, but
also of helping to choose them for al-Qaeda. [Chicago Tribune, 10/12/2003; Chicago Tribune, 3/31/2004]
The
US begins a policy of abducting Islamic Jihad militants and sending
them to Egypt. The US began a policy of allowing abductions, known as
“renditions,” in 1993 (see 1993).
At first, renditions were rarely used because few countries wanted the
suspects. Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, is one of
the architects of a 1995 agreement with Egypt to send militants there.
He will later recall, “It was begun in desperation.… We were turning
into voyeurs. We knew where these people were, but we couldn’t capture
them because we had nowhere to take them,” due to legal and diplomatic
complications. The CIA realized that “we had to come up with a third
party.” Egypt was the obvious choice because the Islamic Jihad is the
prime political enemy of the Egyptian government, and many Islamic
Jihad militants also work for al-Qaeda, an enemy of the US. However,
the Egyptian secret police force, the Mukhabarat, is notorious for its
torture of prisoners. As part of the program, the US helps track,
capture, and transport suspects to Egypt and then turns a blind eye
while the Egyptians torture them. Scheuer claims the US could give the
Egyptian interrogators questions they wanted put to the detainees in
the morning and get answers by the evening. Because torture is illegal
in the US, US officials are never present when the torture is done.
Further, the CIA only abducts suspects who have already been convicted
in absentia. Talaat Fouad Qassem is the first known person the CIA
renders to Egypt (see September 13, 1995).
But the number of renditions greatly increases in 1998, when the CIA
gets a list of Islamic Jihad operatives around the world (see Late August 1998).
These renditions result in a big trial in Egypt in 1999 that
effectively destroys Islamic Jihad as a major force in that country
(see 1999). [New Yorker, 2/8/2005]
The
US decides to deport Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s
brother-in-law, who was arrested in the US in mid-December 1994 (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
Khalifa was sentenced to death in Jordan later in December and the
Jordanian government wants the US to deport him to face retrial, even
though Jordan does not have an extradition treaty with the US. On this
day, Secretary of State William Christopher writes a letter to Attorney
General Janet Reno: “Jordan is aware of Mr. Khalifa’s presence in the
United States and has asked for our assistance in sending him to Jordan
so that he may be brought to justice. To permit Mr. Khalifa to remain
in the United States in these circumstances would potentially be seen
as an affront to Jordan and at odd with many of the basic elements of
our cooperative bilateral relationship [and] potentially undermine our
longstanding and successful policy of international legal cooperation
to bring about the prosecution of terrorists.” The next day, Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, acting for an absent Janet Reno, sends
a letter supporting the deportation request. [Lance, 2006, pp. 160-161]
Gorelick will later be named one of the ten 9/11 Commissioners. The
9/11 Commission will not discuss the decision to deport Khalifa at all.
Victim’s relative Monica Gabrielle will later note, “Gorelick was one
of those who wanted [the 9/11 Commission] to concentrate only on the
last few years.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 169]
In April 1995, Khalifa’s conviction will be overturned in Jordan after
a key witness recants, making it highly probable Khalifa will be found
innocent if deported there (see Early April 1995). But the US will go ahead with the deportation anyway, and Khalifa will be found innocent and set free (see April 26-May 3, 1995).
One of Ramzi Yousef’s timers seized by Philippines police in January 1995. [Source: Peter Lance]Responding
to an apartment fire, Philippine investigators uncover an al-Qaeda plot
to assassinate the Pope that is scheduled to take place when he visits
the Philippines one week later. While investigating that scheme, they
also uncover Operation Bojinka, planned by the same people: 1993 WTC
bomber Ramzi Yousef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). [Independent, 6/6/2002; Los Angeles Times, 6/24/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
Many initial reports after 9/11 will claim the fire was accidental and
the police discovery of it was a lucky break, but in 2002 the Los
Angeles Times will report that the police started the fire on purpose
as an excuse to look around the apartment. In the course of
investigating the fire, one of the main plotters, Abdul Hakim Murad, is
arrested. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
The plot has two main components. On January 12, Pope John Paul II is
scheduled to visit Manila and stay for five days. A series of bombs
along his parade route would be detonated by remote control, killing
thousands, including the Pope. Yousef’s apartment is only 500 feet from
the residence where the Pope will be staying. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 78; Lance, 2006, pp. 138] Then, starting January 21, a series of bombs would be placed on airplanes. [Insight, 5/27/2002]
Five men, Yousef, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Abdul Hakim Murad, Abd al-Karim
Yousef (a.k.a., Adel Anon, Yousef’s twin brother), and Khalid Al-Shaikh
(thought to be an alias for KSM) would depart to different Asian cities
and place a timed bomb on board during the first leg of passenger
planes traveling to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, and New York.
They would then transfer to another flight and place a second bomb on
board that flight. In all, 11 to 12 planes would blow up in a two day
period over the Pacific. If successful, some 4,000 people would have
been killed. [Agence France-Presse, 12/8/2001; Insight, 5/27/2002; Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002]
According to another account, some of the bombs would be timed to go
off weeks or even months later. Presumably worldwide air travel could
be interrupted for months. [Lance, 2003, pp. 260-61]
A second wave of attacks involving crashing airplanes into buildings in
the US would go forward later, once the pilots are trained for it (see February-Early May 1995).
Ramzi Yousef apprehended. [Source: Public domain]Ramzi Yousef is arrested in Pakistan, in a safe house owned by bin Laden (see February 1992-February 7, 1995).
At the time, his uncle Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is staying in the same
building, and brazenly gives an interview to Time magazine as “Khalid
Sheikh,” describing Yousef’s capture. [Lance, 2003, pp. 328]
Yousef had recruited Istaique Parker to implement a limited version of
Operation Bojinka, but Parker got cold feet and instead turned in
Yousef (see February 3-7, 1995). [Lance, 2003, pp. 284-85]
The New Yorker will later report that the CIA “fought with the FBI over
arresting Yousef in Pakistan - the CIA reportedly wanted to continue
tracking him - and President Clinton was forced to intervene.” [New Yorker, 3/17/1995] Yousef is extradited to the US the next day and makes a partial confession while flying there (see February 8, 1995).
On day after Ramzi Yousef is arrested in Pakistan (see February 7, 1995),
he makes a partial confession while being flown to the US. Apparently
believing that his conversations with FBI agents flying with him could
not be used as evidence since they are not being written down, he
confesses to masterminding the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center
(see February 26, 1993).
In fact, the agents secretly take notes and they will be used as
evidence in Yousef’s trial. As Yousef is flying over New York City on
his way to a prison cell, an FBI agent asks him, “You see the Trade
Centers down there, they’re still standing, aren’t they?” Yousef
responds, “They wouldn’t be if I had enough money and enough
explosives.” [MSNBC, 9/23/2001; Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 135]
Yousef also soon admits to ties with Wali Khan Amin Shah, who fought
with bin Laden in Afghanistan, and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, one of bin
Laden’s brothers-in-law, who is being held by the US at the time (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
But although Yousef talks freely, he makes no direct mention of bin
Laden, or the planned second wave of Operation Bojinka that closely
parallels the later 9/11 plot (see Spring 1995). [Lance, 2003, pp. 297-98]
He also fails to mention his uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who
is still at large and was a co-mastermind in most of Yousef’s plots.
When talking about his preparations to assassinate President Clinton in
Manila (see September 18-November 14, 1994), Yousef makes a vague mention of an “intermediary” who is actually KSM, but refuses to discuss him any further. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. xxiv-xxv] However, Yousef’s arrest will soon lead investigators to KSM in other ways (see After February 7, 1995-January 1996).
The flow chart made by Colonel Mendoza. [Source: Peter Lance] (click image to enlarge)Philippines
investigator Colonel Rodolfo Mendoza makes a remarkably accurate flow
chart connecting many key operators in the Bojinka plot, and sends it
to US investigators. The chart is based on what he is learning from
interrogating Bojinka plotter Abdul Hakim Murad (see February-Early May 1995), while also drawing on a terrorism report he recently finished (see December 15, 1994) and debriefings of a key undercover operative (see Early February 1995). The chart identifies the following key organizations as being involved in the plot:
Al-Harakat al-Islamiya. Meaning “Islamic Movement,” this is an
apparently meaningless group name used by Ramzi Yousef and others to
disguise their connections to al-Qaeda. Yousef also sometimes uses the
equally meaningless name “The Liberation Army.”
The Abu Sayyaf. This Philippine Muslim militant group is believed to
help with the Bojinka plot that is also penetrated by Philippine
intelligence (see Late 1994-January 1995). The chart mentions 20 Abu Sayyaf operatives trained by Yousef in 1992 (see December 1991-May 1992). [Lance, 2003, pp. 303-4]
IRIC (International Research and Information Center). Most of the money
for Bojinka is believed to flow through this charity front. The chart
names the only three employees: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (bin Laden’s
brother-in-law), Abu Omar (whose real name is Ahmad al-Hamwi (see 1995 and After),
and Dr. Zubair. Mendoza’s 1994 report names Abdul Salam Zubair as an
Iraqi working as Khalifa’s assistant in running a number of charity
fronts. [Japan Economic Newswire, 4/24/1995; Lance, 2003, pp. 303-4]
Konsonjaya. Money for the Bojinka plot also flows through this Malaysian business front (see June 1994).
Amien Mohammed (real name: Mohammed Amin al-Ghafari) is named and is
one of the company directors. There is a link to Wali Khan Amin Shah,
another company director. Hambali, a major al-Qaeda figure, is also a
company director but is not included in the chart.
The chart also mentions many other key figures in the plot:
Osama bin Laden, who is connected to the IRIC and Yousef’s group.
“Usama Asmorai / Wali K” is Wali Khan Amin Shah.
“Yousef / Adam Ali / A Basit” is Ramzi Yousef.
“Salem Ali / Mohmad” is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM).
Abdul Hakin Murad. [Lance, 2003, pp. 303-4]
“Ibrahim Muneer / Munir.” Ibrahim Munir, a rich Saudi Arabian
businessman, has close ties to bin Laden. He came to the Philippines in
November and witnesses say he was Yousef’s constant companion. In 2003,
it will be reported he is still wanted by authorities. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 139; Ressa, 2003, pp. 20]
The names in hexagonal boxes are the girlfriends of the plotters. Some Bojinka money is transferred in their names.
However,
despite the accurate information in this chart, only Shah, Yousef, and
Murad will be caught before 9/11. Khalifa is actually in US custody at
the time the US is given this chart (see December 16, 1994-May 1995), but he is allowed to be deported a short time later (see April 26-May 3, 1995).
The US also learns about a connection between Konsonjaya and bin Laden
by searching Yousef’s apartment. But the other Konsonjaya directors,
including Hambali, will not be apprehended, and the IRIC will be
allowed to continue functioning with the same staff after being taken
over by another charity front connected to Khalifa (see 1995 and After). [Lance, 2003, pp. 303-4]
Entity Tags: Rodolfo Mendoza, Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Wali Khan Amin Shah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ahmad al-Hamwi, Abu Sayyaf, Abdul Salam Zubair, Konsonjaya, Hambali, Abdul Hakim Murad, International Relations and Information Center, Ibrahim Munir
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Bin
Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, who is being detained in
the US, files a civil suit to have his possessions returned to him.
These possessions, confiscated at the time of his arrest, include an
address book and computer files linking him to Islamic militancy (see December 16, 1994-May 1995 and Late December 1994-April 1995).
On this day, the Justice Department states that it has no objection to
returning his possessions to him. Author Peter Lance will later call
these possessions a “treasure trove of al-Qaeda related intelligence”
that the US loses access to. While some or all of material may have
been copied, having the originals would increase their value in future
trials. [Lance, 2006, pp. 162] Khalifa will be deported from the US with all his possessions in early May 1995 (see April 26-May 3, 1995).
A
Jordanian appeals court overturns the conviction of Mohammed Jamal
Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law. A Jordanian court had convicted
Khalifa and sentenced him to death in December 1994, shortly after he
was arrested in the US (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
His conviction hinged on the testimony of one witness, a student at a
school in the Philippines run by one of Khalifa’s organizations. The
witness claimed that Khalifa had given him $50,000 to finance bombings
and assassinations in Jordan. But when the case goes to the appeals
court, the witness recants, and the court overturns the conviction. [Associated Press, 4/9/1995; Associated Press, 4/16/1995; San Francisco Chronicle, 4/18/1995]
Shortly after the court’s ruling, Khalifa’s lawyer says that Khalifa
wants to be deported to Jordan and retried in person. He is confident a
new trial will end in his acquittal. [Associated Press, 4/26/1995] The US will deport Khalifa to Jordan about one month later (see April 26-May 3, 1995). He will quickly be retried, found innocent, and set free (see July 19, 1995).
An
immigration judge approves the deportation of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa,
bin Laden’s brother-in-law, saying “his presence in the United States
would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.”
Khalifa reportedly leaves the US for Jordan on May 3, although there is
some evidence he remains in US custody until August (see May 3, 1995-August 31, 1995). [United Press International, 5/5/1995] He will quickly be retried in Jordan, pronounced not guilty of all charges, and set free (see July 19, 1995).
Jacob Boesen, an analyst at the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, will
later recall, “I remember people at the CIA who were ripsh_t at the
time. Not even speaking in retrospect, but contemporaneous with what
the intelligence community knew about bin Laden, Khalifa’s deportation
was unreal.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 4/18/1995; Associated Press, 4/26/1995; New York Times, 5/2/2002; Lance, 2003, pp. 233-35]
Author Peter Lance will later comment, “If this arrest had been
properly followed up by the FBI and the Justice Department, it could
have led to the seizure of both Ramzi Yousef and his uncle Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, and stopped the 9/11 plot dead in its tracks.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 158]
Nabil
al-Marabh returned to Canada from Afghanistan in February 1994 using a
fraudulent Saudi Arabian passport. But his request for asylum was
eventually denied. He then enters the US in June 1995 and applies for
asylum there. That too is denied, and he is ordered deported in 1997.
But the order is not enforced and he continues to live in the US and
Canada illegally until 9/11. [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/22/2001; Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
Al-Marabh moves to Boston and gets a job as a taxi driver. He had known
al-Qaeda operatives Bassam Kanj, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi, and Raed
Hijazi in training camps in Afghanistan (see Late 1980s; 1989-1994),
and this group of four regathers in Boston. Kanj has been there since
1995, driving taxis at the same company that hires al-Marabh. Elzahabi
moves to Boston from New York City in 1997 and also gets a job at this
same taxi company. There are conflicting accounts as to who brings Raed
Hijazi to Boston and why he goes there, but by the beginning of 1998 he
is also working for this taxi company. [Boston Globe, 2/5/2001; New York Times, 9/18/2001; New York Times, 10/14/2001; Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
Al-Marabh and Hijazi are roommates for at least two months. While they
work together driving taxis, Hijazi is saving his earnings to spend on
bomb plots and is working on an al-Qaeda plot to attack a US warship.
That plot will develop into the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. [ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002; Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
Around the end of 1998, Kanj and Hijazi leave Boston to work on
al-Qaeda plots overseas while Elzahabi leaves in 1999 to fight as a
sniper in Chechnya. Al-Marabh will also leave, moving to Florida in
early 1999 (see February 1999-February 2000),
but he periodically returns to his Boston residence for some time, as
his wife and son continue to live there. These four men will continue
to help each other in various al-Qaeda plots. [Boston Globe, 2/5/2001; Boston Globe, 6/26/2004]
Apparently, al-Qaeda recruiter Kamal Derwish also works at the same
Boston taxi company, though the timing is not clear. He trained in
Afghanistan in 1992, a time when al-Marabh was also there. He will be
killed by a US missile strike in November 2002 (see November 3, 2002). [Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/2003] Even though the Boston FBI is aware long before 9/11 that at least four of the men are connected to al-Qaeda (see January 2001), the FBI will officially deny the possibility of any al-Qaeda cell in Boston until 2004 (see June 27, 2004).
Bin
Laden’s brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa is pronounced not guilty
of all charges and set free in a retrial in Jordan. Khalifa had been
convicted and sentenced to death in a December 1994 Jordanian trial,
but then a key witness recanted and the verdict was overturned in April
1995 (see Early April 1995). The US then deported him to Jordan to face retrial anyway (see April 26-May 3, 1995). [Agence France-Presse, 7/19/1995]
He quickly returns to Saudi Arabia, where he has citizenship. Michael
Scheuer, the first head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, will later claim
that that “day he flew back to Saudi Arabia, he was greeted by a limo
and a high-ranking official of the government embraced him.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 164]
One later article similarly claims, “Returning to Saudi Arabia, Khalifa
was allegedly welcomed like a hero by Prince Sultan, Saudi’s second
deputy premier.” [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/2000] Khalifa will go on to help found a militant group in Yemen that will take credit for the USS Cole bombing in 2000 (see 1996-1997 and After), while his Philippine front companies will continue to fund militant groups with few obstacles long after 9/11 (see 1995 and After).
The
CIA and Albanian intelligence recruit an informer knowledgeable about
al-Qaeda in the Balkans. The informer, whose name is Hassan Mustafa
Osama Nasr, but is known as Abu Omar, is recruited by a special unit of
the Albanian National Intelligence Service (ShIK) created at the behest
of the CIA. An officer in the unit, Astrit Nasufi, will say that the
unit is actually run by a CIA agent known as “Mike” who is based on the
US embassy in Tirana, Albania, and who teaches them intelligence
techniques. The CIA and ShIK are worried about a possible assassination
attempt against the Egyptian foreign minister, who is to visit Albania
soon, so about twelve radical Egyptians, members of Al-Gama’a
al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad, are detained beforehand. Nasr is not on
the list, but is detained because of a link to a suspect charity, the
Human Relief and Construction Agency (HRCA). He is held for about 10
days and, although he initially refuses to talk, ShIK has a “full file”
on him after a week. He provides information about around ten fellow
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya members working for HRCA and two other
charities, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society, both of which will be declared designated
supporters of terrorism after 9/11. However, he says there are no plans
to kill the Egyptian foreign minister, as this would mean Albania would
no longer be a safe haven for fundamentalist Muslims. The intelligence
Nasr goes on to provide is regarded as good quality and includes the
identities of operatives monitoring the US embassy and entering and
leaving Albania. The CIA is most interested in monitoring former
mujaheddin joining the Bosnian Muslims, and Nasr also provides
intelligence on Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya branches in Britain, Germany,
and Italy, in particular the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, which
is a base for mujaheddin operations in the Balkans and is raided by the
Italian government around this time (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995).
Even though cooperation appears to be good, after a few weeks Nasr
suddenly disappears and the CIA tells ShIK that Nasr has moved to
Germany. [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005] Nasr will later surface in Italy and will become close to Islamic militants in Milan (see Summer 2000), but will be kidnapped by the CIA after 9/11 (see February 17, 2003).
Entity Tags: Human Relief and Construction Agency, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Astrit Nasufi, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, Islamic Jihad, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Islamic Cultural Institute, Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Service (Albania), al-Haramain Islamic Foundation
Timeline Tags: Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Complete 911 Timeline
Talaat
Fouad Qassem, 38, a known leader of the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the
Islamic Group), an Egyptian extremist organization, is arrested and
detained in Croatia as he travels to Bosnia from Denmark, where he has
been been living after being granted political asylum. He is suspected
of clandestine support of terrorist operations, including the 1993
World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993). He also allegedly led mujaheddin efforts in Bosnia since 1990 (see 1990).
In a joint operation, he is arrested by Croatian intelligence agents
and handed over to the CIA. Qassem is then interrogated by US officials
aboard a US ship off the Croatian coast in the Adriatic Sea and sent to
Egypt, which has a rendition agreement with the US (see 1995). An Egyptian military tribunal has already sentenced him to death in absentia, and he is executed soon after he arrives. [Associated Press, 10/31/1995; Washington Post, 3/11/2002, pp. A01; Mahle, 2005, pp. 204-205; New Yorker, 2/8/2005] According to the 1999 book Dollars for Terror,
two weeks before his abduction, Qassem was in Switzerland negotiating
against Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Some Muslim Brotherhood exiles were
negotiating with the Egyptian government to be allowed to return to
Egypt if they agreed not to use Muslim Brotherhood Swiss bank accounts
to fund Egyptian militant groups like Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, but
Qassem and other radicals oppose this deal. So the removal of Qassem
helps the Muslim Brotherhood in their conflict with more militant
groups. [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 70-71]
Melissa Boyle Mahle. [Source: Publicity photo]According
to a later account by CIA agent Melissa Boyle Mahle, “a tidbit received
late in the year revealed the location” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) in
Qatar (see 1992-1996). [Mahle, 2005, pp. 247-248] This presumably is information the FBI learned in Sudan that KSM was traveling to Qatar (see Shortly Before October 1995).
However, US intelligence should also have been aware that KSM’s nephew
Ramzi Yousef attempted to call him in Qatar in February 1995 while
Yousef was in US custody (see After February 7, 1995-January 1996).
Mahle is assigned to verify KSM’s identity. She claims that at the time
the CIA is aware of KSM’s involvement in the Bojinka plot in the
Philippines (see January 6, 1995) and in the 1993 WTC bombing (see February 26, 1993) She is able to match his fingerprints with a set of fingerprints the CIA already has in their files. [Guardian, 3/31/2005] By October 1995, the FBI tracks KSM to a certain apartment building in Qatar.
Then, using high-technology surveillance, his presence in the building is confirmed. [Miniter, 2003, pp. 85-86] Mahle argues that KSM should be rendered out of the country in secret. The US began rendering terrorist suspects in 1993 (see 1993), and a prominent Egyptian extremist is rendered by the CIA in September 1995 (see September 13, 1995). She argues her case to CIA headquarters and to the highest reaches of the NSA, but is overruled. [Guardian, 3/31/2005]
Instead, the decision is made to wait until KSM can be indicted in a US
court and ask Qatar to extradite him to the US. Despite the
surveillance on KSM, he apparently is able to leave Qatar and travel to
Brazil with bin Laden and then back to Qatar at the end of 1995 (see December 1995). KSM will be indicted in early 1996, but he will escape from Qatar a few months later (see January-May 1996).
A
suicide bombing destroys the police station in the town of Rijeka,
Croatia, wounding 29 people. The Egyptian militant group Al-Gama’a
al-Islamiyya takes credit for the bombing, saying it is revenge for the
abduction of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya leader Talaat Fouad Qassem in
Croatia the month before (see September 13, 1995).
The Croatians will later determine that the mastermind, Hassan
al-Sharif Mahmud Saad, and the suicide bomber were both tied to
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. They also were tied to the Islamic Cultural
Institute in Milan, Italy, which in turn has ties to many militant
attacks, some committed Ramzi Yousef (see 1993-1997). CIA soon discovers that the suicide bomber also worked for the Third World Refugee Center charity front (see January 1996). [Kohlmann, 2004, pp. 153-155]
In 1999, the FBI’s Bojinka investigation will notice that Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed (KSM) was believed to be in neighboring Bosnia at the time and
that the timing device of the bomb (a modified Casio watch) closely
resembled those used by KSM and his nephew Yousef in the Bojinka plot
(see January 6, 1995). Presumably, this would have increased the importance of catching KSM. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 489]
Egyptian
diplomat Alaa al-Din Nazmi is shot and killed as he is returning to his
house in Geneva, Switzerland. While he is officially said to be
negotiating with the World Trade Organization on economic matters, the
Independent will later report, “Political sources suggested that Nazmi
was working under diplomatic cover, and that his real job was to track
down members of Egyptian Islamist armed groups in Europe who have sworn
to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. Nazmi’s murderers [say]
as much two days later,” when they take credit for the killing, using
an alias for Islamic Jihad. [Independent, 12/6/1995]
Swiss authorities seem uninterested in vigorously pursuing political
connections to the murder, which is never solved. However, it will
later be reported, “According to various sources close to the
investigation, the Egyptian diplomat had been handling several
sensitive files relating precisely to the financial resources of the
Muslim Brotherhood, of which $200 to $500 was managed by various
financial organizations” in Switzerland. The diplomat had played a
major part in an attempt to recover these funds. He was focusing on the
Al Taqwa Bank on the Swiss-Italian border, known to be a major bank for
the Muslim Brotherhood. [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 63-68]
A few months earlier, Nazmi apparently had been in secret discussions
with the Egyptian militant Talaat Fouad Qassem, who was then abducted
by the CIA and executed in Egypt (see September 13, 1995). So Nazmi’s assassination is seen as revenge for the death of Qassem. [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 70-71]
Anwar
Shaaban, an Islamist militant in charge of logistics for mujaheddin
fighting in Bosnia, is killed in Croatia. Shaaban had been based at the
Islamic Cultural Institute mosque in Milan, but managed to avoid arrest
when it was raided (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995).
On December 14, 1995, the same day a peace accord is signed ending the
Bosnian war, Shaaban is killed by Croatian troops in what mujaheddin
claim is an ambush. Shaaban’s diary is found, and it cites regular
meetings between al-Qaeda leaders and leaders of the Bosnian Muslim
government, including General Staff Chief Rasim Delic and Interior
Minister Bakir Alispahic. [Schindler, 2007, pp. 216-217]
Shaaban, a leader of the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya militant group, had
been in regular contact with Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman and al-Qaeda
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. [Schindler, 2007, pp. 163-164]
The
Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) gains more influence in the
Islamic Cultural Institute, a militant mosque in Milan, Italy,
following the death of its former head, Anwar Shaaban. Under the
leadership of Shaaban, who died in the Bosnian war, the mosque had been
built up into a key European logistics center for militant Islamists. [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001] The mosque is described as “the main al-Qaeda station house in Europe” (see 1993-1997),
but the GIA is said to be infiltrated by government informers at this
point and is losing strength in Algeria due to the penetration (see October 27, 1994-July 16, 1996).
After
fleeing Qatar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) travels the world and plans
many al-Qaeda operations. He previously was involved in the 1993 WTC
bombing, and the Operation Bojinka plot. [Time, 1/20/2003] He is apparently involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998 and Bad link: a0898ksmnairobi), the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000),
and other attacks. One US official says, “There is a clear operational
link between him and the execution of most, if not all, of the al-Qaeda
plots over the past five years.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] He lives in Prague, Czech Republic, through much of 1997. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] By 1999, he is living in Germany and visiting with the hijackers there. [New York Times, 6/8/2002; New York Times, 9/22/2002]
Using 60 aliases and as many passports, he travels through Europe,
Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and South America, personally
setting up al-Qaeda cells. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002; Time, 1/20/2003]
The Al Taqwa Bank had offices in this building in Lugano, Italy, on the border with Switzerland. [Source: Keystone]Newsweek
will later claim that US investigators “on bin Laden’s trail” had known
about the Al Taqwa Bank in Switzerland and its support for al-Qaeda
“for years. But the group’s mazelike structure made it hard to track,
and the Feds considered it a low priority.” A senior Treasury official
later will tell Congress that US investigators learned in 1997 that
Hamas had transferred $60 million into accounts at the Al Taqwa Bank.
Also in 1997, US investigators learn the names of many Al Taqwa
shareholders. Many of them turn out to be rich and powerful Arabs,
including members of the bin Laden family and members of the Kuwaiti
royal family (see 1997-December 1999). Newsweek later will claim that, “The US took a harder look at Al Taqwa after the [1998 US] embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
Sources say US intelligence tracked telephone contacts between Al Taqwa
and members of bin Laden’s inner circle. Al-Qaeda operatives would call
Al Taqwa representatives in the Bahamas as they moved around the world.
Still, the network’s complex structure made it difficult to prove how
money changed hands, and the investigation stalled. Under US pressure,
the Bahamian government revoked Al Taqwa’s license [in the spring of
2001]. Treasury officials say the network continued to do business
anyway.” [Newsweek, 3/18/2002] The US will declare Al Taqwa a terrorist financier two months after 9/11 (see November 7, 2001).
Hassan
Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), a member of the Egyptian
terrorist organization Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya who previously informed
for the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After),
arrives in Italy and settles in Rome. He obtains asylum in Italy and
serves as an imam near the Italian capital for a few years. He will
later move to Milan at the same time a key al-Qaeda operative moves
there (see Summer 2000). [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005; Vidino, 2006, pp. 242]
Mohamed Daki. [Source: Cageprisoners]Records
indicate that would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh lives at the same
Hamburg, Germany, address as a Moroccan named Mohamed Daki during this
time. Daki will be arrested in April 2003, and will admit to knowing
bin al-Shibh and some others in the Hamburg cell. In April 1999 Daki
will obtain a visa to travel to the US, but it is not known if he goes
there. It is generally assumed by the press that the Hamburg cell keep
themselves separate from other al-Qaeda cells in Europe. However, Daki
is an expert document forger and a member of al-Qaeda’s Milan cell.
There is considerable evidence that the Milan cell has foreknowledge of
the 9/11 plot. The cell is under heavy surveillance by Italian
intelligence before 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and January 24, 2001),
but apparently the connection between the Milan and Hamburg cells
through Daki is not made. German authorities will interview him after
9/11, and he will admit ties to bin al-Shibh, but he will be let go,
not investigated further, and not put on any watch lists. He will later
come under investigation in Italy for recruiting fighters to combat the
US in Iraq. He will finally be arrested and charged for that, but not
for his 9/11 connections. [Los Angeles Times, 3/22/2004; New York Times, 3/22/2004]
Following
an investigation of extremists linked to the Islamic Cultural Institute
mosque in Milan, Italy, arrests are made, but most of the suspects are
eventually released. The mosque was a logistics base for radical
Muslims fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995 and Late 1993-1994)
and has been under investigation for some time. However, according to
the Chicago Tribune: “[T]he criminal case appears to [founder] on the
vagaries of the Italian justice system. Because of limitations on
jailing people charged with crimes committed outside Italy, most of the
suspects [will be] released and [vanish].” [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001]
People connected to the mosque will go on to be connected to numerous
plots, such as the failed millennium attacks and 9/11 (see Late 1998-September 11, 2001).
Zein al-Abidine Almihdhar. [Source: Associated Press]Ahmed
Nasrallah, a veteran al-Qaeda operative who has been in Yemen for
several years, decides to defect and turn himself in to the Yemeni
government. He discloses the location of al-Qaeda strongholds in Yemen
and even gives away the location of al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri in a southern Yemeni town. He describes al-Qaeda’s
weaponry, security, and violent plans for the future. He offers to spy
on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or on a militant Yemeni group led by Zein
al-Abidine Almihdhar, a relative of hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. (In 1999
Zein will be caught and executed in Yemen for kidnappings and
killings.) However, two officials in the Political Security
Organization (Yemen’s equivalent of the FBI) have radical militant ties
and hand over Nasrallah to al-Qaeda operatives. These operatives plan
to kill him for betraying their group, but he escapes to Egypt before
they can do so. The Egyptian government then interrogates him for more
than a year. However, it is not known what he told them before 9/11, or
what they might have passed to the US. One of the two Yemeni officers
helping al-Qaeda on this matter, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman al-Hilah,
will be recorded by Italian intelligence in 2000 apparently mentioning
the upcoming 9/11 attacks (see August 12, 2000). [Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002]
Yemeni
security officer Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman travels to Switzerland to
purchase passport forgery equipment for Islamist extremists. Abdulsalam
is a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO),
the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI (see August 12, 2000).
Abdulrahman purchases tools to forge Schengen visas, which allow their
holder to travel without border controls in some European Union
countries. Italian authorities investigating Abdulrahman and his
associates will learn this by 2002. They will speculate that
Abdulrahman is an expert forger and that he trains a militant named
Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman
al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000), in forgery. Es Sayed will travel to Italy in 2000 from Yemen, where he will begin forging documents (see Summer 2000).
Abdulrahman has close ties to radical organizations and provides false
documents and airline tickets to al-Qaeda members to facilitate their
travels to Europe. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 223-4]
Bombings of the Nairobi, Kenya, US embassy (left), and the Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, US embassy (right). [Source: Associated Press] (click image to enlarge)Two
US embassies in Africa are bombed within minutes of each other. The
attack in Nairobi, Kenya, kills 213 people, including 12 US nationals,
and injures more than 4,500. The attack in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
kills 11 and injures 85. The attack is blamed on al-Qaeda. [PBS Frontline, 2001]
The Tanzania death toll is low because, remarkably, the attack takes
place on a national holiday so the US embassy there is closed. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195] The attack shows al-Qaeda has a capability for simultaneous attacks. A third attack against the US embassy in Uganda fails. [Associated Press, 9/25/1998]
In the 2002 book The Cell, reporters John Miller, Michael Stone, and
Chris Miller will write, “What has become clear with time is that
facets of the East Africa plot had been known beforehand to the FBI,
the CIA, the State Department, and to Israeli and Kenyan intelligence
services.… [N]o one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7,
1998, couldn’t have been prevented.” [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195]
After 9/11, it will come to light that three of the alleged hijackers,
Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi, had some
involvement in the bombings (see October 4, 2001, Late 1999, and 1993-1999) and that the US intelligence community was aware of this involvement by late 1999 (see December 15-31, 1999), if not before.
9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) lived in the Philippines for
much of 1994 and took part in the failed Bojinka plot to assassinate
Pope John Paul II and crash a dozen airplanes (see January 6, 1995). In the years after this, he makes repeated visits to the Philippines, as well as neighboring Malaysia. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
KSM returns to the Philippines in September 1998 and stays to organize
the assassination of Pope John Paul II, who is due to visit the country
in January 1999. KSM is seen at a nightclub in Manila in early 1999. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. xxv]
But the Pope’s visit is canceled; it isn’t known if the cancellation is
due to security concerns or not. That same year, the FBI alerts
Philippine intelligence that KSM has returned to that country to visit
an old girlfriend. However, he disappears before agents arrive to
arrest him. Further details on how he was traced there or how he got
away have not been made public. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; London Times, 11/10/2002]
KSM will continue to return to the Philippines occasionally. There are
even “credible reports” that he is seen there in the summer of 2002. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; Knight Ridder, 9/9/2002]
Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later write that after the US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998),
surveillance of al-Qaeda is stepped up around the world. “One
intelligence officer attached to the French embassy in Islamabad,
[Pakistan], urged his counterparts in foreign missions in Pakistan to
detail the recipients of phone calls made by… al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida, then living in Peshawar, to individuals in their various
countries.” As a result, “several governments [launch] investigations
of their own.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 245] A close associate of Zubaida in Peshawar at this time is Khalil Deek, who is actually a mole for the Jordanian government (see 1998-December 11, 1999).
One such investigation is launched by the Philippine government on
October 16, 1998, after being asked by French intelligence to gather
intelligence on people in the Philippines in contact with Zubaida. Code
named CoPlan Pink Poppy, the investigation reveals connections between
al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a Philippine
militant group. On December 16, 1999, Abdesselem Boulanouar and Zoheir
Djalili, two French Algerians belonging to the Algerian al-Qaeda
affiliate the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), are arrested
due to information learned from monitoring Zubaida’s calls to the
Philippines. Boulanouar is arrested at an airport carrying a terrorist
training manual he admitted writing for the MILF. Both men also are
arrested carrying explosive devices. French intelligence says
Boulanouar had ties to Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999),
and like Ressam, may have been planning to carry out attacks at the
turn of the millennium. He will be deported to France and imprisoned on
terrorism related charges. CoPlan Pink Poppy will be canceled in 2000
for lack of funds. [Gulf News, 3/14/2000; Ressa, 2003, pp. 132-133; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 245]
However, while details are murky, it appears other governments continue
to monitor Zubaida’s calls. Around the same time as the Philippines
arrests, one militant in Jordan is even arrested while still in the
middle of a phone call to Zubaida (see November 30, 1999). US intelligence will remain intensely focused on Zubaida before 9/11 (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001), and just days before 9/11 the NSA will monitor calls Zubaida is making to the US (see Early September 2001). It appears his calls will continue to be monitored after 9/11 as well (see October 8, 2001).
The Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy. [Source: Public domain]By
late 1998, US and Italian intelligence are already aware of the
importance of a mosque in Milan, Italy, called the Islamic Cultural
Institute. After 9/11, the Treasury Department will call the mosque
“the main al-Qaeda station house in Europe. It is used to facilitate
the movement of weapons, men and money across the world.” Additionally,
they are aware that Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, a founder and director of Al
Taqwa Bank, is also a founder and financier of the mosque. The mosque
is also less than 50 miles away from Al Taqwa’s headquarters on the
Swiss border.(see 1993-1997). [Newsweek, 3/18/2002]
US officials will later say that al-Qaeda operatives involved in the
1998 US embassy bombings stayed at the Milan mosque. This causes US and
Italian intelligence to watch the mosque more closely, and it also
causes the US to look closer at Al Taqwa Bank (see 1997-September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 3/18/2002] One member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan lives in Hamburg with 9/11 plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh for most of 1998 (see December 1997-November 1998).
In 2000, Abderazek Mahdjoub, the head of the Milan cell, lives in
Hamburg, attends the Al-Quds mosque that the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell
attends, and has ties with some of the 9/11 hijackers (see 2000). Al-Qaeda operatives involved in the failed millennium bombing plot in Jordan also stay at the Milan mosque (see November 30, 1999). The Jordanian government later will claim that Al Taqwa helped fund these millennium bombers. [Newsweek, 3/18/2002; Newsweek, 4/12/2004]
Starting in late 2000, Italian intelligence, wiretapping people
associated with the Milan mosque and/or the Milan al-Qaeda cell, record
conversations suggesting foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot (see August 12, 2000; January 24, 2001). This information is shared with the US in early 2001 (see March 2001). Additional evidence will come out after 9/11 suggesting some people in Milan had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see September 4, 2001; September 7, 2001).
Given the closeness of the Al Taqwa Bank to the mosque, especially
through Nasreddin, this raises the possibility of Al Taqwa involvement
and knowledge of specific al-Qaeda plots, including the 9/11 attacks,
though there is no known evidence of such direct ties except for the
attempted millennium bombing mentioned above.
Nabil
al-Marabh will claim in a 2002 statement that in May 1999, the FBI
approaches him in Boston, looking for Raed Hijazi. Al-Marabh will say
he lied and said he did not know Hijazi, even though he knew him well.
Hijazi apparently has not been involved in any violent crime yet, but
will participate in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel in Jordan (see November 30, 1999) and will help plan the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 (see October 12, 2000). [Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
In August 1999 FBI agents again visit al-Marabh’s Boston apartment to
ask him about another man. Al-Marabh’s wife will later recall that the
first name of this man is Ahmed. [New York Times, 10/14/2001] He is from Jordan and had lived in their apartment for two months. [New York Times, 9/21/2001] Around the same time, the Boston FBI is looking for another associate of al-Marabh’s, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi (see 1997 and 1999). They work at the same taxi company and fought together in Afghanistan.
On December 5, 1999, a Jordanian raid discovers 71 vats of bomb making chemicals in this residence. [Source: Judith Miller]Jordanian
officials successfully uncover an al-Qaeda plot to blow up the Radisson
Hotel in Amman, Jordan, and other sites on January 1, 2000. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002]
The Jordanian government intercepts a call between al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida and a suspected Jordanian terrorist named Abu Hoshar. Zubaida
says, “The training is over.” [New York Times, 1/15/2001] Zubaida also says, “The grooms are ready for the big wedding.” [Seattle Times, 6/23/2002]
This call reflects an extremely poor code system, because the FBI had
already determined in the wake of the 1998 US embassy bombings that
“wedding” was the al-Qaeda code word for bomb. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 214]
Furthermore, it appears al-Qaeda fails to later change the system,
because the code-name for the 9/11 attack is also “The Big Wedding.” [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002]
Jordan arrests Hoshar while he’s still on the phone talking to Zubaida.
In the next few days, 27 other suspects are charged. A Jordanian
military court will later convict 22 of them for participating in
planned attacks, sentencing six of them death. In addition to bombing
the Radisson Hotel around the start of the millennium, the plan calls
for suicide bombings on two border crossings with Israel and a
Christian baptism site. Further attacks in Jordan are planned for
later. The plotters had already stockpiled the equivalent of 16 tons of
TNT, enough to flatten “entire neighborhoods.” [New York Times, 1/15/2001] Key alleged plotters include:
Raed Hijazi, a US citizen who is part of a Boston al-Qaeda cell (see June 1995-Early 1999). He will be arrested and convicted in late 2000 (see September 2000 and October 2000). [New York Times, 1/15/2001]
Khalid Deek, who is also a US citizen and part of an Anaheim,
California al-Qaeda cell. He will be arrested in Pakistan and deported
to Jordan, but strangely he will released without going to trial.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He initially escapes arrest (see 2001) but is later sentenced in absentia. He will later be a notorious figure in the Iraq war starting in 2003. [Washington Post, 10/3/2004]
Luai Sakra. The Washington Post will later say he “played a role” in
the plot, though he is never charged for it. Sakra apparently is a CIA
informant before 9/11, perhaps starting in 2000 (see 2000). [Washington Post, 2/20/2006]
The
Jordanian government will also later claim that the Al Taqwa Bank in
Switzerland helped finance the network of operatives who planned the
attack. The bank will be shut down shortly after 9/11 (see November 7, 2001). [Newsweek, 4/12/2004]
Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Al Taqwa Bank, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Luai Sakra, Khalil Deek, Abu Hoshar, Jordan, Raed Hijazi
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Ahmed Ressam. [Source: Public domain]The CIA learns from the Jordanian government about an al-Qaeda millennium bombing plot in that country (see November 30, 1999). Further, the CIA concludes more attacks are likely soon, including some inside the US (see December 8, 1999). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told of this, and he implements a plan to neutralize the threat. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 205, 211]
The plan, approved by President Clinton, focuses on harassing and
disrupting al-Qaeda members throughout the world. The FBI is put on
heightened alert, counterterrorism teams are dispatched overseas, a
formal ultimatum is given to the Taliban to keep al-Qaeda under
control, and friendly intelligence agencies are asked to help. There
are Cabinet-level meetings nearly every day dealing with terrorism [Washington Post, 4/2/2000; Associated Press, 6/28/2002]
All US embassies, military bases, police departments, and other
agencies are given a warning to be on the lookout for signs of an
al-Qaeda millennium attack. One alert border agent responds by
arresting terrorist Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999), which leads to the unraveling of several bombing plots (see December 15-31, 1999).
No terror attacks occur. However, Clarke claims the FBI generally
remains unhelpful. For example, around this time the FBI says there are
no websites in the US soliciting volunteers for training in Afghanistan
or money for terrorist front groups. Clarke has a private citizen check
to see if this is true, and within days, he is given a long list of
such websites. The FBI and Justice Department apparently fail to do
anything with the information. [Newsweek, 3/31/2004]
As an al-Qaeda millennium plot is broken up in Jordan (see November 30, 1999),
attention is focused on the fact that two of the plotters were long
time US residents. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger sends a memo
to President Clinton about the two men, Raed Hijazi and Khalil Deek.
Hijazi had lived in California and then moved to Boston to drive a taxi
there for several years. The 9/11 Commission will say Berger tells
Clinton was a naturalized US citizen who had “been in touch with
extremists in the United States as well as abroad.” Later in the month,
counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will warn Berger in an e-mail,
“Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in
the US are likely.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 179, 501] Deek is arrested on December 11 (see December 11, 1999), but he will eventually be released without being charged (see May 2001).
A few days later, Clarke authorizes a study that looks into Deek’s
connections, but no action will be taken when it is discovered Deek’s
next-door neighbor is still living in Anaheim, California, and running
an al-Qaeda sleeper cell there (see December 14-25, 1999). Similarly, while Hijazi will be arrested overseas some months later (see September 2000),
US intelligence seems oblivious to the other al-Qaeda operatives who
have been his roommates and fellow taxi drivers in Boston (see June 1995-Early 1999 and October 2000). One of them, Nabil al-Marabh, will apparently go on to have a major role in the 9/11 plot (see for example January 2001-Summer 2001 and Early September 2001).
Investigators will also fail to act on knowledge of financial
transactions between Hijazi and three of the 9/11 hijackers (see Spring 2001).
Khalil Deek. [Source: Tawfiq Deek]Khalil
Deek is arrested by police in Peshawar, Pakistan, and immediately
extradited to Jordan. The Jordanian government requested the arrest
after tying Deek to a millennium plot to blow up hotels in Jordan that
had been broken up a few days earlier (see November 30, 1999). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006]
Deek is a naturalized US citizen who has been part of a California
al-Qaeda sleeper cell for most of the 1990s. He had been investigated
by US authorities since the late 1980s (see Late 1980s, March 1993-1996, and December 14-25, 1999)
but strangely was never arrested. Deek’s computer is confiscated when
he is arrested, and computer files reveals the targets of the Jordanian
plot. [Cooley, 2002, pp. 33]
According to contemporary press accounts, Deek, who was running a
computer repair shop in Peshawar, Pakistan, had helped encrypt
al-Qaeda’s Internet communications and smuggled recruits to al-Qaeda
training camps in Afghanistan. Some reports identify him as a former
mujaheddin fighter, a US Army veteran, and a close associate of bin
Laden. Articles also claim he worked closely with al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida on the Jordanian plot and other things (see May 2000, Late 1980s, and 1998-December 11, 1999). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006] CNN says Deek “is believed to be the mastermind” of the Jordanian plot. [CNN, 12/17/1999]
But unlike the rest of the defendants in the Jordanian case, Deek is
transferred from a maximum-security prison to a minimum-security one.
He alone is not charged. He will be released in May 2001 (see May 2001). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006] It will later be alleged that Deek was a Jordanian intelligence mole (see Shortly After December 11, 1999).
Earlier
in December, the CIA estimated that al-Qaeda would launch between five
and 15 attacks against American targets around the world over the New
Year’s weekend, and that several targets would likely be inside the US
(see December 8, 1999). Since late 1999, there has been intelligence that targets in Washington and New York would be attacked at this time. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] There in fact are a number of planned attacks, including bomb attacks on the Boston and Los Angeles airports (see December 14, 1999 and December 15-31, 1999), a hotel in Jordan (see November 30, 1999), and a naval ship in Yemen (see January 3, 2000). However, all of the attacks are foiled, thanks to alerts and luck. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002]
Abderazek Mahdjoub. [Source: Associated Press]Abderazek
Mahdjoub, an Algerian living in Hamburg, Germany, attends the al-Quds
mosque, and has ties to some of the 9/11 hijackers. According to a
senior German intelligence official, Mahdjoub is under observation by
German domestic intelligence since at least this year. However, he is
also connected to the al-Qaeda cell in Milan and in fact is believed to
be the head of that cell. There is considerable evidence that the Milan
cell has foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. The cell is under heavy
surveillance by Italian intelligence before 9/11 (see August 12, 2000)
(see January 24, 2001).
But apparently the connection between the Milan and Hamburg cells
through Mahdjoub is not made. He is also tied to Mohamed Daki, another
alleged member of the Milan cell periodically living in Hamburg before
9/11 (see December 1997-November 1998).
He apparently continues to be a major organizer after 9/11, and the
Italian and German governments fail to share information about him. He
is suspected of leading European recruitment of those who want to fight
the US in Iraq. In late 2003, he will finally be arrested trying to
cross the border into Iraq. He is put in German custody. [New York Times, 11/29/2003; New York Times, 3/22/2004]
Attendees
of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid
Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin
Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid
Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI]About
a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level
al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar
- The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11
plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence
at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by
the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
- Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and
the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is
an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January
1995 (see January 6, 1995),
and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only
realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the
presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002]
Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed
by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the
9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s
interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading
this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot
targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003; New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003]
For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make
the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the
agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had
photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]
Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002]
The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot
at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003]
Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos,
as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them
of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after
the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000).
Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by
Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]
Tawfiq bin Attash
- Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of
bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and
served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001]
He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is
reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to
get a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188; Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002).
He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An
al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in
late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006]
Ramzi bin al-Shibh
- Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His
presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11,
despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin
Attash, and had video footage of him. [Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the
Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi
bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [New York Times, 8/24/2002]
Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes
that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks
of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which
makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and
the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002]
Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s
presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh
and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir
- A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter
at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him
to the apartment where the summit is held. [Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004]
After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after
the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]
Abu Bara al Taizi
- A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11
hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny
for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]
Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).
Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001]
However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso
are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may
just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Ulrich Kersten, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Bara al Taizi, Hambali, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Islamic Jihad, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Salem Alhazmi, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Malaysian Secret Service
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Mahmoud
Es Sayed is arrested in Syria with other militants on weapons smuggling
charges, according to Italian authorities. The Italians will learn this
later based on wiretaps of Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. While in prison, Es Sayed is
visited by Muftafa Tlass, the Syrian defense minister, and Es Sayed
tells him that the weapons are meant to fight Jews. Tlass, a virulent
anti-Semite who even claimed in a book that Jews kill non-Jews to use
their blood to make pastries, arranges for the release of the whole
group, and puts them in touch with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
[Vidino, 2006, pp. 222]
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr. [Source: ABC]Italian resident Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA on extremists in Albania (see February 17, 2003), moves from Rome to Milan to live with a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000 and Summer 2000).
Al-Zawahiri’s associate, Mahmoud Es Sayed, and Nasr arrive in Milan at
the same time, and it appears their movements are coordinated. Nasr
actually lives in Es Sayed’s apartment and the pair make use of two
radical mosques in Milan, the Via Quaranta mosque, which is their
headquarters, and the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI), which is
associated with a cell of radical Islamists that works with al-Qaeda
and appears to have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and March 2001).
The ICI has a reputation as the most radical Islamic center in Italy,
was a key supply point for Muslims fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995), and was connected to the first World Trade Center bombing (see Late 1993-1994).
Nasr serves as deputy imam at the ICI and preaches anti-US sermons.
Italian law enforcement authorities monitor him with bugs in his
apartment and through a tap on his phone, finding out that after 9/11
he recruits Muslims to go and fight in Afghanistan. He does not seem to
be directly involved in serious illegal activity, but the information
the Italians gain helps them monitor other radicals. His relationship
with the CIA during his time in Italy is unclear, but in one monitored
call after 9/11 he appears to be dissuading another radical from
attacking Jews and in another he tells an associate not to carry out a
car bombing. [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005; Vidino, 2006, pp. 242] The CIA will kidnap Nasr in 2003 (see February 17, 2003).
In August 2000, Nabil al-Marabh moves to Detroit, Michigan, to enroll in a truck driving course in nearby Dearborn. [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
According to an informant who will claim that al-Marabh confided to him
in 2002, al-Marabh is taking instructions from a mystery figure in
Chicago known only as “al Mosul”, which means “boss” or “person in
charge” in Arabic. Al Mosul asks al-Marabh to attend the driving school
to get a commercial truck driver’s license. Also according to this
informant, al-Marabh and Raed Hijazi have plans to steal a fuel truck
from a rest stop in New York or New Jersey and detonate it in the
heavily traveled Lincoln or Holland tunnels leading into New York City,
but the plan is foiled when Hijazi is arrested in October 2000 (see October 2000) for an attempted bombing in Jordan (see November 30, 1999). [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003] Al-Marabh may have moved to Detroit to avoid government scrutiny in Boston after stabbing a roommate in May 2000 (see May 30, 2000-March 2001).
His wife and son apparently continue to live at his long-time Boston
address until September 2000 and then move to elsewhere in the city
without leaving a forwarding address. [New York Times, 9/18/2001; Boston Herald, 9/19/2001; New York Times, 9/21/2001]
Al-Marabh continues to live in Detroit until January 2001. The
Washington Post will note that al-Marabh “appears to [move] every few
months or continually [change] his residence on official documents ? at
one point listing an address in Dearborn, Michigan, that is a truck
stop.” [Washington Post, 9/21/2001; Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
He repeatedly claims to Michigan state officials that he lost his
license, and secures temporary driver’s licenses without photographs. [Washington Post, 9/21/2001]
He receives five driver’s licenses in Michigan over a period of 13
months in addition to carrying driver’s licenses from Massachusetts,
Illinois, Florida, and Ontario, Canada. [Toronto Star, 10/26/2001] He moves to Toronto, Canada in January 2001 (see January 2001-Summer 2001),
but will return to Detroit in August 2001 and will still be getting
duplicate Michigan licenses and looking for a tractor-trailer driving
job in the week after 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2001; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002]
A
former member of the militant group Abu Sayyaf claims that the group is
still being funded by a Saudi charity tied to bin Laden’s
brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. The Philippine branch of the
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) was founded in 1991 by
Khalifa. This former member, who uses the alias “Abu Anzar,” says the
IIRO continues to fund the Abu Sayyaf after Khalifa’s arrest in the US
in late 1994 (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
Anzar says, “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the
legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist
operations.” Anzar is said to be recruited by Edwin Angeles and his
right hand man; since Angeles has been revealed as a deep undercover
operative (see 1991-Early February 1995), it is speculated Anzar may have been working undercover too. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/9/2000]
A 1994 Philippine intelligence report listed a Gemma Cruz as the
treasurer and board member of the IIRO. In 1998, Gemma Cruz-Araneta
became the tourism secretary in the cabinet of new president Joseph
Estrada. Anzar claims that in 1993 and 1994 he toured IIRO projects
with Khalifa and Cruz-Araneta and identifies her as the same person who
is now tourism secretary. Cruz-Araneta denies all the charges as a case
of mistaken identity and retains her position in the cabinet. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/2000; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000]
In 2006, the US government will officially list the Philippine IIRO
branch as a terrorism financier and state that it is still being run by
one of Khalifa’s associates (see August 3, 2006).
Italian intelligence successfully wiretaps an al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, starting in late 1999. [Boston Globe, 8/4/2002]
In a wiretapped conversation from this day, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman,
a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO -
roughly the equivalent to the FBI in the US) traveling on a diplomatic
passport (see Spring-Summer 1998),
talks about a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving
aircraft and the sky. The conversation takes place in a car on the way
to a terrorist summit near Bologna (see August 12, 2000 and Shortly After),
and the person Abdulrahman talks to is Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close
associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000). There are several significant aspects to the conversation:
Abdulrahman makes comments indicating he has foreknowledge of the 9/11
attacks. He says that he is “studying airlines,” comments, “Our focus
is only on the air,” and tells Es Sayed to remember the words “above
the head.” He also says that next time they meet he hopes to bring Es
Sayed “a window or piece of the airplane,” and that the security on
Alitalia and at Rome airport is poor. The name of the operation is
given as “Jihadia,” and Abdulrahman says, “the big blow will come from
the other country: one of those blows no one can ever forget.” He adds:
“[It is] moving from south to north, from east to west: whoever created
this plan is crazy, but he’s also a genius. It will leave them
speechless.” He also says: “We can fight any power using candles and
airplanes: they will not be able to stop us with even their most
powerful weapons. We must hit them. And keep your head up.… Remember,
the danger in the airports.… If it happens the newspapers from all over
the world will write about it.”
Es Sayed remarks, “I know brothers who went to America with the trick
of the wedding publications.” The phrase “Big wedding” is sometimes
used by al-Qaeda as code for a bombing or attack, including 9/11 (see November 30, 1999 and Late Summer 2001), so, taken together with Abdulrahman’s remarks, this indicates an unconventional attack in the US using aircraft;
The two discuss training camps in Yemen, which are “proceeding on a
world scale.” They also mention youth in Italy, and presumably the
youth are training;
Es Sayed says, “my dream is building an Islamic state,” and Abdulrahman
replies that this is possible because the Yemeni government is weak and
“sooner or later we will dominate it;”
Es Sayed asks after a person named Ayman, evidently al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri;
Abdulrahman twice mentions the name of Abdul Mejid, apparently a
reference to Abdul Mejid al-Zindani, a radical leader in Yemen and
associate of Osama bin Laden (see January-August 1998);
Es Sayed makes the cryptic comment, “One must be cautious, like in Iran; not a single photo.”
Beginning
in October 2000, FBI experts will help Italian police analyze the
intercepts and warnings. Related conversations are overheard early the
next year (see January 24, 2001 and February 2001).
Neither Italy nor the FBI will fully understand their meaning until
after 9/11, but apparently the Italians will understand enough to give
the US an attack warning in March 2001 (see March 2001). After 9/11,
this conversation and others like it will cause US intelligence to
think there may be a link between the 9/11 plot and Yemen’s PSO. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/2002; Guardian, 5/30/2002; Washington Post, 5/31/2002; Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002; Vidino, 2006, pp. 224-5]
Author Lorenzo Vidino will later comment: “The chilling conversation
alarmed officials before 9/11, but it took on a completely different
resonance after the attacks had taken place. [Abdulrahman], who had
close connections to the highest ranks of al-Qaeda, likely knew about
the plan in advance and had told Es Sayed about it.” [Vidino, 2006, pp. 226]
Italian
counterterrorist authorities monitor a summit of leading terrorist
operatives near Bologna. Attendees at the meeting, which is arranged
through an extremist mosque in Milan called the Islamic Cultural
Institute, include:
Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000);
Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief with Yemen’s Political
Security Organization (PSO—roughly equivalent to the FBI). Es Sayed and
Abdulrahman are overheard discussing an attack using aircraft on their
way to the summit, indicating they have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000);
Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali, another close associate of al-Zawahiri’s; and
Mohammed Fazazi, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan group Salafia
Jihadia, which is responsible for a 2003 attack in Casablanca (see May 16, 2003). Fazazi is also an imam at Hamburg’s al Quds mosque, which is attended by the core cell of 9/11 pilots (see Early 1996 and April 1, 1999).
Fazazi’s presence indicates a further connection between the cell in
Milan, which is under heavy surveillance by Italian authorities (see 2000), but this link is not exploited to prevent 9/11. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230]
Raed
Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh’s former Boston roommate, is tried and
convicted in Jordan for his role in planned millennium bombings in that
country. (Hijazi is tried in absentia since he has yet to be arrested,
but will later be retried in person and reconvicted.) In the wake of
the trial, Jordanian officials send information to US investigators
that shows Nabil al-Marabh and future 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi are
associates of Hijazi. The Washington Post will report, “An FBI document
circulated among law enforcement agencies [just after 9/11] noted that
Hijazi, who is in a Jordanian jail, had shared a telephone number with
[9/11] hijacker, Hamza Alghamdi.” Apparently this document is created
when Jordan sends the US this information in late 2000. [Washington Post, 9/21/2001]
The Boston Globe will later report that an FBI investigation found that
“al-Marabh had, in the report’s language, a ‘telephone connection’ with
one of the suspected hijackers, according to a federal source involved
in the investigation. However, the source was uncertain whether the
connection involved telephone conversations between al-Marabh and the
unidentified suspect, or whether it involved their sharing a telephone
number.” This is a probable reference to the same FBI report mentioning
the Alghamdi-Hijazi phone link, especially since the same Globe article
mentions that around the this time al-Marabh tells his coworkers that
the FBI has been asking him about his links to bin Laden (see Late August 2000). [Boston Globe, 10/15/2001]
It appears that Alghamdi is not put on any kind of watch list and will
not be stopped when he will arrive in the US by January 2001 (see January or July 28, 2001) nor again on May 23, 2001 (see April 23-June 29, 2001).
The 9/11 Commission Final Report will fail to mention any investigation
into Alghamdi and will give no hint that his name was known to US
authorities before 9/11.
In
September 2000, Luai Sakra enters Germany seeking asylum, using the
name “Louia Sakka” (one of several ways his name is transliterated). He
moves with his wife and two children to a government asylum dormitory
in a small town in central Germany while waiting for a verdict. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/15/2005; Agence France-Presse, 10/27/2005]
After his 2005 arrest in Turkey, Sakra will confess to helping some of
the 9/11 hijackers. He will claim to have helped some of the 9/11
hijackers while in Bursa, a city in Turkey 60 miles south of Istanbul
(see Late 1999-2000). [Washington Post, 2/20/2006] But he will also say that he knew Mohamed Atta, which presumably would take place during Sakra’s time in Germany (see Early August 2005). He will warn the Syrian government about the 9/11 attacks one day before they happen (see September 10, 2001) and evidence will suggest he was an informant working for the CIA and other governments (see 2000).
He will later admit meeting Asaf Shawkat, head of Syrian intelligence,
in Germany, but it is not known when this meeting took place. [BBC, 11/10/2005]
Apparently while still living in Germany, Sakra is indicted in Jordan
for allegedly supporting planned attacks around the turn of the
millennium (see November 30, 1999).
His 2001 Jordanian indictment reads, “Current residence: Germany, on
the run.” It is not clear if Jordan communicated with the German
government about his whereabouts at this time. He will be convicted in
absentia in Jordan in early 2002 and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Meanwhile, in Germany he loses his asylum appeal and leaves the country
on July 24, 2001. His family flies to Syria around the same time. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/15/2005]
Raed Hijazi. [Source: Associated Press]Raed Hijazi participated in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel in Jordan at the start of the millennium (see November 30, 1999) and helped plan the USS Cole bombing in early October 2000 (see October 12, 2000).
Hijazi knew Nabil al-Marabh in Boston, where they were roommates and
drove taxis for the same company. In May 1999, the FBI had already
approached al-Marabh looking for Hijazi, but al-Marabh will later claim
he lied and said he did not know him. [Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
Hijazi is arrested in Syria this month and imprisoned in Jordan, where
he has just been convicted for his failed bomb attempt there. He
quickly begins to cooperate with investigators, identifies himself as
an al-Qaeda operative, and also identifies al-Marabh as an al-Qaeda
operative still living in the US. Customs agents soon discover that
al-Marabh had on at least one occasion wired money to Hijazi that was
used to fund the failed millennium plot. These agents will eventually
learn that al-Marabh repeatedly sent money overseas to Hijazi. Ahmed
Ressam, arrested in late 1999 for attempting to bomb the Los Angeles
airport, helps confirm the connection between al-Marabh and Hijazi.
Ressam will start cooperating with US investigators in early 2001, but
it is not clear if he gave this information before 9/11 or just after
it. [New York Times, 9/18/2001; New York Times, 10/14/2001; New York Times, 10/14/2001; Toronto Sun, 11/16/2001; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002]
Yet, the New York Times will note, “For months after the CIA learned of
his ties to the bin Laden network, Mr. Marabh moved about
unfettered—traveling around the [US], moving large amounts of money,
getting duplicate driver’s licenses, and forging immigration
documents.” [New York Times, 10/14/2001]
Damage to the USS Cole. [Source: Department of Defense]The USS Cole
is bombed in the Aden, Yemen harbor by two al-Qaeda militants, Hassan
al-Khamri and Ibrahim al-Thawar (a.k.a. Nibras). Seventeen US soldiers
are killed and 30 are wounded. The CIA will later conclude that with
just slightly more skilled execution, the attack would have killed 300
and sunk the ship. [ABC News, 10/13/2000; Coll, 2004, pp. 532; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 191]
The Islamic Army of Aden immediately takes credit for the attack. This
is a Yemen-based Muslim militant group widely believed to have close
ties to al-Qaeda (see 1996-1997 and After). [Guardian, 10/14/2000] The prime minister of Yemen at the time of the bombing will say shortly after 9/11, “The Islamic Army was part of al-Qaeda.” [Guardian, 10/13/2001]
The US soon learns the names of some al-Qaeda operatives involved in
the attack, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash and
Fahad al-Quso (see Early December 2000), and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see November-December 2000). 9/11 hijackers Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000) and Khalid Almihdhar (see Around October 12, 2000) may also have been involved. This is a repeat of a previously attempted attack, against the USS The Sullivans, which failed and was apparently undetected (see January 3, 2000). [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later say the Cole
bombing “was a full-fledged al-Qaeda operation, supervised directly by
bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the
suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase
explosives and equipment.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 190]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, USS Cole, Osama bin Laden, Islamic Army of Aden, Khalid Almihdhar, Hassan al-Khamri, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ibrahim al-Thawar, Fahad al-Quso
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Al-Qaeda
affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) sets off two series of bombs, first in
Indonesia, then in the Philippines. The Christmas Eve attacks in
Indonesia comprise a series of 38 bombings in 11 cities and are
directed against churches. Nineteen people are killed and over a
hundred injured. [Asia Times, 10/8/2004]
The attacks in the Philippines kill 22 and injure 120 in the country’s
capital, Manila. The operation, involving attacks on a train, a bus, an
abandoned petrol station, an airport car park, and a park, is
apparently carried out by Indonesian JI operative Fathur Rohman
Al-Ghozi. [BBC, 2/27/2002]
Many militants are arrested after the attacks. The investigation leads
to JI and al-Qaeda leader Hambali, a veteran Islamic fighter who was
involved in the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), is tied to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see June 1994), and attended an al-Qaeda Malaysia summit in 2000, which was monitored by Malaysia intelligence and the CIA (see January 5-8, 2000).
Although Hambali, an Indonesian, has lived in Malaysia since the
mid-1990s, the authorities cannot find him and say that he has fled to
Saudi Arabia (see January 2001 and after). [Jakarta Post, 2/7/2001] JI’s spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, is also arrested, but then released. [CNN, 2/26/2004] Hambali will finally be captured in August 2003 in Thailand (see August 12, 2003).
Abu
Mussab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Muslim militant later alleged by the
Bush administration to have ties to Osama bin Laden, is allegedly
arrested in Jordan sometime in 2001 for his involvement in a late 1999
plot to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan (see November 30, 1999). This is according to an unnamed Bush administration official. Supposedly, some time after his arrest, he is released. [Guardian, 10/9/2002; Washington Post, 2/7/2003 Sources: Unnamed Bush administration official]
However, there are no contemporary press accounts of this arrest and
release, and no signs of a trial. According to other accounts, at some
point he is convicted for his role in the plot and sentenced to death
by a Jordanian court in absentia. [Independent, 2/6/2003]
On
this day, Italian intelligence hears an interesting wiretapped
conversation eerily similar to the one from August 12, 2000 (see August 12, 2000). This one occurs between al-Qaeda operatives Mahmoud Es Sayed (see Summer 2000)
and Ben Soltane Adel, two members of al-Qaeda’s Milan cell. Adel asks,
in reference to fake documents, “Will these work for the brothers who
are going to the United States?” Sayed responds angrily, saying: “don’t
ever say those words again, not even joking!… If it’s necessary…
whatever place we may be, come up and talk in my ear, because these are
very important things. You must know… that this plan is very, very
secret, as if you were protecting the security of the state.” This will
be only one of many clues found from the Italian wiretaps and passed on
to US intelligence in March 2001 (see March 2001).
However, they apparently will not be properly understood until after
9/11. Adel is later arrested and convicted of belonging to a terrorist
cell, and Es Sayed will flee to Afghanistan in July 2001. [Guardian, 5/30/2002]
Mahmoud
Es Sayed (aka Abu Saleh), a member of an Italian al-Qaeda cell being
monitored by the authorities there, calls an associate, Abdulsalam Ali
Abdulrahman, in Yemen to discuss travel to the US. Abdulrahman is a
section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (see August 12, 2000),
but Italian authorities overhear Es Sayed telling Abdulrahman’s younger
brother, “I heard you were going to America.” The brother replies: “I’m
sorry to say we’re not able to get in. It is our most important wish
and our big target.” [Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002]
Italian authorities had previously overheard conversations between Es
Sayed and Albdulrahman in which they discussed a massive strike against
the enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see August 12, 2000). The US will soon be warned of this (see March 2001).
The
Italian government gives the US information about possible attacks
based on apartment wiretaps in the Italian city of Milan. [Fox News, 5/17/2002]
Presumably, the information includes a discussion between two al-Qaeda
agents talking about a “very, very secret” plan to forge documents “for
the brothers who are going to the United States” (see January 24, 2001).
The warning may also mention a wiretap the previous August involving
one of the same people, who discussed a massive strike against the
enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see August 12, 2000) and another of his monitored conversations in which he discusses travel by al-Qaeda operatives to the US (see February 2001).
Jemaah Islamiyah operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana. [Source: Channel News Asia]9/11
hijacker Khalid Almihdhar makes another visit to Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, to continue planning for an attack on a US warship in
Singapore (see October 2000).
He asks Faiz abu Baker Bafana, an operative for the al-Qaeda-linked
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, for more information about the operation
and for a proposed budget. Almihdhar was apparently involved in the
attacks on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in Yemen (see Late 1999 and Around October 12, 2000).
Bafana then begins meeting with two other bin Laden operatives to
discuss the Singapore operation and an attack that is being planned for
Manila. They end up only meeting twice, because by the second meeting
Bafana believes he is under surveillance by Malaysian intelligence. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006]
JI has been under increased surveillance from the authorities in
Southeast Asia since a series of bomb attacks at the end of 2000 (see December 24-30, 2000 and January 2001 and after).
Malaysian intelligence also monitored an al-Qaeda summit held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, which Almihdhar and JI leader Hambali attended (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After).
If Malaysian intelligence did monitor this meeting, they had an
opportunity to recognize Almihdhar from their earlier surveillance of
the 2000 al-Qaeda summit, but it is not known if they did so.
Jordanian
intelligence (the GID) makes a communications intercept deemed so
important that King Abdullah’s men relay it to Washington, probably
through the CIA station in Amman. To make doubly sure the message gets
through it is passed through an Arab intermediary to a German
intelligence agent. The message states that a major attack, code named
“The Big Wedding,” is planned inside the US and that aircraft will be
used. “When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to
Bush administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that
there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian
officials backed away from their earlier confirmations.” The Christian
Science Monitor will call the story “confidently authenticated” even
though Jordan has backed away from it. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/2002; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/2002]
It has been reported elsewhere that in July 2001, Jordan warns the US
that al-Qaeda is planning an attack inside the US, but it is unknown if
this is referring to the same warning or a separate one (see July 2001).
In late July 2001, the king of Jordan will offer the US to send two
battalions of Jordanian special forces to Afghanistan to eliminate
al-Qaeda havens there (see July 24, 2001).
A courtroom sketch of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: Andrea Shepard / Associated Press]Hambali,
a top al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, appears aware of the date of
the 9/11 attacks. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a young Canadian citizen
who recently joined al-Qaeda, meets Hambali in Karachi, Pakistan, to
get instructions in carrying out an attack in Southeast Asia. Hambali
tells him, “Make sure you leave before Tuesday” - September 11. Jabarah
does heed the warning and flies to Southeast Asian on September 10. He
will be arrested in 2002 and deported to Canada, where he will make a
full confession about his al-Qaeda contacts (including an unheeded
warning about the October 2002 Bali bombing (see August-September 2002). [National Post, 1/18/2003]
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is also in Karachi and working with
Jabarah and Hambali on future Southeast Asian plots, and KSM also warns
Jabarah to travel before September 11. [CBC News, 10/2004]
At
least one member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, apparently uses
steganography, a method of encoding messages within computerized
photographs. In Milan’s Via Quaranta mosque in Milan, frequented by
Egyptian al-Qaeda operative Mahmoud Es Sayed, pictures of the World
Trade Center that have steganographic messages in them are saved on a
computer. A number of other pictures of world leaders and pornography
are also manipulated in a similar manner. These pictures will not be
discovered until months after 9/11, but they help suggest that some in
the Milan cell had foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. Es Sayed had been
wiretapped on previous occasions, and was heard making comments
suggesting he had such foreknowledge (see August 12, 2000)
(see January 24, 2001). His current whereabouts are unknown. [ABC News, 5/8/2003]
Adel Ben Soltane Adel, a Tunisian detained in Milan, Italy, for his role in an extremist cell (see January 24, 2001),
receives a letter from a fellow militant. The envelope contains an
empty chewing gum wrapper. The wrapper is from Brooklyn gum, a popular
Italian brand that features a picture of the Brooklyn bridge, so
presumably it is a hint to Soltane about 9/11. Prison guards notice the
wrapper when they open the envelope and think it odd. However, they do
not realize the full significance until five days later. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 226]
Father Jean-Marie Benjamin.
[Source: Public domain]At
a wedding in Todi, Italy, Father Jean-Marie Benjamin is told of a plot
to attack the US and Britain using hijacked airplanes as weapons. He is
not told specifics regarding time or place. He immediately passes what
he knows to a judge and several politicians. He later will state,
“Although I am friendly with many Muslims, I wondered why they were
telling me, specifically. I felt it my duty to inform the Italian
government.” Benjamin has been called “one of the West’s most
knowledgeable experts on the Muslim world.” Two days after 9/11, he
will meet with the Italian Foreign Minister on this topic. He will say
he learned the attack on Britain failed at the last minute. [Zenit (Vatican), 9/16/2001] An al-Qaeda cell based in nearby Milan, Italy, appears to have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see August 12, 2000) and (see January 24, 2001). It is not known if the Italian government warns the US government of this latest warning before 9/11.
An Italian network of extremists that has been closely monitored by local authorities (see After April 2001)
goes silent following 9/11, after which only one message is
intercepted. The message, which says, “Congratulations for the USA,” is
from an unknown militant to Abdelhalim Remadna, a leading radical based
in Milan. Remadna is arrested on November 12 as he attempts to flee
Italy. One of his associates, Yassin Chekkouri, is arrested on the same
day. Remadna will be sentenced to eight years in prison, whereas
Chekkouri will receive four. Mahmoud Es Sayed, one of their associates
who apparently had some foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and September 4, 2001), escapes Italy some time in October, but is apparently killed at the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 227-30]
Kamar Eddine Kherbane. [Source: Marco Hebdo]A
militant leader named Kamar Eddine Kherbane is arrested in Morocco, but
he has been given political asylum in Britain since 1994 and he is
quickly deported to Britain and freed. Agence France-Presse claims that
his arrest was “apparently in connection with the [9/11] attacks on the
US.” The Moroccan government also questions him about arms smuggling. [Agence France-Presse, 9/20/2001]
But by sending him back to Britain, the Moroccan government ignores an
extradition request by the Algerian government who claim Kherbane is a
wanted criminal and an al-Qaeda operative. [BBC, 9/21/2001]
Kherbane was a founding member of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an
Algerian political party outlawed in the early 1990s. He is also a
known al-Qaeda operative said to have met bin Laden on several
occasions, most recently in 1998. He appears to have been a key leader
of mujaheddin fighting in Bosnia (see 1990 and 1991). [Agence France-Presse, 9/20/2001] A Spanish police report will later claim that he was the head of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center’s Zabreb, Croatia, office (see Early 1990s).
Al-Kifah was a US-based al-Qaeda charity front until the early 1990s
that had ties to both the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the CIA
(see 1986-1993). [CNN, 12/8/2002] Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna says Kherbane is “close to both the [Algerian] GIA and al-Qaeda’s leaderships.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 183]
In an interview shortly after the Moroccan incident, Kherbane claims
that he was released there because “Britain put a lot of pressure,
which reached the point of threatening to expel the Moroccan ambassador
from London.” He also admits to having met bin Laden in the 1990s. [BBC, 9/26/2001]
It is not known why the British government helps him avoid being sent
to Algeria. But a few days after his return to Britain, The London
Times will report, “More than 20 Islamic terrorists, including those
wanted for the murders of at least 100 people abroad, are living freely
in Britain. Many on the global terror ‘wanted list’ have been granted
political asylum despite being close to Osama bin Laden’s
organization.” [London Times, 9/23/2001] A 2005 article will indicate Kherbane is still living openly in Britain. [BBC, 2/24/2005]
Italian police raid Youssef Nada’s villa in Lugano, Italy. [Source: Keystone]The
US and other countries announce the closure of the Al Taqwa Bank and
the Al Barakaat financial network. President Bush says, “Al Taqwa and
Al Barakaat raise funds for al-Qaeda. They manage, invest and
distribute those funds.” US officials claim that both entities skimmed
a part of the fees charged on each financial transaction it conducted
and paid it to al-Qaeda. This would provide al-Qaeda with tens of
millions of dollars annually. Additionally, Al Taqwa would provide
investment advice and transfer cash for al-Qaeda. Al Taqwa is based in
Switzerland while Al Barakaat is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Over 100 nations are said to be cooperating with efforts to block the
funds of these two groups. [New York Times, 11/8/2001]
Swiss authorities raid Al Taqwa-related businesses and the homes of
bank leaders Youssef Nada, Ali Himmat, and Ahmad Huber, but no arrests
are made. In January 2002, Nada will announce that the Al Taqwa Bank is
shutting down, due to bad publicity after the raids. He will maintain
that he and his organization are completely innocent. [Newsweek, 11/7/2001; Reuters, 1/10/2002]
Days after 9/11, Huber called the 9/11 attacks “counterterror against
American-Israeli terror,” the World Trade Center a “the Twin Towers of
the godless,” and the Pentagon “a symbol of Satan,” yet he will claim
to have no ties to the attackers. [Playboy, 2/1/2002; Newsweek, 3/18/2002]
In searching Nada’s house, Swiss authorities discover a document
entitled “The Project,” which is a strategic plan for the Muslim
Brotherhood to infiltrate and defeat Western countries (see December 1982).
By late 2002, both the US and UN will declare Al Taqwa Bank, Nada, and
Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, another founder and director of the bank,
supporters of terrorism. All of their accounts will be declared frozen
worldwide. [US Department of the Treasury, 8/29/2002]
However, while Al Taqwa itself will be shut down, later reports will
indicate that other financial entities operated by the directors will
continue to operate freely (see June-October 2005).
Richard Reid’s shoe bomb.
[Source: NEFA Foundation]British citizen Richard Reid is arrested for allegedly trying to blow up a Miami-bound jet using explosives hidden in his shoe. [Associated Press, 8/19/2002] He later pleads guilty to all charges, and declares himself a follower of bin Laden. [CBS News, 10/4/2002] He may have ties to Pakistan. [Washington Post, 3/31/2002] It is later believed that Reid and others in the shoe bomb plot reported directly to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [CNN, 1/30/2003]
It has been suggested that Mohammed has ties to the ISI, and that Reid
is a follower of Ali Gilani, a religious leader believed to be working
with the ISI (see January 6, 2002).
Reporter Daniel Pearl moments before he is killed. [Source: Associated Press]Wall
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is murdered. He is reported dead
on February 21; his mutilated body is found months later. Police
investigators say “there were at least eight to ten people present on
the [murder] scene” and at least 15 who participated in his kidnapping
and murder. “Despite issuing a series of political demands shortly
after Pearl’s abduction four weeks ago, it now seems clear that the
kidnappers planned to kill Pearl all along.” [Washington Post, 2/23/2002] Some captured participants later claim 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the one who cuts Pearl’s throat. [MSNBC, 9/17/2002; Time, 1/26/2003]
The land on which Pearl was held and murdered reportedly belongs to
either the Al Rashid Trust, or one of its supporters, Saud Memon. The
Al Rashid Trust, an ostensibly charitable organization that US
intelligence linked to the financing of al-Qeada, is closely linked to
the jihadi organization Jaish-i-Mohammed and was one of the very first
organizations to have its assets frozen after 9/11. It may have been
used to funnel money to the 9/11 hijackers in the US (see Early August 2001 and September 24, 2001). [Time, 1/26/2003; Daily Telegraph, 5/9/2004; Tribune, 4/2/2006]
In
2007, NBC News will report that the CIA uses aggressive interrogation
techniques on at least 13 high-ranking al-Qaeda detainees between 2002
and 2004. These techniques are first used on Abu Zubaida, captured in
March 2002 (see March 28, 2002), and some of the techniques are discontinued in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal around the middle of 2004 (see Evening April 28, 2004),
which is also around the time the CIA’s Inspector General issues a
secret report suggesting many of these techniques could be a violation
of an international treaty against torture (see Spring 2004). Euphemistically called “enhanced interrogation,” these techniques include:
Sleep deprivation.
Exposure to extreme heat and cold.
Confined quarters.
Psychological and physical abuse.
The use of psychotropic drugs.
Waterboarding. However, waterboarding is allegedly only used on about four of the detainees (see May 2002-2003).
All 13 of these detainees will later be transferred to Guantanamo prison to stand trial before a military tribunal there (see September 2-3, 2006).
(Two others similarly transferred - Abu Faraj al-Libbi and Abu al-Hadi
al-Iraqi - are captured after the Abu Ghraib scandal and thus are not
subjected to as many interrogation techniques.) [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] However, there are other “ghost detainees” not officially acknowledged as captured by the US government (see June 7, 2007).
Some, like Hassan Ghul, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, and Mohammed Omar
Abdul-Rahman, are held in the same secret prison as most of the
“official” high-ranking detainees later transferred to Guantanamo, so
it would seem likely that aggressive techniques have been used on many
of them as well. In 2007, President Bush will sign an executive order
allowing the CIA to use most of these aggressive techniques again (see July 2007).
Entity Tags: Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Mohamad Farik Amin, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Majid Khan, Tawfiq bin Attash, Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Hambali, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hassan Ghul, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Abu Zubaida, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Complete 911 Timeline
In the wake of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida’s arrest (see March 28, 2002), the FBI discovers much useful information (see Shortly After March 28, 2002).
FBI agent Dan Coleman leads a team to sort through Zubaida’s computer
files and documents. However, at the same, 2002 time, it is discovered
that Zubaida’s prominence in al-Qaeda’s hierarchy was overestimated and
some conclude that he was used as little more than a travel agent for
training camp attendees because he was mentally ill. Coleman will later
comment, “This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality. That’s
why they let him fly all over the world doing meet and greet. That’s
why people used his name on all sorts of calls and e-mails. He was like
a travel agent, the guy who booked your flights.… He knew very little
about real operations, or strategy. He was expendable….” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 94-96, 100]
Other accounts back this up. For instance, Omar Nasiri, a former
informant for European intelligence agencies who met Zubaida in the
nineties, will later describe Zubaida’s odd behavior. He “shuffled
around his home in near-total darkness, carrying a gas lantern from
room to room. He barely spoke and would often communicate by pointing.”
[New Yorker, 1/22/2007] On the other hand, Zubaida does appear to be involved in numerous plots before 9/11 (see for instance November 30, 1999 and Early September 2001).
Al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam cooperated with US investigators after
being arrested. He worked with Zubaida and suggested Zubaida was of
some importance, but not one of al-Qaeda’s highest leaders: “He is the
person in charge of the [training] camps. He receives young men from
all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. He takes care of the
expenses of the camps. He makes arrangements for you when you travel
coming in or leaving.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 133]
In a 2007, former CIA Director George Tenet will claim that the reports
Zubaida was mentally unstable are “Baloney.… Apparently, the source of
the rumor that Abu Zubaida was unbalanced was his personal diary, in
which he adopted various personas. From that shaky perch, some junior
Freudians leapt to the conclusion that Zubaida had multiple
personalities. In fact, Agency psychiatrists eventually determined that
in his diary he was using a sophisticated literary device to express
himself.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 243]
Regardless, despite being briefed otherwise, President Bush and others
in his administration will repeatedly tout the importance of capturing
Zubaida and no hint of any doubts about his importance or sanity will
be publicly expressed (see April 9, 2002 and After).
Ramzi bin al-Shibh. [Source: FBI]It
is originally reported that Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda interviews
9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and 9/11 associate Ramzi
Bin al-Shibh at a secret location in Karachi, Pakistan, in either June [London Times, 9/8/2002] or August. [Guardian, 9/9/2002]
Details and audio footage of the interview come out between September 8
and 12, 2002. The video footage of the interview al-Qaeda promised to
hand over is never given to Al Jazeera. [Associated Press, 9/8/2002]
Both figures claim the 9/11 attacks were originally going to target
nuclear reactors, but “decided against it for fear it would go out of
control.” Interviewer Fouda is struck that KSM and bin al-Shibh
remember only the hijackers’ code names, and have trouble remembering
their real names. [Australian, 9/9/2002]
KSM, who calls himself the head of al-Qaeda’s military committee and
refers to bin al-Shibh as the coordinator of the “Holy Tuesday”
operation, reportedly acknowledges “[a]nd, yes, we did it.” [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 38]
These interviews “are the first full admission by senior figures from
bin Laden’s network that they carried out the September 11 attacks.” [London Times, 9/8/2002]
Some, however, call Fouda’s claims into doubt. For example, the
Financial Times states: “Analysts cited the crude editing of [Fouda’s
interview] tapes and the timing of the broadcasts as reasons to be
suspicious about their authenticity. Dia Rashwan, an expert on Islamist
movements at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said:
‘I have very serious doubts [about the authenticity of this tape]. It
could have been a script written by the FBI.’” [Financial Times, 9/11/2002]
KSM is later variously reported to be arrested in June 2002, killed or
arrested in September 2002, and then arrested in March 2003. After this
last arrest report, for the first time Fouda claims this interview took
place in April, placing it safely before the first reports of KSM’s
capture. [Guardian, 3/4/2003; CTV Television, 3/6/2003]
Bin al-Shibh also gets captured several days after Fouda’s interview is
broadcast, and some reports say he is captured because this interview
allows his voice to be identified. [Observer, 9/15/2002; CBS News, 10/9/2002] As a result, Fouda has been accused of betraying al-Qaeda, and now fears for his life. [Independent, 9/17/2002] As the Washington Post states, “Now Al Jazeera is also subject to rumors of a conspiracy.” [Washington Post, 9/15/2002] Yet after being so reviled by al-Qaeda supporters, Fouda is later given a cassette said to be a bin Laden speech. [MSNBC, 11/18/2002]
US officials believe the voice on that cassette is “almost certainly”
bin Laden, but one of the world’s leading voice-recognition institutes
said it is 95 percent certain the tape is a forgery. [BBC, 11/18/2002; BBC, 11/29/2002]
It will later be revealed that details of the interview were told to
the CIA in mid-June 2002, which directly resulted in bin al-Shibh’s
arrest a few months later (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After).
A
truck bomb kills 19 people, mostly German tourists, at a synagogue in
Djerba, Tunisia. It is later claimed that al-Qaeda is behind the
attack, and that the suspected bomber speaks with Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed (KSM) by phone about three hours before the attack. [Associated Press, 8/24/2002]
This
picture of US soldiers supervising the waterboarding of North
Vietnamese prisoners was published in a US newspaper in 1968, resulting
in an investigation and convictions. [Source: Bettmann / Corbis]In
2007, it will be reported that the CIA used the controversial
interrogation technique of waterboarding on at least three detainees.
The Associated Press will claim the detainees are:
Abu Zubaida, who is captured in March 2002 and tortured around May 2002 (see March 28, 2002 and Mid-May 2002 and After).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who is captured in November 2002 (see Early October 2002 and Shortly After Early October 2002).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who is allegedly captured in early 2003 (see March 1, 2003 and Shortly After March 1, 2003). [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]
NBC News will report a list of three that includes Hambali, who is captured in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003 and Shortly After August 12, 2003). NBC’s list also mentions KSM and Zubaida, but does not mention al-Nashiri. [MSNBC, 9/13/2007]
In a 2007 book, former CIA Director George Tenet will hint that
slightly more than three may have been waterboarded, writing, “The most
aggressive interrogation techniques conducted by CIA personnel were
applied to only a handful of the worst terrorists on the planet,
including people who had planned the 9/11 attacks…” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 242]
ABC News will claim in September 2007, “It is believed that
waterboarding was used on fewer than five ‘high-value’ terrorist
subjects…” [ABC News, 9/14/2007]
Prior to 2002, waterboarding was classified by the US government as a
form of torture, and treated as a serious criminal offense. US soldiers
were court-martialled for waterboarding captives as recently as the
Vietnam War. The technique is said to simulate death by drowning. [New Yorker, 8/6/2007]
In the 1600s, King James I of England wrote about the torture his
government was using and stated that waterboarding was the most extreme
form of torture used, worse than the rack and thumbscrews. [Harper's, 12/15/2007]
In 2007, it will be revealed that at least some of the interrogations
of Zubaida and al-Nashiri were videotaped, and it is suspected by some
that their waterboarding may have been taped (see Spring-Late 2002). These tapes will later be destroyed under controversial circumstances (see November 2005).
A government official will later claim that waterboarding is no longer
used after 2003. The CIA and US military will prohibit the use of
waterboarding in 2006. [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]
Italian
authorities monitoring a cell of Islamist extremists based in Milan,
Italy, overhear one of the radicals plotting to create a new
trans-European network. The surveillance target, Hassan Mustafa Osama
Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After),
tells an unidentified man that they will use the network to “eliminate
the enemies of God.” News of the network, which is to be based in
Britain, causes the Italians to place Nasr under round the clock
surveillance. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 236-41] Nasr will subsequently be kidnapped by the CIA (see February 17, 2003).
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: CBC]A
number of governments are given warnings suggesting an upcoming attack
on nightclubs on the island of Bali, Indonesia, but this does not
prevent the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 (see October 12, 2002).
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda operative with Canadian
citizenship, attended a meeting held in southern Thailand led by
Hambali, an al-Qaeda leader who also heads the al-Qaeda affiliate
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Hambali announces a new plan to target
nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia. A second meeting held
shortly thereafter also attended by Jabarah narrowed the target to
nightclubs in Bali. Jabarah was arrested in Oman in April 2002 and
deported to Canada. By August, he is in the US and interrogated by US
agents, and he reveals this attack plan. As a result, US officials pass
a warning to all Southeast Asian governments in August. [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003]
In September, a secret report compiled by the CIA, State Department,
and other US agencies lists six likely bomb targets in Indonesia,
including two Bali nightclubs that are just a short distance away from
the two that will ultimately be attacked one month later. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6/26/2003]
On September 26, 2002, the US embassy in Indonesia issues a public
warning that states, “Americans and Westerners should avoid large
gatherings, and locations known to cater primarily to a Western
clientele such as certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas.”
However, the US State Department does not issue any travel warning for
Indonesia, and other governments such as Australia do not issue any
warnings. There also is no evidence that the owners of Bali nightclubs
are given any warnings. The Sydney Morning Herald will conclude in 2003
that it is now “impossible for anyone to believe that Mohammed Mansour
Jabarah’s interrogation did not result in the US learning of JI’s plan
for a terrorist attack in Bali.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage will later call Jabarah’s warning “stunningly explicit and
specific.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003]
Abdulsalam
Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security
Organization, the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI, disappears in Cairo,
Egypt, after going there on business. Abdulrahman, who appears to have
had foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000),
calls his family after arriving in Cairo, but is apparently kidnapped
by Egyptian intelligence and handed over to the CIA. However, it is
unclear whether the CIA takes him to Azerbaijan or Afghanistan. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230; Grey, 2007, pp. 252] He will later be taken to Guantanamo (see September 20, 2004).
High-ranking
al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is captured in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Al-Nashiri is believed to have played a role in the
1998 African embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998), attended a 9/11 planning summit in Malaysia in 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000), was one of the masterminds of the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), and planned the 2002 bombing of the French oil tanker Limburg (see October 6, 2002).
Said to be chief of al-Qaeda’s operations in the Persian Gulf region,
he is taking flight lessons in the remote UAE region of Umm Al-Qaiwain
when he is arrested by local authorities and then turned over to the
CIA. An unknown number of other al-Qaeda suspects are arrested with
him, but apparently they are considered less important and are not
handed to the CIA as well. Most reports indicate he is arrested on
November 8, 2002, about two weeks before the first media leaks about
his arrest. [New York Times, 12/23/2002]
However, US News and World Report will later claim that he was arrested
even earlier, early in October 2002. “Al-Nashiri soon broke; he even
let officials listen in as he called his associates.” This leads to
intelligence on Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a top al-Qaeda operative,
and the US assassinates him with a missile strike on November 3, 2002,
after trailing him for about two weeks (see November 3, 2002). [US News and World Report, 6/2/2003] Al-Nashiri will remain in secret CIA prisons until 2006 and then will be transfered to the Guantanamo Bay prison (see September 2-3, 2006).
The Limburg after the attack. [Source: NAVSEA]Al-Qaeda conducts a suicide bombing against a French oil tanker, the Limburg.
The attack takes places in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Yemen. One
crew member is killed and over 90,000 barrels of oil leak into the sea.
The attack is similar to the one on the USS Cole almost two years before (see October 12, 2000) and is planned by one of the same people, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. [BBC, 10/16/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 153]
An explosion lights up the sky on the island of Bali, Indonesia. [Source: Agence France-Presse]A
car bomb detonates in front of a discotheque at Kuta Beach, on the
Indonesian resort island of Bali, starting a fire that rages through a
dozen buildings, killing 202 people. No group claims responsibility,
but Jemaah Islamiyah, a radical Islamic organization in Indonesia, is
suspected. [New York Times, 10/13/2002; New York Times, 10/14/2002; BBC, 2/19/2003] Hambali, a leader in both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, is said to have been involved. [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003]
It will later turn out that the US was given a “stunningly explicit and
specific” advanced warning that Hambali and Jemaah Islamiyah were
planning to attack nightclubs in Bali (see August-September 2002).
Following six attacks by different radical Islamic groups in Tunisia (see April 11, 2002), Pakistan, Yemen (see October 6, 2002), Kuwait, Bali (see October 12, 2002),
and Moscow, a new audio message is released by a man said by some to be
Osama bin Laden, although the identity of the speaker will be disputed
(see November 29, 2002).
The voice on the tape outlines a principle he says he and his allies
are using: reciprocity. He comments: “If it pains you to see your
victims and your allies’ victims in Tunisia, Karachi, Failaka, and
Oman, then remember that our children are murdered daily in Palestine
and Iraq… If it pains you to see your victims in Moscow, then remember
ours in Chechnya. How long will fear, killing, destruction,
displacement, orphaning, and widowing be our sole destiny, while
security, stability, and happiness is yours? This is injustice. The
time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so you shall be
killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be
more to come.” [Laden, 2005, pp. 173-5]
The
authenticity of a new audio tape purportedly made by bin Laden, in
which he praises recent attacks in Bali, Kuwait, Yemen and Moscow (see November 12, 2002),
is disputed by Swiss voice analysts. US officials believe the voice is
“almost certainly” bin Laden, but the Dalle Molle Institute for
Perceptual Artificial Intelligence in Switzerland, one of the world’s
leading voice-recognition institutes, is 95 percent certain the tape is
a forgery. [BBC, 11/13/2002; BBC, 11/18/2002; BBC, 11/29/2002; Toronto Star, 12/16/2002]
Two weeks after it was broadcast, a British newspaper publishes the
complete text of a “letter to the American people,” purportedly written
by bin Laden. [Observer, 11/25/2002] However, “diplomats [are] skeptical about the authenticity of the document.” [Guardian, 10/15/2002] The institute will not continue to analyse bin Laden’s speeches (see February 12, 2003).
Entity Tags: Dalle Molle Institute, Osama bin Laden
Mahmoud
Es Sayed is arrested in Syria with other militants on weapons smuggling
charges, according to Italian authorities. The Italians will learn this
later based on wiretaps of Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. While in prison, Es Sayed is
visited by Muftafa Tlass, the Syrian defense minister, and Es Sayed
tells him that the weapons are meant to fight Jews. Tlass, a virulent
anti-Semite who even claimed in a book that Jews kill non-Jews to use
their blood to make pastries, arranges for the release of the whole
group, and puts them in touch with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
[Vidino, 2006, pp. 222]
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr. [Source: ABC]Italian resident Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA on extremists in Albania (see February 17, 2003), moves from Rome to Milan to live with a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000 and Summer 2000).
Al-Zawahiri’s associate, Mahmoud Es Sayed, and Nasr arrive in Milan at
the same time, and it appears their movements are coordinated. Nasr
actually lives in Es Sayed’s apartment and the pair make use of two
radical mosques in Milan, the Via Quaranta mosque, which is their
headquarters, and the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI), which is
associated with a cell of radical Islamists that works with al-Qaeda
and appears to have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and March 2001).
The ICI has a reputation as the most radical Islamic center in Italy,
was a key supply point for Muslims fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995), and was connected to the first World Trade Center bombing (see Late 1993-1994).
Nasr serves as deputy imam at the ICI and preaches anti-US sermons.
Italian law enforcement authorities monitor him with bugs in his
apartment and through a tap on his phone, finding out that after 9/11
he recruits Muslims to go and fight in Afghanistan. He does not seem to
be directly involved in serious illegal activity, but the information
the Italians gain helps them monitor other radicals. His relationship
with the CIA during his time in Italy is unclear, but in one monitored
call after 9/11 he appears to be dissuading another radical from
attacking Jews and in another he tells an associate not to carry out a
car bombing. [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005; Vidino, 2006, pp. 242] The CIA will kidnap Nasr in 2003 (see February 17, 2003).
In August 2000, Nabil al-Marabh moves to Detroit, Michigan, to enroll in a truck driving course in nearby Dearborn. [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
According to an informant who will claim that al-Marabh confided to him
in 2002, al-Marabh is taking instructions from a mystery figure in
Chicago known only as “al Mosul”, which means “boss” or “person in
charge” in Arabic. Al Mosul asks al-Marabh to attend the driving school
to get a commercial truck driver’s license. Also according to this
informant, al-Marabh and Raed Hijazi have plans to steal a fuel truck
from a rest stop in New York or New Jersey and detonate it in the
heavily traveled Lincoln or Holland tunnels leading into New York City,
but the plan is foiled when Hijazi is arrested in October 2000 (see October 2000) for an attempted bombing in Jordan (see November 30, 1999). [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003] Al-Marabh may have moved to Detroit to avoid government scrutiny in Boston after stabbing a roommate in May 2000 (see May 30, 2000-March 2001).
His wife and son apparently continue to live at his long-time Boston
address until September 2000 and then move to elsewhere in the city
without leaving a forwarding address. [New York Times, 9/18/2001; Boston Herald, 9/19/2001; New York Times, 9/21/2001]
Al-Marabh continues to live in Detroit until January 2001. The
Washington Post will note that al-Marabh “appears to [move] every few
months or continually [change] his residence on official documents ? at
one point listing an address in Dearborn, Michigan, that is a truck
stop.” [Washington Post, 9/21/2001; Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
He repeatedly claims to Michigan state officials that he lost his
license, and secures temporary driver’s licenses without photographs. [Washington Post, 9/21/2001]
He receives five driver’s licenses in Michigan over a period of 13
months in addition to carrying driver’s licenses from Massachusetts,
Illinois, Florida, and Ontario, Canada. [Toronto Star, 10/26/2001] He moves to Toronto, Canada in January 2001 (see January 2001-Summer 2001),
but will return to Detroit in August 2001 and will still be getting
duplicate Michigan licenses and looking for a tractor-trailer driving
job in the week after 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2001; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002]
A
former member of the militant group Abu Sayyaf claims that the group is
still being funded by a Saudi charity tied to bin Laden’s
brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. The Philippine branch of the
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) was founded in 1991 by
Khalifa. This former member, who uses the alias “Abu Anzar,” says the
IIRO continues to fund the Abu Sayyaf after Khalifa’s arrest in the US
in late 1994 (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
Anzar says, “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the
legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist
operations.” Anzar is said to be recruited by Edwin Angeles and his
right hand man; since Angeles has been revealed as a deep undercover
operative (see 1991-Early February 1995), it is speculated Anzar may have been working undercover too. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/9/2000]
A 1994 Philippine intelligence report listed a Gemma Cruz as the
treasurer and board member of the IIRO. In 1998, Gemma Cruz-Araneta
became the tourism secretary in the cabinet of new president Joseph
Estrada. Anzar claims that in 1993 and 1994 he toured IIRO projects
with Khalifa and Cruz-Araneta and identifies her as the same person who
is now tourism secretary. Cruz-Araneta denies all the charges as a case
of mistaken identity and retains her position in the cabinet. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/2000; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000]
In 2006, the US government will officially list the Philippine IIRO
branch as a terrorism financier and state that it is still being run by
one of Khalifa’s associates (see August 3, 2006).
Italian intelligence successfully wiretaps an al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, starting in late 1999. [Boston Globe, 8/4/2002]
In a wiretapped conversation from this day, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman,
a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO -
roughly the equivalent to the FBI in the US) traveling on a diplomatic
passport (see Spring-Summer 1998),
talks about a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving
aircraft and the sky. The conversation takes place in a car on the way
to a terrorist summit near Bologna (see August 12, 2000 and Shortly After),
and the person Abdulrahman talks to is Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close
associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000). There are several significant aspects to the conversation:
Abdulrahman makes comments indicating he has foreknowledge of the 9/11
attacks. He says that he is “studying airlines,” comments, “Our focus
is only on the air,” and tells Es Sayed to remember the words “above
the head.” He also says that next time they meet he hopes to bring Es
Sayed “a window or piece of the airplane,” and that the security on
Alitalia and at Rome airport is poor. The name of the operation is
given as “Jihadia,” and Abdulrahman says, “the big blow will come from
the other country: one of those blows no one can ever forget.” He adds:
“[It is] moving from south to north, from east to west: whoever created
this plan is crazy, but he’s also a genius. It will leave them
speechless.” He also says: “We can fight any power using candles and
airplanes: they will not be able to stop us with even their most
powerful weapons. We must hit them. And keep your head up.… Remember,
the danger in the airports.… If it happens the newspapers from all over
the world will write about it.”
Es Sayed remarks, “I know brothers who went to America with the trick
of the wedding publications.” The phrase “Big wedding” is sometimes
used by al-Qaeda as code for a bombing or attack, including 9/11 (see November 30, 1999 and Late Summer 2001), so, taken together with Abdulrahman’s remarks, this indicates an unconventional attack in the US using aircraft;
The two discuss training camps in Yemen, which are “proceeding on a
world scale.” They also mention youth in Italy, and presumably the
youth are training;
Es Sayed says, “my dream is building an Islamic state,” and Abdulrahman
replies that this is possible because the Yemeni government is weak and
“sooner or later we will dominate it;”
Es Sayed asks after a person named Ayman, evidently al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri;
Abdulrahman twice mentions the name of Abdul Mejid, apparently a
reference to Abdul Mejid al-Zindani, a radical leader in Yemen and
associate of Osama bin Laden (see January-August 1998);
Es Sayed makes the cryptic comment, “One must be cautious, like in Iran; not a single photo.”
Beginning
in October 2000, FBI experts will help Italian police analyze the
intercepts and warnings. Related conversations are overheard early the
next year (see January 24, 2001 and February 2001).
Neither Italy nor the FBI will fully understand their meaning until
after 9/11, but apparently the Italians will understand enough to give
the US an attack warning in March 2001 (see March 2001). After 9/11,
this conversation and others like it will cause US intelligence to
think there may be a link between the 9/11 plot and Yemen’s PSO. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/2002; Guardian, 5/30/2002; Washington Post, 5/31/2002; Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002; Vidino, 2006, pp. 224-5]
Author Lorenzo Vidino will later comment: “The chilling conversation
alarmed officials before 9/11, but it took on a completely different
resonance after the attacks had taken place. [Abdulrahman], who had
close connections to the highest ranks of al-Qaeda, likely knew about
the plan in advance and had told Es Sayed about it.” [Vidino, 2006, pp. 226]
Italian
counterterrorist authorities monitor a summit of leading terrorist
operatives near Bologna. Attendees at the meeting, which is arranged
through an extremist mosque in Milan called the Islamic Cultural
Institute, include:
Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000);
Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief with Yemen’s Political
Security Organization (PSO—roughly equivalent to the FBI). Es Sayed and
Abdulrahman are overheard discussing an attack using aircraft on their
way to the summit, indicating they have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000);
Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali, another close associate of al-Zawahiri’s; and
Mohammed Fazazi, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan group Salafia
Jihadia, which is responsible for a 2003 attack in Casablanca (see May 16, 2003). Fazazi is also an imam at Hamburg’s al Quds mosque, which is attended by the core cell of 9/11 pilots (see Early 1996 and April 1, 1999).
Fazazi’s presence indicates a further connection between the cell in
Milan, which is under heavy surveillance by Italian authorities (see 2000), but this link is not exploited to prevent 9/11. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230]
Raed
Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh’s former Boston roommate, is tried and
convicted in Jordan for his role in planned millennium bombings in that
country. (Hijazi is tried in absentia since he has yet to be arrested,
but will later be retried in person and reconvicted.) In the wake of
the trial, Jordanian officials send information to US investigators
that shows Nabil al-Marabh and future 9/11 hijacker Hamza Alghamdi are
associates of Hijazi. The Washington Post will report, “An FBI document
circulated among law enforcement agencies [just after 9/11] noted that
Hijazi, who is in a Jordanian jail, had shared a telephone number with
[9/11] hijacker, Hamza Alghamdi.” Apparently this document is created
when Jordan sends the US this information in late 2000. [Washington Post, 9/21/2001]
The Boston Globe will later report that an FBI investigation found that
“al-Marabh had, in the report’s language, a ‘telephone connection’ with
one of the suspected hijackers, according to a federal source involved
in the investigation. However, the source was uncertain whether the
connection involved telephone conversations between al-Marabh and the
unidentified suspect, or whether it involved their sharing a telephone
number.” This is a probable reference to the same FBI report mentioning
the Alghamdi-Hijazi phone link, especially since the same Globe article
mentions that around the this time al-Marabh tells his coworkers that
the FBI has been asking him about his links to bin Laden (see Late August 2000). [Boston Globe, 10/15/2001]
It appears that Alghamdi is not put on any kind of watch list and will
not be stopped when he will arrive in the US by January 2001 (see January or July 28, 2001) nor again on May 23, 2001 (see April 23-June 29, 2001).
The 9/11 Commission Final Report will fail to mention any investigation
into Alghamdi and will give no hint that his name was known to US
authorities before 9/11.
In
September 2000, Luai Sakra enters Germany seeking asylum, using the
name “Louia Sakka” (one of several ways his name is transliterated). He
moves with his wife and two children to a government asylum dormitory
in a small town in central Germany while waiting for a verdict. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/15/2005; Agence France-Presse, 10/27/2005]
After his 2005 arrest in Turkey, Sakra will confess to helping some of
the 9/11 hijackers. He will claim to have helped some of the 9/11
hijackers while in Bursa, a city in Turkey 60 miles south of Istanbul
(see Late 1999-2000). [Washington Post, 2/20/2006] But he will also say that he knew Mohamed Atta, which presumably would take place during Sakra’s time in Germany (see Early August 2005). He will warn the Syrian government about the 9/11 attacks one day before they happen (see September 10, 2001) and evidence will suggest he was an informant working for the CIA and other governments (see 2000).
He will later admit meeting Asaf Shawkat, head of Syrian intelligence,
in Germany, but it is not known when this meeting took place. [BBC, 11/10/2005]
Apparently while still living in Germany, Sakra is indicted in Jordan
for allegedly supporting planned attacks around the turn of the
millennium (see November 30, 1999).
His 2001 Jordanian indictment reads, “Current residence: Germany, on
the run.” It is not clear if Jordan communicated with the German
government about his whereabouts at this time. He will be convicted in
absentia in Jordan in early 2002 and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Meanwhile, in Germany he loses his asylum appeal and leaves the country
on July 24, 2001. His family flies to Syria around the same time. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 8/15/2005]
Raed Hijazi. [Source: Associated Press]Raed Hijazi participated in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel in Jordan at the start of the millennium (see November 30, 1999) and helped plan the USS Cole bombing in early October 2000 (see October 12, 2000).
Hijazi knew Nabil al-Marabh in Boston, where they were roommates and
drove taxis for the same company. In May 1999, the FBI had already
approached al-Marabh looking for Hijazi, but al-Marabh will later claim
he lied and said he did not know him. [Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
Hijazi is arrested in Syria this month and imprisoned in Jordan, where
he has just been convicted for his failed bomb attempt there. He
quickly begins to cooperate with investigators, identifies himself as
an al-Qaeda operative, and also identifies al-Marabh as an al-Qaeda
operative still living in the US. Customs agents soon discover that
al-Marabh had on at least one occasion wired money to Hijazi that was
used to fund the failed millennium plot. These agents will eventually
learn that al-Marabh repeatedly sent money overseas to Hijazi. Ahmed
Ressam, arrested in late 1999 for attempting to bomb the Los Angeles
airport, helps confirm the connection between al-Marabh and Hijazi.
Ressam will start cooperating with US investigators in early 2001, but
it is not clear if he gave this information before 9/11 or just after
it. [New York Times, 9/18/2001; New York Times, 10/14/2001; New York Times, 10/14/2001; Toronto Sun, 11/16/2001; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002]
Yet, the New York Times will note, “For months after the CIA learned of
his ties to the bin Laden network, Mr. Marabh moved about
unfettered—traveling around the [US], moving large amounts of money,
getting duplicate driver’s licenses, and forging immigration
documents.” [New York Times, 10/14/2001]
Damage to the USS Cole. [Source: Department of Defense]The USS Cole
is bombed in the Aden, Yemen harbor by two al-Qaeda militants, Hassan
al-Khamri and Ibrahim al-Thawar (a.k.a. Nibras). Seventeen US soldiers
are killed and 30 are wounded. The CIA will later conclude that with
just slightly more skilled execution, the attack would have killed 300
and sunk the ship. [ABC News, 10/13/2000; Coll, 2004, pp. 532; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 191]
The Islamic Army of Aden immediately takes credit for the attack. This
is a Yemen-based Muslim militant group widely believed to have close
ties to al-Qaeda (see 1996-1997 and After). [Guardian, 10/14/2000] The prime minister of Yemen at the time of the bombing will say shortly after 9/11, “The Islamic Army was part of al-Qaeda.” [Guardian, 10/13/2001]
The US soon learns the names of some al-Qaeda operatives involved in
the attack, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash and
Fahad al-Quso (see Early December 2000), and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (see November-December 2000). 9/11 hijackers Ramzi bin al-Shibh (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000) and Khalid Almihdhar (see Around October 12, 2000) may also have been involved. This is a repeat of a previously attempted attack, against the USS The Sullivans, which failed and was apparently undetected (see January 3, 2000). [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later say the Cole
bombing “was a full-fledged al-Qaeda operation, supervised directly by
bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the
suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase
explosives and equipment.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 190]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, USS Cole, Osama bin Laden, Islamic Army of Aden, Khalid Almihdhar, Hassan al-Khamri, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ibrahim al-Thawar, Fahad al-Quso
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Al-Qaeda
affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) sets off two series of bombs, first in
Indonesia, then in the Philippines. The Christmas Eve attacks in
Indonesia comprise a series of 38 bombings in 11 cities and are
directed against churches. Nineteen people are killed and over a
hundred injured. [Asia Times, 10/8/2004]
The attacks in the Philippines kill 22 and injure 120 in the country’s
capital, Manila. The operation, involving attacks on a train, a bus, an
abandoned petrol station, an airport car park, and a park, is
apparently carried out by Indonesian JI operative Fathur Rohman
Al-Ghozi. [BBC, 2/27/2002]
Many militants are arrested after the attacks. The investigation leads
to JI and al-Qaeda leader Hambali, a veteran Islamic fighter who was
involved in the Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), is tied to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see June 1994), and attended an al-Qaeda Malaysia summit in 2000, which was monitored by Malaysia intelligence and the CIA (see January 5-8, 2000).
Although Hambali, an Indonesian, has lived in Malaysia since the
mid-1990s, the authorities cannot find him and say that he has fled to
Saudi Arabia (see January 2001 and after). [Jakarta Post, 2/7/2001] JI’s spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, is also arrested, but then released. [CNN, 2/26/2004] Hambali will finally be captured in August 2003 in Thailand (see August 12, 2003).
Abu
Mussab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Muslim militant later alleged by the
Bush administration to have ties to Osama bin Laden, is allegedly
arrested in Jordan sometime in 2001 for his involvement in a late 1999
plot to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan (see November 30, 1999). This is according to an unnamed Bush administration official. Supposedly, some time after his arrest, he is released. [Guardian, 10/9/2002; Washington Post, 2/7/2003 Sources: Unnamed Bush administration official]
However, there are no contemporary press accounts of this arrest and
release, and no signs of a trial. According to other accounts, at some
point he is convicted for his role in the plot and sentenced to death
by a Jordanian court in absentia. [Independent, 2/6/2003]
On
this day, Italian intelligence hears an interesting wiretapped
conversation eerily similar to the one from August 12, 2000 (see August 12, 2000). This one occurs between al-Qaeda operatives Mahmoud Es Sayed (see Summer 2000)
and Ben Soltane Adel, two members of al-Qaeda’s Milan cell. Adel asks,
in reference to fake documents, “Will these work for the brothers who
are going to the United States?” Sayed responds angrily, saying: “don’t
ever say those words again, not even joking!… If it’s necessary…
whatever place we may be, come up and talk in my ear, because these are
very important things. You must know… that this plan is very, very
secret, as if you were protecting the security of the state.” This will
be only one of many clues found from the Italian wiretaps and passed on
to US intelligence in March 2001 (see March 2001).
However, they apparently will not be properly understood until after
9/11. Adel is later arrested and convicted of belonging to a terrorist
cell, and Es Sayed will flee to Afghanistan in July 2001. [Guardian, 5/30/2002]
Mahmoud
Es Sayed (aka Abu Saleh), a member of an Italian al-Qaeda cell being
monitored by the authorities there, calls an associate, Abdulsalam Ali
Abdulrahman, in Yemen to discuss travel to the US. Abdulrahman is a
section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (see August 12, 2000),
but Italian authorities overhear Es Sayed telling Abdulrahman’s younger
brother, “I heard you were going to America.” The brother replies: “I’m
sorry to say we’re not able to get in. It is our most important wish
and our big target.” [Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002]
Italian authorities had previously overheard conversations between Es
Sayed and Albdulrahman in which they discussed a massive strike against
the enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see August 12, 2000). The US will soon be warned of this (see March 2001).
The
Italian government gives the US information about possible attacks
based on apartment wiretaps in the Italian city of Milan. [Fox News, 5/17/2002]
Presumably, the information includes a discussion between two al-Qaeda
agents talking about a “very, very secret” plan to forge documents “for
the brothers who are going to the United States” (see January 24, 2001).
The warning may also mention a wiretap the previous August involving
one of the same people, who discussed a massive strike against the
enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see August 12, 2000) and another of his monitored conversations in which he discusses travel by al-Qaeda operatives to the US (see February 2001).
Jemaah Islamiyah operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana. [Source: Channel News Asia]9/11
hijacker Khalid Almihdhar makes another visit to Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, to continue planning for an attack on a US warship in
Singapore (see October 2000).
He asks Faiz abu Baker Bafana, an operative for the al-Qaeda-linked
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, for more information about the operation
and for a proposed budget. Almihdhar was apparently involved in the
attacks on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in Yemen (see Late 1999 and Around October 12, 2000).
Bafana then begins meeting with two other bin Laden operatives to
discuss the Singapore operation and an attack that is being planned for
Manila. They end up only meeting twice, because by the second meeting
Bafana believes he is under surveillance by Malaysian intelligence. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006]
JI has been under increased surveillance from the authorities in
Southeast Asia since a series of bomb attacks at the end of 2000 (see December 24-30, 2000 and January 2001 and after).
Malaysian intelligence also monitored an al-Qaeda summit held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, which Almihdhar and JI leader Hambali attended (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After).
If Malaysian intelligence did monitor this meeting, they had an
opportunity to recognize Almihdhar from their earlier surveillance of
the 2000 al-Qaeda summit, but it is not known if they did so.
Jordanian
intelligence (the GID) makes a communications intercept deemed so
important that King Abdullah’s men relay it to Washington, probably
through the CIA station in Amman. To make doubly sure the message gets
through it is passed through an Arab intermediary to a German
intelligence agent. The message states that a major attack, code named
“The Big Wedding,” is planned inside the US and that aircraft will be
used. “When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to
Bush administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that
there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian
officials backed away from their earlier confirmations.” The Christian
Science Monitor will call the story “confidently authenticated” even
though Jordan has backed away from it. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/2002; Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/2002]
It has been reported elsewhere that in July 2001, Jordan warns the US
that al-Qaeda is planning an attack inside the US, but it is unknown if
this is referring to the same warning or a separate one (see July 2001).
In late July 2001, the king of Jordan will offer the US to send two
battalions of Jordanian special forces to Afghanistan to eliminate
al-Qaeda havens there (see July 24, 2001).
A courtroom sketch of Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: Andrea Shepard / Associated Press]Hambali,
a top al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, appears aware of the date of
the 9/11 attacks. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a young Canadian citizen
who recently joined al-Qaeda, meets Hambali in Karachi, Pakistan, to
get instructions in carrying out an attack in Southeast Asia. Hambali
tells him, “Make sure you leave before Tuesday” - September 11. Jabarah
does heed the warning and flies to Southeast Asian on September 10. He
will be arrested in 2002 and deported to Canada, where he will make a
full confession about his al-Qaeda contacts (including an unheeded
warning about the October 2002 Bali bombing (see August-September 2002). [National Post, 1/18/2003]
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is also in Karachi and working with
Jabarah and Hambali on future Southeast Asian plots, and KSM also warns
Jabarah to travel before September 11. [CBC News, 10/2004]
At
least one member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, apparently uses
steganography, a method of encoding messages within computerized
photographs. In Milan’s Via Quaranta mosque in Milan, frequented by
Egyptian al-Qaeda operative Mahmoud Es Sayed, pictures of the World
Trade Center that have steganographic messages in them are saved on a
computer. A number of other pictures of world leaders and pornography
are also manipulated in a similar manner. These pictures will not be
discovered until months after 9/11, but they help suggest that some in
the Milan cell had foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. Es Sayed had been
wiretapped on previous occasions, and was heard making comments
suggesting he had such foreknowledge (see August 12, 2000)
(see January 24, 2001). His current whereabouts are unknown. [ABC News, 5/8/2003]
Adel Ben Soltane Adel, a Tunisian detained in Milan, Italy, for his role in an extremist cell (see January 24, 2001),
receives a letter from a fellow militant. The envelope contains an
empty chewing gum wrapper. The wrapper is from Brooklyn gum, a popular
Italian brand that features a picture of the Brooklyn bridge, so
presumably it is a hint to Soltane about 9/11. Prison guards notice the
wrapper when they open the envelope and think it odd. However, they do
not realize the full significance until five days later. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 226]
Father Jean-Marie Benjamin.
[Source: Public domain]At
a wedding in Todi, Italy, Father Jean-Marie Benjamin is told of a plot
to attack the US and Britain using hijacked airplanes as weapons. He is
not told specifics regarding time or place. He immediately passes what
he knows to a judge and several politicians. He later will state,
“Although I am friendly with many Muslims, I wondered why they were
telling me, specifically. I felt it my duty to inform the Italian
government.” Benjamin has been called “one of the West’s most
knowledgeable experts on the Muslim world.” Two days after 9/11, he
will meet with the Italian Foreign Minister on this topic. He will say
he learned the attack on Britain failed at the last minute. [Zenit (Vatican), 9/16/2001] An al-Qaeda cell based in nearby Milan, Italy, appears to have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see August 12, 2000) and (see January 24, 2001). It is not known if the Italian government warns the US government of this latest warning before 9/11.
An Italian network of extremists that has been closely monitored by local authorities (see After April 2001)
goes silent following 9/11, after which only one message is
intercepted. The message, which says, “Congratulations for the USA,” is
from an unknown militant to Abdelhalim Remadna, a leading radical based
in Milan. Remadna is arrested on November 12 as he attempts to flee
Italy. One of his associates, Yassin Chekkouri, is arrested on the same
day. Remadna will be sentenced to eight years in prison, whereas
Chekkouri will receive four. Mahmoud Es Sayed, one of their associates
who apparently had some foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and September 4, 2001), escapes Italy some time in October, but is apparently killed at the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 227-30]
Kamar Eddine Kherbane. [Source: Marco Hebdo]A
militant leader named Kamar Eddine Kherbane is arrested in Morocco, but
he has been given political asylum in Britain since 1994 and he is
quickly deported to Britain and freed. Agence France-Presse claims that
his arrest was “apparently in connection with the [9/11] attacks on the
US.” The Moroccan government also questions him about arms smuggling. [Agence France-Presse, 9/20/2001]
But by sending him back to Britain, the Moroccan government ignores an
extradition request by the Algerian government who claim Kherbane is a
wanted criminal and an al-Qaeda operative. [BBC, 9/21/2001]
Kherbane was a founding member of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an
Algerian political party outlawed in the early 1990s. He is also a
known al-Qaeda operative said to have met bin Laden on several
occasions, most recently in 1998. He appears to have been a key leader
of mujaheddin fighting in Bosnia (see 1990 and 1991). [Agence France-Presse, 9/20/2001] A Spanish police report will later claim that he was the head of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center’s Zabreb, Croatia, office (see Early 1990s).
Al-Kifah was a US-based al-Qaeda charity front until the early 1990s
that had ties to both the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the CIA
(see 1986-1993). [CNN, 12/8/2002] Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna says Kherbane is “close to both the [Algerian] GIA and al-Qaeda’s leaderships.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 183]
In an interview shortly after the Moroccan incident, Kherbane claims
that he was released there because “Britain put a lot of pressure,
which reached the point of threatening to expel the Moroccan ambassador
from London.” He also admits to having met bin Laden in the 1990s. [BBC, 9/26/2001]
It is not known why the British government helps him avoid being sent
to Algeria. But a few days after his return to Britain, The London
Times will report, “More than 20 Islamic terrorists, including those
wanted for the murders of at least 100 people abroad, are living freely
in Britain. Many on the global terror ‘wanted list’ have been granted
political asylum despite being close to Osama bin Laden’s
organization.” [London Times, 9/23/2001] A 2005 article will indicate Kherbane is still living openly in Britain. [BBC, 2/24/2005]
Italian police raid Youssef Nada’s villa in Lugano, Italy. [Source: Keystone]The
US and other countries announce the closure of the Al Taqwa Bank and
the Al Barakaat financial network. President Bush says, “Al Taqwa and
Al Barakaat raise funds for al-Qaeda. They manage, invest and
distribute those funds.” US officials claim that both entities skimmed
a part of the fees charged on each financial transaction it conducted
and paid it to al-Qaeda. This would provide al-Qaeda with tens of
millions of dollars annually. Additionally, Al Taqwa would provide
investment advice and transfer cash for al-Qaeda. Al Taqwa is based in
Switzerland while Al Barakaat is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Over 100 nations are said to be cooperating with efforts to block the
funds of these two groups. [New York Times, 11/8/2001]
Swiss authorities raid Al Taqwa-related businesses and the homes of
bank leaders Youssef Nada, Ali Himmat, and Ahmad Huber, but no arrests
are made. In January 2002, Nada will announce that the Al Taqwa Bank is
shutting down, due to bad publicity after the raids. He will maintain
that he and his organization are completely innocent. [Newsweek, 11/7/2001; Reuters, 1/10/2002]
Days after 9/11, Huber called the 9/11 attacks “counterterror against
American-Israeli terror,” the World Trade Center a “the Twin Towers of
the godless,” and the Pentagon “a symbol of Satan,” yet he will claim
to have no ties to the attackers. [Playboy, 2/1/2002; Newsweek, 3/18/2002]
In searching Nada’s house, Swiss authorities discover a document
entitled “The Project,” which is a strategic plan for the Muslim
Brotherhood to infiltrate and defeat Western countries (see December 1982).
By late 2002, both the US and UN will declare Al Taqwa Bank, Nada, and
Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, another founder and director of the bank,
supporters of terrorism. All of their accounts will be declared frozen
worldwide. [US Department of the Treasury, 8/29/2002]
However, while Al Taqwa itself will be shut down, later reports will
indicate that other financial entities operated by the directors will
continue to operate freely (see June-October 2005).
Richard Reid’s shoe bomb.
[Source: NEFA Foundation]British citizen Richard Reid is arrested for allegedly trying to blow up a Miami-bound jet using explosives hidden in his shoe. [Associated Press, 8/19/2002] He later pleads guilty to all charges, and declares himself a follower of bin Laden. [CBS News, 10/4/2002] He may have ties to Pakistan. [Washington Post, 3/31/2002] It is later believed that Reid and others in the shoe bomb plot reported directly to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [CNN, 1/30/2003]
It has been suggested that Mohammed has ties to the ISI, and that Reid
is a follower of Ali Gilani, a religious leader believed to be working
with the ISI (see January 6, 2002).
Reporter Daniel Pearl moments before he is killed. [Source: Associated Press]Wall
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is murdered. He is reported dead
on February 21; his mutilated body is found months later. Police
investigators say “there were at least eight to ten people present on
the [murder] scene” and at least 15 who participated in his kidnapping
and murder. “Despite issuing a series of political demands shortly
after Pearl’s abduction four weeks ago, it now seems clear that the
kidnappers planned to kill Pearl all along.” [Washington Post, 2/23/2002] Some captured participants later claim 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the one who cuts Pearl’s throat. [MSNBC, 9/17/2002; Time, 1/26/2003]
The land on which Pearl was held and murdered reportedly belongs to
either the Al Rashid Trust, or one of its supporters, Saud Memon. The
Al Rashid Trust, an ostensibly charitable organization that US
intelligence linked to the financing of al-Qeada, is closely linked to
the jihadi organization Jaish-i-Mohammed and was one of the very first
organizations to have its assets frozen after 9/11. It may have been
used to funnel money to the 9/11 hijackers in the US (see Early August 2001 and September 24, 2001). [Time, 1/26/2003; Daily Telegraph, 5/9/2004; Tribune, 4/2/2006]
In
2007, NBC News will report that the CIA uses aggressive interrogation
techniques on at least 13 high-ranking al-Qaeda detainees between 2002
and 2004. These techniques are first used on Abu Zubaida, captured in
March 2002 (see March 28, 2002), and some of the techniques are discontinued in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal around the middle of 2004 (see Evening April 28, 2004),
which is also around the time the CIA’s Inspector General issues a
secret report suggesting many of these techniques could be a violation
of an international treaty against torture (see Spring 2004). Euphemistically called “enhanced interrogation,” these techniques include:
Sleep deprivation.
Exposure to extreme heat and cold.
Confined quarters.
Psychological and physical abuse.
The use of psychotropic drugs.
Waterboarding. However, waterboarding is allegedly only used on about four of the detainees (see May 2002-2003).
All 13 of these detainees will later be transferred to Guantanamo prison to stand trial before a military tribunal there (see September 2-3, 2006).
(Two others similarly transferred - Abu Faraj al-Libbi and Abu al-Hadi
al-Iraqi - are captured after the Abu Ghraib scandal and thus are not
subjected to as many interrogation techniques.) [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] However, there are other “ghost detainees” not officially acknowledged as captured by the US government (see June 7, 2007).
Some, like Hassan Ghul, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, and Mohammed Omar
Abdul-Rahman, are held in the same secret prison as most of the
“official” high-ranking detainees later transferred to Guantanamo, so
it would seem likely that aggressive techniques have been used on many
of them as well. In 2007, President Bush will sign an executive order
allowing the CIA to use most of these aggressive techniques again (see July 2007).
Entity Tags: Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Mohamad Farik Amin, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Majid Khan, Tawfiq bin Attash, Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Hambali, Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Hassan Ghul, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Abu Zubaida, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Complete 911 Timeline
In the wake of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida’s arrest (see March 28, 2002), the FBI discovers much useful information (see Shortly After March 28, 2002).
FBI agent Dan Coleman leads a team to sort through Zubaida’s computer
files and documents. However, at the same, 2002 time, it is discovered
that Zubaida’s prominence in al-Qaeda’s hierarchy was overestimated and
some conclude that he was used as little more than a travel agent for
training camp attendees because he was mentally ill. Coleman will later
comment, “This guy is insane, certifiable, split personality. That’s
why they let him fly all over the world doing meet and greet. That’s
why people used his name on all sorts of calls and e-mails. He was like
a travel agent, the guy who booked your flights.… He knew very little
about real operations, or strategy. He was expendable….” [Suskind, 2006, pp. 94-96, 100]
Other accounts back this up. For instance, Omar Nasiri, a former
informant for European intelligence agencies who met Zubaida in the
nineties, will later describe Zubaida’s odd behavior. He “shuffled
around his home in near-total darkness, carrying a gas lantern from
room to room. He barely spoke and would often communicate by pointing.”
[New Yorker, 1/22/2007] On the other hand, Zubaida does appear to be involved in numerous plots before 9/11 (see for instance November 30, 1999 and Early September 2001).
Al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam cooperated with US investigators after
being arrested. He worked with Zubaida and suggested Zubaida was of
some importance, but not one of al-Qaeda’s highest leaders: “He is the
person in charge of the [training] camps. He receives young men from
all countries. He accepts you or rejects you. He takes care of the
expenses of the camps. He makes arrangements for you when you travel
coming in or leaving.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 133]
In a 2007, former CIA Director George Tenet will claim that the reports
Zubaida was mentally unstable are “Baloney.… Apparently, the source of
the rumor that Abu Zubaida was unbalanced was his personal diary, in
which he adopted various personas. From that shaky perch, some junior
Freudians leapt to the conclusion that Zubaida had multiple
personalities. In fact, Agency psychiatrists eventually determined that
in his diary he was using a sophisticated literary device to express
himself.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 243]
Regardless, despite being briefed otherwise, President Bush and others
in his administration will repeatedly tout the importance of capturing
Zubaida and no hint of any doubts about his importance or sanity will
be publicly expressed (see April 9, 2002 and After).
Ramzi bin al-Shibh. [Source: FBI]It
is originally reported that Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda interviews
9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and 9/11 associate Ramzi
Bin al-Shibh at a secret location in Karachi, Pakistan, in either June [London Times, 9/8/2002] or August. [Guardian, 9/9/2002]
Details and audio footage of the interview come out between September 8
and 12, 2002. The video footage of the interview al-Qaeda promised to
hand over is never given to Al Jazeera. [Associated Press, 9/8/2002]
Both figures claim the 9/11 attacks were originally going to target
nuclear reactors, but “decided against it for fear it would go out of
control.” Interviewer Fouda is struck that KSM and bin al-Shibh
remember only the hijackers’ code names, and have trouble remembering
their real names. [Australian, 9/9/2002]
KSM, who calls himself the head of al-Qaeda’s military committee and
refers to bin al-Shibh as the coordinator of the “Holy Tuesday”
operation, reportedly acknowledges “[a]nd, yes, we did it.” [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 38]
These interviews “are the first full admission by senior figures from
bin Laden’s network that they carried out the September 11 attacks.” [London Times, 9/8/2002]
Some, however, call Fouda’s claims into doubt. For example, the
Financial Times states: “Analysts cited the crude editing of [Fouda’s
interview] tapes and the timing of the broadcasts as reasons to be
suspicious about their authenticity. Dia Rashwan, an expert on Islamist
movements at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies in Cairo, said:
‘I have very serious doubts [about the authenticity of this tape]. It
could have been a script written by the FBI.’” [Financial Times, 9/11/2002]
KSM is later variously reported to be arrested in June 2002, killed or
arrested in September 2002, and then arrested in March 2003. After this
last arrest report, for the first time Fouda claims this interview took
place in April, placing it safely before the first reports of KSM’s
capture. [Guardian, 3/4/2003; CTV Television, 3/6/2003]
Bin al-Shibh also gets captured several days after Fouda’s interview is
broadcast, and some reports say he is captured because this interview
allows his voice to be identified. [Observer, 9/15/2002; CBS News, 10/9/2002] As a result, Fouda has been accused of betraying al-Qaeda, and now fears for his life. [Independent, 9/17/2002] As the Washington Post states, “Now Al Jazeera is also subject to rumors of a conspiracy.” [Washington Post, 9/15/2002] Yet after being so reviled by al-Qaeda supporters, Fouda is later given a cassette said to be a bin Laden speech. [MSNBC, 11/18/2002]
US officials believe the voice on that cassette is “almost certainly”
bin Laden, but one of the world’s leading voice-recognition institutes
said it is 95 percent certain the tape is a forgery. [BBC, 11/18/2002; BBC, 11/29/2002]
It will later be revealed that details of the interview were told to
the CIA in mid-June 2002, which directly resulted in bin al-Shibh’s
arrest a few months later (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After).
A
truck bomb kills 19 people, mostly German tourists, at a synagogue in
Djerba, Tunisia. It is later claimed that al-Qaeda is behind the
attack, and that the suspected bomber speaks with Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed (KSM) by phone about three hours before the attack. [Associated Press, 8/24/2002]
This
picture of US soldiers supervising the waterboarding of North
Vietnamese prisoners was published in a US newspaper in 1968, resulting
in an investigation and convictions. [Source: Bettmann / Corbis]In
2007, it will be reported that the CIA used the controversial
interrogation technique of waterboarding on at least three detainees.
The Associated Press will claim the detainees are:
Abu Zubaida, who is captured in March 2002 and tortured around May 2002 (see March 28, 2002 and Mid-May 2002 and After).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who is captured in November 2002 (see Early October 2002 and Shortly After Early October 2002).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who is allegedly captured in early 2003 (see March 1, 2003 and Shortly After March 1, 2003). [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]
NBC News will report a list of three that includes Hambali, who is captured in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003 and Shortly After August 12, 2003). NBC’s list also mentions KSM and Zubaida, but does not mention al-Nashiri. [MSNBC, 9/13/2007]
In a 2007 book, former CIA Director George Tenet will hint that
slightly more than three may have been waterboarded, writing, “The most
aggressive interrogation techniques conducted by CIA personnel were
applied to only a handful of the worst terrorists on the planet,
including people who had planned the 9/11 attacks…” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 242]
ABC News will claim in September 2007, “It is believed that
waterboarding was used on fewer than five ‘high-value’ terrorist
subjects…” [ABC News, 9/14/2007]
Prior to 2002, waterboarding was classified by the US government as a
form of torture, and treated as a serious criminal offense. US soldiers
were court-martialled for waterboarding captives as recently as the
Vietnam War. The technique is said to simulate death by drowning. [New Yorker, 8/6/2007]
In the 1600s, King James I of England wrote about the torture his
government was using and stated that waterboarding was the most extreme
form of torture used, worse than the rack and thumbscrews. [Harper's, 12/15/2007]
In 2007, it will be revealed that at least some of the interrogations
of Zubaida and al-Nashiri were videotaped, and it is suspected by some
that their waterboarding may have been taped (see Spring-Late 2002). These tapes will later be destroyed under controversial circumstances (see November 2005).
A government official will later claim that waterboarding is no longer
used after 2003. The CIA and US military will prohibit the use of
waterboarding in 2006. [Associated Press, 12/11/2007]
Italian
authorities monitoring a cell of Islamist extremists based in Milan,
Italy, overhear one of the radicals plotting to create a new
trans-European network. The surveillance target, Hassan Mustafa Osama
Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After),
tells an unidentified man that they will use the network to “eliminate
the enemies of God.” News of the network, which is to be based in
Britain, causes the Italians to place Nasr under round the clock
surveillance. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 236-41] Nasr will subsequently be kidnapped by the CIA (see February 17, 2003).
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. [Source: CBC]A
number of governments are given warnings suggesting an upcoming attack
on nightclubs on the island of Bali, Indonesia, but this does not
prevent the bombing of two nightclubs in Bali in October 2002 (see October 12, 2002).
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, an al-Qaeda operative with Canadian
citizenship, attended a meeting held in southern Thailand led by
Hambali, an al-Qaeda leader who also heads the al-Qaeda affiliate
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Hambali announces a new plan to target
nightclubs and restaurants in Southeast Asia. A second meeting held
shortly thereafter also attended by Jabarah narrowed the target to
nightclubs in Bali. Jabarah was arrested in Oman in April 2002 and
deported to Canada. By August, he is in the US and interrogated by US
agents, and he reveals this attack plan. As a result, US officials pass
a warning to all Southeast Asian governments in August. [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003]
In September, a secret report compiled by the CIA, State Department,
and other US agencies lists six likely bomb targets in Indonesia,
including two Bali nightclubs that are just a short distance away from
the two that will ultimately be attacked one month later. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 6/26/2003]
On September 26, 2002, the US embassy in Indonesia issues a public
warning that states, “Americans and Westerners should avoid large
gatherings, and locations known to cater primarily to a Western
clientele such as certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas.”
However, the US State Department does not issue any travel warning for
Indonesia, and other governments such as Australia do not issue any
warnings. There also is no evidence that the owners of Bali nightclubs
are given any warnings. The Sydney Morning Herald will conclude in 2003
that it is now “impossible for anyone to believe that Mohammed Mansour
Jabarah’s interrogation did not result in the US learning of JI’s plan
for a terrorist attack in Bali.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage will later call Jabarah’s warning “stunningly explicit and
specific.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/10/2003]
Abdulsalam
Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security
Organization, the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI, disappears in Cairo,
Egypt, after going there on business. Abdulrahman, who appears to have
had foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000),
calls his family after arriving in Cairo, but is apparently kidnapped
by Egyptian intelligence and handed over to the CIA. However, it is
unclear whether the CIA takes him to Azerbaijan or Afghanistan. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230; Grey, 2007, pp. 252] He will later be taken to Guantanamo (see September 20, 2004).
High-ranking
al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is captured in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Al-Nashiri is believed to have played a role in the
1998 African embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998), attended a 9/11 planning summit in Malaysia in 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000), was one of the masterminds of the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), and planned the 2002 bombing of the French oil tanker Limburg (see October 6, 2002).
Said to be chief of al-Qaeda’s operations in the Persian Gulf region,
he is taking flight lessons in the remote UAE region of Umm Al-Qaiwain
when he is arrested by local authorities and then turned over to the
CIA. An unknown number of other al-Qaeda suspects are arrested with
him, but apparently they are considered less important and are not
handed to the CIA as well. Most reports indicate he is arrested on
November 8, 2002, about two weeks before the first media leaks about
his arrest. [New York Times, 12/23/2002]
However, US News and World Report will later claim that he was arrested
even earlier, early in October 2002. “Al-Nashiri soon broke; he even
let officials listen in as he called his associates.” This leads to
intelligence on Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a top al-Qaeda operative,
and the US assassinates him with a missile strike on November 3, 2002,
after trailing him for about two weeks (see November 3, 2002). [US News and World Report, 6/2/2003] Al-Nashiri will remain in secret CIA prisons until 2006 and then will be transfered to the Guantanamo Bay prison (see September 2-3, 2006).
The Limburg after the attack. [Source: NAVSEA]Al-Qaeda conducts a suicide bombing against a French oil tanker, the Limburg.
The attack takes places in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Yemen. One
crew member is killed and over 90,000 barrels of oil leak into the sea.
The attack is similar to the one on the USS Cole almost two years before (see October 12, 2000) and is planned by one of the same people, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. [BBC, 10/16/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 153]
An explosion lights up the sky on the island of Bali, Indonesia. [Source: Agence France-Presse]A
car bomb detonates in front of a discotheque at Kuta Beach, on the
Indonesian resort island of Bali, starting a fire that rages through a
dozen buildings, killing 202 people. No group claims responsibility,
but Jemaah Islamiyah, a radical Islamic organization in Indonesia, is
suspected. [New York Times, 10/13/2002; New York Times, 10/14/2002; BBC, 2/19/2003] Hambali, a leader in both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, is said to have been involved. [Chicago Tribune, 12/7/2003]
It will later turn out that the US was given a “stunningly explicit and
specific” advanced warning that Hambali and Jemaah Islamiyah were
planning to attack nightclubs in Bali (see August-September 2002).
Following six attacks by different radical Islamic groups in Tunisia (see April 11, 2002), Pakistan, Yemen (see October 6, 2002), Kuwait, Bali (see October 12, 2002),
and Moscow, a new audio message is released by a man said by some to be
Osama bin Laden, although the identity of the speaker will be disputed
(see November 29, 2002).
The voice on the tape outlines a principle he says he and his allies
are using: reciprocity. He comments: “If it pains you to see your
victims and your allies’ victims in Tunisia, Karachi, Failaka, and
Oman, then remember that our children are murdered daily in Palestine
and Iraq… If it pains you to see your victims in Moscow, then remember
ours in Chechnya. How long will fear, killing, destruction,
displacement, orphaning, and widowing be our sole destiny, while
security, stability, and happiness is yours? This is injustice. The
time has come to settle accounts. Just as you kill, so you shall be
killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be
more to come.” [Laden, 2005, pp. 173-5]
The
authenticity of a new audio tape purportedly made by bin Laden, in
which he praises recent attacks in Bali, Kuwait, Yemen and Moscow (see November 12, 2002),
is disputed by Swiss voice analysts. US officials believe the voice is
“almost certainly” bin Laden, but the Dalle Molle Institute for
Perceptual Artificial Intelligence in Switzerland, one of the world’s
leading voice-recognition institutes, is 95 percent certain the tape is
a forgery. [BBC, 11/13/2002; BBC, 11/18/2002; BBC, 11/29/2002; Toronto Star, 12/16/2002]
Two weeks after it was broadcast, a British newspaper publishes the
complete text of a “letter to the American people,” purportedly written
by bin Laden. [Observer, 11/25/2002] However, “diplomats [are] skeptical about the authenticity of the document.” [Guardian, 10/15/2002] The institute will not continue to analyse bin Laden’s speeches (see February 12, 2003).
Entity Tags: Dalle Molle Institute, Osama bin Laden
After
fleeing Qatar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) travels the world and plans
many al-Qaeda operations. He previously was involved in the 1993 WTC
bombing, and the Operation Bojinka plot. [Time, 1/20/2003] He is apparently involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998 and Bad link: a0898ksmnairobi), the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000),
and other attacks. One US official says, “There is a clear operational
link between him and the execution of most, if not all, of the al-Qaeda
plots over the past five years.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] He lives in Prague, Czech Republic, through much of 1997. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] By 1999, he is living in Germany and visiting with the hijackers there. [New York Times, 6/8/2002; New York Times, 9/22/2002]
Using 60 aliases and as many passports, he travels through Europe,
Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and South America, personally
setting up al-Qaeda cells. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002; Time, 1/20/2003]
The Al Taqwa Bank had offices in this building in Lugano, Italy, on the border with Switzerland. [Source: Keystone]Newsweek
will later claim that US investigators “on bin Laden’s trail” had known
about the Al Taqwa Bank in Switzerland and its support for al-Qaeda
“for years. But the group’s mazelike structure made it hard to track,
and the Feds considered it a low priority.” A senior Treasury official
later will tell Congress that US investigators learned in 1997 that
Hamas had transferred $60 million into accounts at the Al Taqwa Bank.
Also in 1997, US investigators learn the names of many Al Taqwa
shareholders. Many of them turn out to be rich and powerful Arabs,
including members of the bin Laden family and members of the Kuwaiti
royal family (see 1997-December 1999). Newsweek later will claim that, “The US took a harder look at Al Taqwa after the [1998 US] embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
Sources say US intelligence tracked telephone contacts between Al Taqwa
and members of bin Laden’s inner circle. Al-Qaeda operatives would call
Al Taqwa representatives in the Bahamas as they moved around the world.
Still, the network’s complex structure made it difficult to prove how
money changed hands, and the investigation stalled. Under US pressure,
the Bahamian government revoked Al Taqwa’s license [in the spring of
2001]. Treasury officials say the network continued to do business
anyway.” [Newsweek, 3/18/2002] The US will declare Al Taqwa a terrorist financier two months after 9/11 (see November 7, 2001).
Hassan
Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), a member of the Egyptian
terrorist organization Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya who previously informed
for the CIA in Albania (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After),
arrives in Italy and settles in Rome. He obtains asylum in Italy and
serves as an imam near the Italian capital for a few years. He will
later move to Milan at the same time a key al-Qaeda operative moves
there (see Summer 2000). [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005; Vidino, 2006, pp. 242]
Mohamed Daki. [Source: Cageprisoners]Records
indicate that would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh lives at the same
Hamburg, Germany, address as a Moroccan named Mohamed Daki during this
time. Daki will be arrested in April 2003, and will admit to knowing
bin al-Shibh and some others in the Hamburg cell. In April 1999 Daki
will obtain a visa to travel to the US, but it is not known if he goes
there. It is generally assumed by the press that the Hamburg cell keep
themselves separate from other al-Qaeda cells in Europe. However, Daki
is an expert document forger and a member of al-Qaeda’s Milan cell.
There is considerable evidence that the Milan cell has foreknowledge of
the 9/11 plot. The cell is under heavy surveillance by Italian
intelligence before 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and January 24, 2001),
but apparently the connection between the Milan and Hamburg cells
through Daki is not made. German authorities will interview him after
9/11, and he will admit ties to bin al-Shibh, but he will be let go,
not investigated further, and not put on any watch lists. He will later
come under investigation in Italy for recruiting fighters to combat the
US in Iraq. He will finally be arrested and charged for that, but not
for his 9/11 connections. [Los Angeles Times, 3/22/2004; New York Times, 3/22/2004]
Following
an investigation of extremists linked to the Islamic Cultural Institute
mosque in Milan, Italy, arrests are made, but most of the suspects are
eventually released. The mosque was a logistics base for radical
Muslims fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995 and Late 1993-1994)
and has been under investigation for some time. However, according to
the Chicago Tribune: “[T]he criminal case appears to [founder] on the
vagaries of the Italian justice system. Because of limitations on
jailing people charged with crimes committed outside Italy, most of the
suspects [will be] released and [vanish].” [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001]
People connected to the mosque will go on to be connected to numerous
plots, such as the failed millennium attacks and 9/11 (see Late 1998-September 11, 2001).
Zein al-Abidine Almihdhar. [Source: Associated Press]Ahmed
Nasrallah, a veteran al-Qaeda operative who has been in Yemen for
several years, decides to defect and turn himself in to the Yemeni
government. He discloses the location of al-Qaeda strongholds in Yemen
and even gives away the location of al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri in a southern Yemeni town. He describes al-Qaeda’s
weaponry, security, and violent plans for the future. He offers to spy
on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or on a militant Yemeni group led by Zein
al-Abidine Almihdhar, a relative of hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. (In 1999
Zein will be caught and executed in Yemen for kidnappings and
killings.) However, two officials in the Political Security
Organization (Yemen’s equivalent of the FBI) have radical militant ties
and hand over Nasrallah to al-Qaeda operatives. These operatives plan
to kill him for betraying their group, but he escapes to Egypt before
they can do so. The Egyptian government then interrogates him for more
than a year. However, it is not known what he told them before 9/11, or
what they might have passed to the US. One of the two Yemeni officers
helping al-Qaeda on this matter, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman al-Hilah,
will be recorded by Italian intelligence in 2000 apparently mentioning
the upcoming 9/11 attacks (see August 12, 2000). [Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002]
Yemeni
security officer Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman travels to Switzerland to
purchase passport forgery equipment for Islamist extremists. Abdulsalam
is a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO),
the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI (see August 12, 2000).
Abdulrahman purchases tools to forge Schengen visas, which allow their
holder to travel without border controls in some European Union
countries. Italian authorities investigating Abdulrahman and his
associates will learn this by 2002. They will speculate that
Abdulrahman is an expert forger and that he trains a militant named
Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman
al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000), in forgery. Es Sayed will travel to Italy in 2000 from Yemen, where he will begin forging documents (see Summer 2000).
Abdulrahman has close ties to radical organizations and provides false
documents and airline tickets to al-Qaeda members to facilitate their
travels to Europe. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 223-4]
Bombings of the Nairobi, Kenya, US embassy (left), and the Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, US embassy (right). [Source: Associated Press] (click image to enlarge)Two
US embassies in Africa are bombed within minutes of each other. The
attack in Nairobi, Kenya, kills 213 people, including 12 US nationals,
and injures more than 4,500. The attack in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
kills 11 and injures 85. The attack is blamed on al-Qaeda. [PBS Frontline, 2001]
The Tanzania death toll is low because, remarkably, the attack takes
place on a national holiday so the US embassy there is closed. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195] The attack shows al-Qaeda has a capability for simultaneous attacks. A third attack against the US embassy in Uganda fails. [Associated Press, 9/25/1998]
In the 2002 book The Cell, reporters John Miller, Michael Stone, and
Chris Miller will write, “What has become clear with time is that
facets of the East Africa plot had been known beforehand to the FBI,
the CIA, the State Department, and to Israeli and Kenyan intelligence
services.… [N]o one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7,
1998, couldn’t have been prevented.” [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195]
After 9/11, it will come to light that three of the alleged hijackers,
Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi, had some
involvement in the bombings (see October 4, 2001, Late 1999, and 1993-1999) and that the US intelligence community was aware of this involvement by late 1999 (see December 15-31, 1999), if not before.
9/11
mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) lived in the Philippines for
much of 1994 and took part in the failed Bojinka plot to assassinate
Pope John Paul II and crash a dozen airplanes (see January 6, 1995). In the years after this, he makes repeated visits to the Philippines, as well as neighboring Malaysia. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
KSM returns to the Philippines in September 1998 and stays to organize
the assassination of Pope John Paul II, who is due to visit the country
in January 1999. KSM is seen at a nightclub in Manila in early 1999. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. xxv]
But the Pope’s visit is canceled; it isn’t known if the cancellation is
due to security concerns or not. That same year, the FBI alerts
Philippine intelligence that KSM has returned to that country to visit
an old girlfriend. However, he disappears before agents arrive to
arrest him. Further details on how he was traced there or how he got
away have not been made public. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; London Times, 11/10/2002]
KSM will continue to return to the Philippines occasionally. There are
even “credible reports” that he is seen there in the summer of 2002. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; Knight Ridder, 9/9/2002]
Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will later write that after the US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998),
surveillance of al-Qaeda is stepped up around the world. “One
intelligence officer attached to the French embassy in Islamabad,
[Pakistan], urged his counterparts in foreign missions in Pakistan to
detail the recipients of phone calls made by… al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida, then living in Peshawar, to individuals in their various
countries.” As a result, “several governments [launch] investigations
of their own.” [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 245] A close associate of Zubaida in Peshawar at this time is Khalil Deek, who is actually a mole for the Jordanian government (see 1998-December 11, 1999).
One such investigation is launched by the Philippine government on
October 16, 1998, after being asked by French intelligence to gather
intelligence on people in the Philippines in contact with Zubaida. Code
named CoPlan Pink Poppy, the investigation reveals connections between
al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a Philippine
militant group. On December 16, 1999, Abdesselem Boulanouar and Zoheir
Djalili, two French Algerians belonging to the Algerian al-Qaeda
affiliate the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), are arrested
due to information learned from monitoring Zubaida’s calls to the
Philippines. Boulanouar is arrested at an airport carrying a terrorist
training manual he admitted writing for the MILF. Both men also are
arrested carrying explosive devices. French intelligence says
Boulanouar had ties to Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999),
and like Ressam, may have been planning to carry out attacks at the
turn of the millennium. He will be deported to France and imprisoned on
terrorism related charges. CoPlan Pink Poppy will be canceled in 2000
for lack of funds. [Gulf News, 3/14/2000; Ressa, 2003, pp. 132-133; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 245]
However, while details are murky, it appears other governments continue
to monitor Zubaida’s calls. Around the same time as the Philippines
arrests, one militant in Jordan is even arrested while still in the
middle of a phone call to Zubaida (see November 30, 1999). US intelligence will remain intensely focused on Zubaida before 9/11 (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001), and just days before 9/11 the NSA will monitor calls Zubaida is making to the US (see Early September 2001). It appears his calls will continue to be monitored after 9/11 as well (see October 8, 2001).
The Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy. [Source: Public domain]By
late 1998, US and Italian intelligence are already aware of the
importance of a mosque in Milan, Italy, called the Islamic Cultural
Institute. After 9/11, the Treasury Department will call the mosque
“the main al-Qaeda station house in Europe. It is used to facilitate
the movement of weapons, men and money across the world.” Additionally,
they are aware that Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, a founder and director of Al
Taqwa Bank, is also a founder and financier of the mosque. The mosque
is also less than 50 miles away from Al Taqwa’s headquarters on the
Swiss border.(see 1993-1997). [Newsweek, 3/18/2002]
US officials will later say that al-Qaeda operatives involved in the
1998 US embassy bombings stayed at the Milan mosque. This causes US and
Italian intelligence to watch the mosque more closely, and it also
causes the US to look closer at Al Taqwa Bank (see 1997-September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 3/18/2002] One member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan lives in Hamburg with 9/11 plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh for most of 1998 (see December 1997-November 1998).
In 2000, Abderazek Mahdjoub, the head of the Milan cell, lives in
Hamburg, attends the Al-Quds mosque that the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell
attends, and has ties with some of the 9/11 hijackers (see 2000). Al-Qaeda operatives involved in the failed millennium bombing plot in Jordan also stay at the Milan mosque (see November 30, 1999). The Jordanian government later will claim that Al Taqwa helped fund these millennium bombers. [Newsweek, 3/18/2002; Newsweek, 4/12/2004]
Starting in late 2000, Italian intelligence, wiretapping people
associated with the Milan mosque and/or the Milan al-Qaeda cell, record
conversations suggesting foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot (see August 12, 2000; January 24, 2001). This information is shared with the US in early 2001 (see March 2001). Additional evidence will come out after 9/11 suggesting some people in Milan had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks (see September 4, 2001; September 7, 2001).
Given the closeness of the Al Taqwa Bank to the mosque, especially
through Nasreddin, this raises the possibility of Al Taqwa involvement
and knowledge of specific al-Qaeda plots, including the 9/11 attacks,
though there is no known evidence of such direct ties except for the
attempted millennium bombing mentioned above.
Nabil
al-Marabh will claim in a 2002 statement that in May 1999, the FBI
approaches him in Boston, looking for Raed Hijazi. Al-Marabh will say
he lied and said he did not know Hijazi, even though he knew him well.
Hijazi apparently has not been involved in any violent crime yet, but
will participate in a failed attempt to bomb a hotel in Jordan (see November 30, 1999) and will help plan the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 (see October 12, 2000). [Washington Post, 9/4/2002]
In August 1999 FBI agents again visit al-Marabh’s Boston apartment to
ask him about another man. Al-Marabh’s wife will later recall that the
first name of this man is Ahmed. [New York Times, 10/14/2001] He is from Jordan and had lived in their apartment for two months. [New York Times, 9/21/2001] Around the same time, the Boston FBI is looking for another associate of al-Marabh’s, Mohamad Kamal Elzahabi (see 1997 and 1999). They work at the same taxi company and fought together in Afghanistan.
On December 5, 1999, a Jordanian raid discovers 71 vats of bomb making chemicals in this residence. [Source: Judith Miller]Jordanian
officials successfully uncover an al-Qaeda plot to blow up the Radisson
Hotel in Amman, Jordan, and other sites on January 1, 2000. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002]
The Jordanian government intercepts a call between al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida and a suspected Jordanian terrorist named Abu Hoshar. Zubaida
says, “The training is over.” [New York Times, 1/15/2001] Zubaida also says, “The grooms are ready for the big wedding.” [Seattle Times, 6/23/2002]
This call reflects an extremely poor code system, because the FBI had
already determined in the wake of the 1998 US embassy bombings that
“wedding” was the al-Qaeda code word for bomb. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 214]
Furthermore, it appears al-Qaeda fails to later change the system,
because the code-name for the 9/11 attack is also “The Big Wedding.” [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002]
Jordan arrests Hoshar while he’s still on the phone talking to Zubaida.
In the next few days, 27 other suspects are charged. A Jordanian
military court will later convict 22 of them for participating in
planned attacks, sentencing six of them death. In addition to bombing
the Radisson Hotel around the start of the millennium, the plan calls
for suicide bombings on two border crossings with Israel and a
Christian baptism site. Further attacks in Jordan are planned for
later. The plotters had already stockpiled the equivalent of 16 tons of
TNT, enough to flatten “entire neighborhoods.” [New York Times, 1/15/2001] Key alleged plotters include:
Raed Hijazi, a US citizen who is part of a Boston al-Qaeda cell (see June 1995-Early 1999). He will be arrested and convicted in late 2000 (see September 2000 and October 2000). [New York Times, 1/15/2001]
Khalid Deek, who is also a US citizen and part of an Anaheim,
California al-Qaeda cell. He will be arrested in Pakistan and deported
to Jordan, but strangely he will released without going to trial.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He initially escapes arrest (see 2001) but is later sentenced in absentia. He will later be a notorious figure in the Iraq war starting in 2003. [Washington Post, 10/3/2004]
Luai Sakra. The Washington Post will later say he “played a role” in
the plot, though he is never charged for it. Sakra apparently is a CIA
informant before 9/11, perhaps starting in 2000 (see 2000). [Washington Post, 2/20/2006]
The
Jordanian government will also later claim that the Al Taqwa Bank in
Switzerland helped finance the network of operatives who planned the
attack. The bank will be shut down shortly after 9/11 (see November 7, 2001). [Newsweek, 4/12/2004]
Entity Tags: Abu Zubaida, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Al-Qaeda, Al Taqwa Bank, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Luai Sakra, Khalil Deek, Abu Hoshar, Jordan, Raed Hijazi
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Ahmed Ressam. [Source: Public domain]The CIA learns from the Jordanian government about an al-Qaeda millennium bombing plot in that country (see November 30, 1999). Further, the CIA concludes more attacks are likely soon, including some inside the US (see December 8, 1999). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told of this, and he implements a plan to neutralize the threat. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 205, 211]
The plan, approved by President Clinton, focuses on harassing and
disrupting al-Qaeda members throughout the world. The FBI is put on
heightened alert, counterterrorism teams are dispatched overseas, a
formal ultimatum is given to the Taliban to keep al-Qaeda under
control, and friendly intelligence agencies are asked to help. There
are Cabinet-level meetings nearly every day dealing with terrorism [Washington Post, 4/2/2000; Associated Press, 6/28/2002]
All US embassies, military bases, police departments, and other
agencies are given a warning to be on the lookout for signs of an
al-Qaeda millennium attack. One alert border agent responds by
arresting terrorist Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999), which leads to the unraveling of several bombing plots (see December 15-31, 1999).
No terror attacks occur. However, Clarke claims the FBI generally
remains unhelpful. For example, around this time the FBI says there are
no websites in the US soliciting volunteers for training in Afghanistan
or money for terrorist front groups. Clarke has a private citizen check
to see if this is true, and within days, he is given a long list of
such websites. The FBI and Justice Department apparently fail to do
anything with the information. [Newsweek, 3/31/2004]
As an al-Qaeda millennium plot is broken up in Jordan (see November 30, 1999),
attention is focused on the fact that two of the plotters were long
time US residents. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger sends a memo
to President Clinton about the two men, Raed Hijazi and Khalil Deek.
Hijazi had lived in California and then moved to Boston to drive a taxi
there for several years. The 9/11 Commission will say Berger tells
Clinton was a naturalized US citizen who had “been in touch with
extremists in the United States as well as abroad.” Later in the month,
counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will warn Berger in an e-mail,
“Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in
the US are likely.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 179, 501] Deek is arrested on December 11 (see December 11, 1999), but he will eventually be released without being charged (see May 2001).
A few days later, Clarke authorizes a study that looks into Deek’s
connections, but no action will be taken when it is discovered Deek’s
next-door neighbor is still living in Anaheim, California, and running
an al-Qaeda sleeper cell there (see December 14-25, 1999). Similarly, while Hijazi will be arrested overseas some months later (see September 2000),
US intelligence seems oblivious to the other al-Qaeda operatives who
have been his roommates and fellow taxi drivers in Boston (see June 1995-Early 1999 and October 2000). One of them, Nabil al-Marabh, will apparently go on to have a major role in the 9/11 plot (see for example January 2001-Summer 2001 and Early September 2001).
Investigators will also fail to act on knowledge of financial
transactions between Hijazi and three of the 9/11 hijackers (see Spring 2001).
Khalil Deek. [Source: Tawfiq Deek]Khalil
Deek is arrested by police in Peshawar, Pakistan, and immediately
extradited to Jordan. The Jordanian government requested the arrest
after tying Deek to a millennium plot to blow up hotels in Jordan that
had been broken up a few days earlier (see November 30, 1999). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006]
Deek is a naturalized US citizen who has been part of a California
al-Qaeda sleeper cell for most of the 1990s. He had been investigated
by US authorities since the late 1980s (see Late 1980s, March 1993-1996, and December 14-25, 1999)
but strangely was never arrested. Deek’s computer is confiscated when
he is arrested, and computer files reveals the targets of the Jordanian
plot. [Cooley, 2002, pp. 33]
According to contemporary press accounts, Deek, who was running a
computer repair shop in Peshawar, Pakistan, had helped encrypt
al-Qaeda’s Internet communications and smuggled recruits to al-Qaeda
training camps in Afghanistan. Some reports identify him as a former
mujaheddin fighter, a US Army veteran, and a close associate of bin
Laden. Articles also claim he worked closely with al-Qaeda leader Abu
Zubaida on the Jordanian plot and other things (see May 2000, Late 1980s, and 1998-December 11, 1999). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006] CNN says Deek “is believed to be the mastermind” of the Jordanian plot. [CNN, 12/17/1999]
But unlike the rest of the defendants in the Jordanian case, Deek is
transferred from a maximum-security prison to a minimum-security one.
He alone is not charged. He will be released in May 2001 (see May 2001). [Orange County Weekly, 6/15/2006] It will later be alleged that Deek was a Jordanian intelligence mole (see Shortly After December 11, 1999).
Earlier
in December, the CIA estimated that al-Qaeda would launch between five
and 15 attacks against American targets around the world over the New
Year’s weekend, and that several targets would likely be inside the US
(see December 8, 1999). Since late 1999, there has been intelligence that targets in Washington and New York would be attacked at this time. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] There in fact are a number of planned attacks, including bomb attacks on the Boston and Los Angeles airports (see December 14, 1999 and December 15-31, 1999), a hotel in Jordan (see November 30, 1999), and a naval ship in Yemen (see January 3, 2000). However, all of the attacks are foiled, thanks to alerts and luck. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002]
Abderazek Mahdjoub. [Source: Associated Press]Abderazek
Mahdjoub, an Algerian living in Hamburg, Germany, attends the al-Quds
mosque, and has ties to some of the 9/11 hijackers. According to a
senior German intelligence official, Mahdjoub is under observation by
German domestic intelligence since at least this year. However, he is
also connected to the al-Qaeda cell in Milan and in fact is believed to
be the head of that cell. There is considerable evidence that the Milan
cell has foreknowledge of the 9/11 plot. The cell is under heavy
surveillance by Italian intelligence before 9/11 (see August 12, 2000)
(see January 24, 2001).
But apparently the connection between the Milan and Hamburg cells
through Mahdjoub is not made. He is also tied to Mohamed Daki, another
alleged member of the Milan cell periodically living in Hamburg before
9/11 (see December 1997-November 1998).
He apparently continues to be a major organizer after 9/11, and the
Italian and German governments fail to share information about him. He
is suspected of leading European recruitment of those who want to fight
the US in Iraq. In late 2003, he will finally be arrested trying to
cross the border into Iraq. He is put in German custody. [New York Times, 11/29/2003; New York Times, 3/22/2004]
Attendees
of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid
Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin
Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid
Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI]About
a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level
al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar
- The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11
plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence
at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by
the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
- Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and
the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is
an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January
1995 (see January 6, 1995),
and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only
realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the
presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002]
Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed
by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the
9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s
interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading
this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot
targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003; New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003]
For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make
the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the
agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had
photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]
Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002]
The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot
at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003]
Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos,
as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them
of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after
the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000).
Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by
Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]
Tawfiq bin Attash
- Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of
bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and
served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001]
He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is
reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to
get a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188; Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002).
He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An
al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in
late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006]
Ramzi bin al-Shibh
- Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His
presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11,
despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin
Attash, and had video footage of him. [Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002]
Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the
Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi
bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [New York Times, 8/24/2002]
Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes
that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks
of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which
makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and
the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002]
Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s
presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh
and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir
- A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter
at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him
to the apartment where the summit is held. [Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004]
After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after
the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]
Abu Bara al Taizi
- A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11
hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny
for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]
Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).
Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001]
However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso
are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may
just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Ulrich Kersten, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Bara al Taizi, Hambali, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Islamic Jihad, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Salem Alhazmi, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Malaysian Secret Service
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline
Mahmoud
Es Sayed is arrested in Syria with other militants on weapons smuggling
charges, according to Italian authorities. The Italians will learn this
later based on wiretaps of Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. While in prison, Es Sayed is
visited by Muftafa Tlass, the Syrian defense minister, and Es Sayed
tells him that the weapons are meant to fight Jews. Tlass, a virulent
anti-Semite who even claimed in a book that Jews kill non-Jews to use
their blood to make pastries, arranges for the release of the whole
group, and puts them in touch with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
[Vidino, 2006, pp. 222]
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr. [Source: ABC]Italian resident Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, who previously informed for the CIA on extremists in Albania (see February 17, 2003), moves from Rome to Milan to live with a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000 and Summer 2000).
Al-Zawahiri’s associate, Mahmoud Es Sayed, and Nasr arrive in Milan at
the same time, and it appears their movements are coordinated. Nasr
actually lives in Es Sayed’s apartment and the pair make use of two
radical mosques in Milan, the Via Quaranta mosque, which is their
headquarters, and the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI), which is
associated with a cell of radical Islamists that works with al-Qaeda
and appears to have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000 and March 2001).
The ICI has a reputation as the most radical Islamic center in Italy,
was a key supply point for Muslims fighting in Bosnia (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995), and was connected to the first World Trade Center bombing (see Late 1993-1994).
Nasr serves as deputy imam at the ICI and preaches anti-US sermons.
Italian law enforcement authorities monitor him with bugs in his
apartment and through a tap on his phone, finding out that after 9/11
he recruits Muslims to go and fight in Afghanistan. He does not seem to
be directly involved in serious illegal activity, but the information
the Italians gain helps them monitor other radicals. His relationship
with the CIA during his time in Italy is unclear, but in one monitored
call after 9/11 he appears to be dissuading another radical from
attacking Jews and in another he tells an associate not to carry out a
car bombing. [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005; Vidino, 2006, pp. 242] The CIA will kidnap Nasr in 2003 (see February 17, 2003).
In August 2000, Nabil al-Marabh moves to Detroit, Michigan, to enroll in a truck driving course in nearby Dearborn. [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
According to an informant who will claim that al-Marabh confided to him
in 2002, al-Marabh is taking instructions from a mystery figure in
Chicago known only as “al Mosul”, which means “boss” or “person in
charge” in Arabic. Al Mosul asks al-Marabh to attend the driving school
to get a commercial truck driver’s license. Also according to this
informant, al-Marabh and Raed Hijazi have plans to steal a fuel truck
from a rest stop in New York or New Jersey and detonate it in the
heavily traveled Lincoln or Holland tunnels leading into New York City,
but the plan is foiled when Hijazi is arrested in October 2000 (see October 2000) for an attempted bombing in Jordan (see November 30, 1999). [Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003] Al-Marabh may have moved to Detroit to avoid government scrutiny in Boston after stabbing a roommate in May 2000 (see May 30, 2000-March 2001).
His wife and son apparently continue to live at his long-time Boston
address until September 2000 and then move to elsewhere in the city
without leaving a forwarding address. [New York Times, 9/18/2001; Boston Herald, 9/19/2001; New York Times, 9/21/2001]
Al-Marabh continues to live in Detroit until January 2001. The
Washington Post will note that al-Marabh “appears to [move] every few
months or continually [change] his residence on official documents ? at
one point listing an address in Dearborn, Michigan, that is a truck
stop.” [Washington Post, 9/21/2001; Knight Ridder, 5/23/2003]
He repeatedly claims to Michigan state officials that he lost his
license, and secures temporary driver’s licenses without photographs. [Washington Post, 9/21/2001]
He receives five driver’s licenses in Michigan over a period of 13
months in addition to carrying driver’s licenses from Massachusetts,
Illinois, Florida, and Ontario, Canada. [Toronto Star, 10/26/2001] He moves to Toronto, Canada in January 2001 (see January 2001-Summer 2001),
but will return to Detroit in August 2001 and will still be getting
duplicate Michigan licenses and looking for a tractor-trailer driving
job in the week after 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/21/2001; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002]
A
former member of the militant group Abu Sayyaf claims that the group is
still being funded by a Saudi charity tied to bin Laden’s
brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa. The Philippine branch of the
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) was founded in 1991 by
Khalifa. This former member, who uses the alias “Abu Anzar,” says the
IIRO continues to fund the Abu Sayyaf after Khalifa’s arrest in the US
in late 1994 (see December 16, 1994-May 1995).
Anzar says, “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the
legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest go to terrorist
operations.” Anzar is said to be recruited by Edwin Angeles and his
right hand man; since Angeles has been revealed as a deep undercover
operative (see 1991-Early February 1995), it is speculated Anzar may have been working undercover too. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/9/2000]
A 1994 Philippine intelligence report listed a Gemma Cruz as the
treasurer and board member of the IIRO. In 1998, Gemma Cruz-Araneta
became the tourism secretary in the cabinet of new president Joseph
Estrada. Anzar claims that in 1993 and 1994 he toured IIRO projects
with Khalifa and Cruz-Araneta and identifies her as the same person who
is now tourism secretary. Cruz-Araneta denies all the charges as a case
of mistaken identity and retains her position in the cabinet. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/11/2000; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8/12/2000]
In 2006, the US government will officially list the Philippine IIRO
branch as a terrorism financier and state that it is still being run by
one of Khalifa’s associates (see August 3, 2006).
Italian intelligence successfully wiretaps an al-Qaeda cell in Milan, Italy, starting in late 1999. [Boston Globe, 8/4/2002]
In a wiretapped conversation from this day, Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman,
a section chief in Yemen’s Political Security Organization (PSO -
roughly the equivalent to the FBI in the US) traveling on a diplomatic
passport (see Spring-Summer 1998),
talks about a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving
aircraft and the sky. The conversation takes place in a car on the way
to a terrorist summit near Bologna (see August 12, 2000 and Shortly After),
and the person Abdulrahman talks to is Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close
associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000). There are several significant aspects to the conversation:
Abdulrahman makes comments indicating he has foreknowledge of the 9/11
attacks. He says that he is “studying airlines,” comments, “Our focus
is only on the air,” and tells Es Sayed to remember the words “above
the head.” He also says that next time they meet he hopes to bring Es
Sayed “a window or piece of the airplane,” and that the security on
Alitalia and at Rome airport is poor. The name of the operation is
given as “Jihadia,” and Abdulrahman says, “the big blow will come from
the other country: one of those blows no one can ever forget.” He adds:
“[It is] moving from south to north, from east to west: whoever created
this plan is crazy, but he’s also a genius. It will leave them
speechless.” He also says: “We can fight any power using candles and
airplanes: they will not be able to stop us with even their most
powerful weapons. We must hit them. And keep your head up.… Remember,
the danger in the airports.… If it happens the newspapers from all over
the world will write about it.”
Es Sayed remarks, “I know brothers who went to America with the trick
of the wedding publications.” The phrase “Big wedding” is sometimes
used by al-Qaeda as code for a bombing or attack, including 9/11 (see November 30, 1999 and Late Summer 2001), so, taken together with Abdulrahman’s remarks, this indicates an unconventional attack in the US using aircraft;
The two discuss training camps in Yemen, which are “proceeding on a
world scale.” They also mention youth in Italy, and presumably the
youth are training;
Es Sayed says, “my dream is building an Islamic state,” and Abdulrahman
replies that this is possible because the Yemeni government is weak and
“sooner or later we will dominate it;”
Es Sayed asks after a person named Ayman, evidently al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri;
Abdulrahman twice mentions the name of Abdul Mejid, apparently a
reference to Abdul Mejid al-Zindani, a radical leader in Yemen and
associate of Osama bin Laden (see January-August 1998);
Es Sayed makes the cryptic comment, “One must be cautious, like in Iran; not a single photo.”
Beginning
in October 2000, FBI experts will help Italian police analyze the
intercepts and warnings. Related conversations are overheard early the
next year (see January 24, 2001 and February 2001).
Neither Italy nor the FBI will fully understand their meaning until
after 9/11, but apparently the Italians will understand enough to give
the US an attack warning in March 2001 (see March 2001). After 9/11,
this conversation and others like it will cause US intelligence to
think there may be a link between the 9/11 plot and Yemen’s PSO. [Los Angeles Times, 5/29/2002; Guardian, 5/30/2002; Washington Post, 5/31/2002; Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002; Vidino, 2006, pp. 224-5]
Author Lorenzo Vidino will later comment: “The chilling conversation
alarmed officials before 9/11, but it took on a completely different
resonance after the attacks had taken place. [Abdulrahman], who had
close connections to the highest ranks of al-Qaeda, likely knew about
the plan in advance and had told Es Sayed about it.” [Vidino, 2006, pp. 226]
Italian
counterterrorist authorities monitor a summit of leading terrorist
operatives near Bologna. Attendees at the meeting, which is arranged
through an extremist mosque in Milan called the Islamic Cultural
Institute, include:
Mahmoud Es Sayed, a close associate of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Before Spring 2000);
Abdulsalam Ali Abdulrahman, a section chief with Yemen’s Political
Security Organization (PSO—roughly equivalent to the FBI). Es Sayed and
Abdulrahman are overheard discussing an attack using aircraft on their
way to the summit, indicating they have foreknowledge of 9/11 (see August 12, 2000);
Ayub Usama Saddiq Ali, another close associate of al-Zawahiri’s; and
Mohammed Fazazi, the spiritual leader of the Moroccan group Salafia
Jihadia, which is responsible for a 2003 attack in Casablanca (see May 16, 2003). Fazazi is also an imam at Hamburg’s al Quds mosque, which is attended by the core cell of 9/11 pilots (see Early 1996 and April 1, 1999).
Fazazi’s presence indicates a further connection between the cell in
Milan, which is under heavy surveillance by Italian authorities (see 2000), but this link is not exploited to prevent 9/11. [Vidino, 2006, pp. 230]
Raed
Hijazi, Nabil al-Marabh’s former Boston roommate, is tried and
convicted in Jordan for his role in planned millennium bombings in that
country. (Hijazi is tried in absentia since he has yet to be arrested,
but will later be retried in person and reconvicted.) In the wake of
the trial, Jordanian officials send information to US investigators
that shows Nabil al-Marabh and future 9/11 hijacker Hamza A